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A crucial element of politics... is the struggle to define social reality and
to interpret people's inchoate aspirations and needs. Particular words and
expressions often become focal in such struggles, functioning as keywords,
sites at which the meaning of social existence is negotiated and contested.
Keywords typically carry unspoken assumptions and connotations that can
powerfully influence the discourses they permeate-in part by constituting




In the United States the concept of the "role model" has
emerged with increasing frequency in both the social and legal
domains. Indeed, talk about role models has become an important
aspect of social, political, and legal discourse. People argue about
whether professional women have enough role models,2 whether
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' Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword
of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 310 (1994) (citations omitted).
2 See generally Berenice Fisher, Wandering in the Wilderness: The Search for Women
Role Models, 13 SIGNS 211 (1988). It is interesting to note here that the debate about
the need for such role models not only occurs among individuals with different
outlooks on life and social relations, but also within individuals themselves. For
example, Fisher reports that when she heard for the first time, in the 1970s, "the
claim that.., women.., needed female role models to make [their] way through the
world," she was very angry. Id. at 211. Angry, (1) because that claim appeared to
deemphasize the idea of the independent woman for which she had struggled, (2)
because the emphasis on role models "sets women up for cooptation when the
powers-that-be offer us role models instead ofjustice," and (3) because of the "subtle
and not-so-subtle ways [in which] such advocacy perpetuates the logic of domination,
by encouraging us to look up to 'special women' rather than to look around us for the
women with whom we might act." Id. at 212.
But writing in 1988 Fischer had a less hostile view toward the notion of role
models. By then she "understood more fully the possibilities of role models for the
lives of contemporary women." Id. at 214; see also Nancy A. Roeske & Karen Lake,
Role Modelsfor Women Medical Students, 52J. MED. EDUC. 459,459 (1977) ("Increasing
numbers of women are entering medical school. However, there are still relatively
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the underrepresentation of minorities' in various occupations and
positions of social and political influence (and the educational crisis
in the inner cities) can be explained in terms of the lack of role
models,4 whether one can be a role model to those who belong to
a different racial group or gender,5 whether membership in a
few women physicians. Thus, many women medical students have not had an
opportunity to know a woman physician prior to entering medical school. This
situation has led to questions regarding the need for women physicians to serve as
role models for women medical students.").
' The "minority" that is the primary focus of this Article is African Americans,
although a great deal of the analysis and observation could be applied to other
minority groups as well. I might also mention here that in this Article, I shall use the
terms "black" and "African American" interchangeably.
Although some parts of this Article deal with the notion of role model as it
applies to women, and although a great deal of analysis could be applied to women,
I must point out, lest I be taken to promise more than I can deliver, that the Article's
focus is the rhetoric of role model as it applies to African Americans.
4 See Verbatim, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1992, at A23 ("[T]he current statistics for
minority higher education are discouraging.... [T]he lack of African-American role
models has been cited in study after study as one of the prime reasons our youngsters
do not pursue college educations and certain career options like science and
engineering." (quoting Rep. Conyers)).
Indeed, some cities and school districts have established, or are in the process
of establishing, special schools exclusively for black male students; their idea is to
provide black male role models for these students to compensate for a perceived lack
of appropriate male role models in their home lives. See Michael J. Weber, Note,
Immersed in an Educational Crisis: Alternative Programs for African-American Males, 45
STAN. L. REV. 1099, 1099-1101 (1993) ("In response [to the educational crisis among
African American males] several public school districts have proposed or implement-
ed African-American all-male schools (or classes) in a controversial attempt to
improve the academic performance and self-esteem of African-American boys....
Although these programs are not identical, they share certain characteristics ... [one
of which is the] attempt to provide African-American male role models or mentors with
whom the students can identify." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Note,
Inner-City Single-Sex Schools: Educational Reform or Invidious Discrimination, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1741, 1744 (1992) (discussing the constitutionality of such programs and
explaining that "[many educators ... maintain that single-sex schools [for boys]
should employ a high proportion of Black male teachers because Black boys-often
abandoned by their fathers-need Black male role models").
The educational crisis among African Americans, especially African American
males, has reached a frightening level. A recent news report stated that the
percentage of African American males going to college, as depressingly low as it once
was, has in fact decreased in the last few years. See Ernesto PortilloJr., High School
Achievers: Minority Grads Opted for School Over "Cool", SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,June
17, 1994, at Al, A27. What is even more depressing are the reasons that young
African Americans gave for choosing not to go to college: that it is not "cool" to
appear brainy and studious, that they will become outsiders in the community of
people that surround and matter to them. See id. One African American high school
student said that he was called a "white boy" by another African American student
because he was seen to be intelligent and studious. As this student put it, "You can't
be cool if you're smart. That's the kind of thing I grew up with." Id. at Al.
' Professor Derrick Bell left the Harvard Law School after a long and unsuccessful
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particular racial minority group in and of itself makes an individual
an appropriate role model for members of that group,6 and even
whether characters in television programs can serve as appropriate
(positive) role models for their audience. 7  "Role model" has
campaign to persuade the school to hire an African American woman professor.
Even though Harvard had a number of African American male professors, including
Professor Bell himself, and several white female professors, Professor Bell felt that
neither the male African American professors nor the white female professors could
be role models for female African American students. See Fox Butterfield, Harvard
Law School Torn By Race Issue, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1990, at A20. The issue also
sparked a lawsuit against Harvard University brought by Harvard Law School
students. See Harvard Law Sch. Coalition for Civil Rights v. President of Harvard
College, 595 N.E.2d 316 (Mass. 1992). The students' complaint alleged that the
absence of members of certain groups on the faculty was a result of the school's
discriminatory hiring practice, which violated a Massachusetts law that prohibited
discriminatory employment practices against certain protected groups. See id. at 317-
18. The SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts dismissed the complaint because
the students did not have standing and partly because "the injuries they complain[ed]
of-denial of 'perspectives,' 'life experiences,' and 'access to ... role models'-[were]
not within the area of concerh of the statute." Id. at 319.
The issue of role models in general as well as the specific question whether
African American women law professors were needed as role models for African
American women law students were explored in a symposium several years ago. See
Symposium, Black Women Law Professors: Building a Community at the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1990-1991) [hereinafter Black Women
Law Professors]. The symposium was apparently inspired by, and was intended to be
a response to, the controversy at Harvard. In the introduction to the symposium,
Emma ColemanJordan writes: "We undertook these reflections in response to two
widely-publicized events at Harvard Law School." Emma C.Jordan, Images of Black
Women in the Legal Academy, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 4 (1990-1991). As Jordan
put it, a response from African American women professors was necessary because,
even though the controversy revolved around the need for African American women
professors to act as role models for African American female students, the intense
media coverage "contained a wide variety of comments and opinions, from black and
white students at Harvard, from Harvard faculty and faculty at other schools....
[C]omments from black women law professors were a glaring omission from the body
of opinion rapidly accumulating in the wake of Professor Bell's leave of absence." Id.
6 The recent controversy at Northwestern University School of Law involving the
candidacy of a minority professor raised the issue of whether a black professor who
has a white Australian father and a black Cuban mother, but who was born and raised
in this country, could be an appropriate role model for black students in the school
and therefore should be considered as a minority candidate. The issue was picked
up by the national media and was given some play, although not always accurately or
fairly. See, e.g.,Jan C. Greenburg et al., Race Issue Sparks Hiring Controversy at NU Law
School, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 13, 1994, § 3, at 3; Melanie Kirkpatrick, Rule of Law: Not
Black Enough for This Law School, WALL ST.J.,Jan. 11, 1995, at A15; Not Black Enough,
NEW REPUBLIC,Jan. 9, 1995, at 8; Rohan Preston, Battle to Keep Black Professor Leaves
Bruised Egos and Reputations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at B8; Racism Takes an Odd
Turn at NU, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1994, at 24; Bob Secter, Black ProfFails Political Test,
CHI. SUN TIMES, Dec. 11, 1994, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
' During the 1992 presidential election, Vice President Dan Quayle accused the
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therefore emerged as a key term in the discursive landscape through
which individuals debate and contest the nature and meaning of
social and political life in this country.
Quite often the discourse (and controversy) concerning role
models, popular and scholarly, does not revolve around empirical
claims.8 Rather, the term is invoked as a means of making and
contesting normative claims about the desirability of certain
activities and as a rhetorical device to defend desired objectives and
to attack unacceptable commitments. 9  Its attractiveness as a
rhetorical device has resulted, to some degree, from its elasticity
and indeterminacy, characteristics that allow people to invoke the
term to assert varying normative positions under various circum-
stances without actually making an extended argument to defend
those positions.
10
fictional character Murphy Brown of being a bad role model for unmarried females
by "mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and calling it just
another 'life-style choice.'" Lance Morrow, But Seriously Folks.. ., TIME,June 1, 1992,
at 29, 30. What was interesting about the Vice President's comment was that he
made it in a speech concerning unmarried young black females in the inner cities,
even though, as Time magazine noted, "few young black females watch Murphy
Brown." Id. ("The show, which in overall audience is the third most popular on
network television, ranks 56th in popularity amongAmerican blacks."); see also Quayle
Speaks and Culture Has a Cow, CHI. TRIB., May 24, 1992, at 6 ("WilliamJ. Bennett, the
Bush administration's first drug policy chief,... told recovering addicts that Bart
Simpson, the resident brat on 'The Simpsons' TV cartoon series, was a lousy role
model.") [hereinafter Quayle Speaks].
Even companies have been referred to as role models. See New '90s-Role Models,
MGMT. TODAY, Mar. 1992, at 3 (referring to a particular company as a "role model"
for other companies on account of its conservative style of asset management).
8 Even though "there's little evidence in social-science literature that children
actually adopt the behavior of athletes they adore," that has not stopped people from
talking about the importance of professional athletes who act as good or positive role
models. David Gelman et al., I'm Not a Role Model, NEWSWEEK,June 28, 1993, at 56,
57. Gary Alan Fine, head of the Sociology Department at the University of Georgia,
aptly observed that "[t]here are not going to be many who say, 'Well, MichaelJordan
gambles, then I'm gonna gamble.'" Id.
' Stanley Fish describes rhetoric as "the art of constructing the (verbal) ground
upon which you then confidently walk." STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING As
FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO 170 (1994). For a brief history of the
emergence, decline, and current reemergence of rhetoric as a "system of education
and communication," see John Bender & David E. Wellbery, Rhetoricality: On the
Modernist Return of Rhetoric, in THE ENDS OF RHETORIC: HISTORY, THEORY, PRACTICE
3, 5 (John Bender & David E. Wellbery eds., 1990).
10 Martha Nussbaum makes a similar argument in relation to those whom she
characterizes as antiessentialist theorists. She argues that antiessentialists assert a link
between essentialism, on the one hand, and "an ignorance of history [and a] lack of
sensitivity to the voices of women and minorities," on the other, without extended
discussion, "as if they were in the know about some new and decisive discovery that
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In some contexts, the term means "mentor," and in other
circumstances, the expression means "hero."" Sometimes the
power of the role model is restricted to a specific segment of the
model's behavior, and thus is role-specific. For example, a profes-
sional can serve as a role model to those who aspire to enter that
profession. Thus, a good medical doctor can be a positive role
model to medical students, and a famous lawyer can inspire law
students,12 but only in relation to the professional lives of the
particular role model followers. Sometimes, however, the term
refers to a comprehensively influential individual. In these
situations, the role aspirant's "emulation may ... extend[] to a
wider array of behaviors and values of these persons." 3 A parent
or a school teacher may serve as a role model in this comprehensive
sense."t Here the reference point transcends a specific role to
include the sum total of roles that constitute the individual. When
people talk about parents as role models, they do not mean that
children will just imitate their parents in relation to specific and
defined activities or professions, but rather that parents' entire set
of commitments, actions, and habits will shape the attitudes and
aspirations of their children.
The concept of role model has not always been part of the
vocabulary of discourse in this country. Indeed, it only emerged as
such in the 1950s, mainly in the social sciences and particularly in
psychological and sociological studies. It was later adopted in
popular usage and has now become part of legal discourse. 5 This
removes the need for argument." Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social
Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202, 205 (1992).
Similarly, in a recent Supreme Court decision,Justice Scalia invoked the concept
of role model to justify an important legal conclusion without explaining why he
invoked the term or what meaning it was meant to carry. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395-96 (1995). Scalia devoted merely a sentence to the
concept, and yet he apparently relied on it to reach a significant constitutional
conclusion. See infra notes 51, 154, 191.
" See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text (discussing the use of and
confusion between the terms).
12 See e.g., Derrick Bell, In Memory of Thurgood Marshall, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212,
213 (1993) ("Thurgood Marshall, like it or not, was a model to black lawyers and law
students across the country.").
Is ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 357 (enlarged ed.
1968).
"' See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979) (stating that a "teacher serves
as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their
perceptions and values").
Is See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2396 (1995) (discussing
the role model effect of student athletes); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 643 (1992)
1996] 1381
1382 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1377
Article will explore the genealogy16 of the concept of role model
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing emulation of teachers in the context of school
prayer); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989) (noting the
shortcomings of a role model theory used by lower courts); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987) (discussing emulation of teachers in the context of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78-79 (discussing a
noncitizen teacher's influence on students as a role model); Avery v. Homewood City
Bd. of Educ., 674 F.2d 337, 341 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (rejecting arguments that
.unwed parenthood is per se proof of immorality and that a parent of an illegitimate
child is an unfit role model"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 943 (1983); Andrews v. Drew Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist., 507 F.2d 611, 616-17 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a role model
theory that justified prohibiting unwed mothers from filling positions as teachers'
aides); Marsh v. Flint Bd. of Educ., 708 F. Supp. 821, 825 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (noting
the repudiation of the role model theory in school hirings); Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D. Neb. 1986) (finding that a "negative role model
policy" did not discriminate on the basis of race), aff'd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987);
Pontoon v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 632 F. Supp. 1056, 1065 (E.D. Va. 1986)
(discussing why the bad moral example set by an unwed pregnant woman is not a
legitimate concern in the teaching profession); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546
F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (upholding the constitutionality of a collective
bargaining agreement with an affirmative action clause that recognized the "vitally
important" role that minority teachers play as role models to minority students), aff'd,
746 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1984), and rev'd, 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986);Jatczak
v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 703 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that an employer's
refusal to hire a woman due to the company's supposed need for a male "role model"
was discriminatory); Harvey v. YWCA, 533 F. Supp. 949, 952 (W.D.N.C. 1982)
(discussing whether an unwed pregnant woman could offer herself to teenagers as a
role model for an alternative lifestyle); Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 498 F. Supp.
732, 754 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (requiring that the Board of Education recall first all laid-
off black tenured teachers to ensure that students would be provided with role
models).
Legal discourse on the concept of role model has not been restricted to the
courts but has been taken up by the legal academy as well. See, e.g., Regina Austin,
Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 557 (asserting that "the use of role models
has become a pretext for continuing and expanding the economic and ideological war
on unwed black mothers"); Black Women Law Professors, supra note 5 (exploring the
issue whether African American women law professors are needed as role models for
African American women law students); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The
Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077,
1104-09 (1991) (noting that black elected officials are role models within the black
community). See generally Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action As a Majoritarian Device:
Or, Do You Really Want to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991) (objecting
to the role model status imposed on successful members of minority groups through
affirmative action by dominant America). In legal discourse the concept is often
invoked in the context of affirmative action, where it is offered as ajustification for
particular hiring or school admissions decisions.
16 By "genealogy" I simply mean the historical development of the concept, the
assumptions and meanings that the term has carried over the years, and how those
assumptions and understandings might have been historically contingent. Therefore,
one purpose of genealogical inquiry, to quote Michel Foucault, is "to dig deeply to
show how things have been historically contingent, for such and such reason
intelligible but not necessary[, to] . . . make the intelligible appear against a
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and the circumstances that gave rise to its emergence.1 7 In this
regard, it might be useful to ask whether the historical fact of racial
divisions in this country has contributed to the popularity of
discourse on the concept of role model, at least in the popular
media and in ordinary daily conversations. As the historian E.J.
Hobsbawm has observed, "[c]oncepts, of course, are not part of
free-floating philosophical discourse, but socially, historically and
locally rooted, and must be explained in terms of these realities."
18
The immense popularity of the concept of role model in the United
States and the frequency with which it is invoked in daily conversa-
tions and in political discourse 9 suggest that its popularity as a
rhetorical device derives largely from past and present local
conditions.
background of emptiness, and deny its necessity..., [and to show] that what exists
is far from filling all possible spaces." MICHEL FOUCAULT, Friendship As a Way of Life,
in FOUCAULT LIVE 208 (Sylvere Lotringer ed., John Johnston trans., 1989); see also
William E. Connolly, Beyond Good and Evil: The Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault,
21 POL. THEORY 365, 367 (1993).
Another purpose of genealogical inquiry is to uncover the nature of social
institutions and social structures that have made the discursive landscape seem
necessary and inevitable to see how they can be reconstituted and reconceptualized.
Put simply, genealogical inquiry has twin purposes. It enables us to critique ideology
that structures people's views and perceptions without those views and perceptions
being points of reflection. See Fraser & Gordon, supra note 1, at 310-11. It also gives
us the means to develop a fuller context within which discursive shifts and
reconceptualizations are possible. See id.
17 My desire to inquire into the genealogy of the term is partly inspired by the
work of the late Raymond Williams. As Williams observed, the purpose of looking
to the past is not to discover "the 'proper' or 'stricter' meaning of a word by
reference to its origins... [and] to produce what can best be called a sacral attitude
to words... [with] corresponding complaints ofvulgar contemporary misunderstand-
ing and misuse." RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND
SOCIETY 20 (rev. ed. 1985). Rather, it is to explore how historical changes-changes
in social structures and circumstances-alter the relationship between words or
phrases and concepts. See id. at 21.
Raymond Williams's work on culture and cultural criticism has inspired many
others to inquire into the genealogy of keywords or phrases. As this project neared
its completion, I came across an excellent article by Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon
that set out to explore "dependency as a keyword of the U.S. welfare state and
reconstruct its genealogy." Fraser & Gordon, supra note 1, at 310. They were also
inspired by Williams's work. See id. It is a testimony to the power of Williams's
intelligence and the acuteness of his insights about the human condition that his work
continues to inspire with equal enthusiasm people of diverse intellectual interests
such as philosophers, cultural critics, historians, and legal scholars.
's EJ. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780, at 9 (1990).
'9 For example, the media invoked the term 249 times in relation to OJ. Simpson
in the few weeks between his arrest onJune 17, 1995, and the day I conducted this
search onJuly 7, 1995. Search of LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (July 7, 1994).
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My aim is also clarificatory, however, because the concept of
role model is more often invoked than examined. When individuals
invoke the concept of role model, they refer to a diverse set of
political virtues (positive role models) and vices (negative role
models). An inquiry into the various meanings that the concept of
role model has carried might well lead us to be skeptical about some
of the ways in which the term is currently used in both the legal and
social domains. Indeed, this Article claims, among other things,
that people often use the term as a convenient substitute for dealing
with real problems. They use the term to shift attention away from
institutional and material issues to questions of mere cultural
signification. In doing so, they emphasize individuals and individual
acts to the exclusion of institutions and collective acts and con-
straints. To use C. Wright Mills's words in another context, com-
mentators use the concept of role model in its "hypnotic though
frivolous shape, [to] divert attention from problems of power and
authority and social reality in general." 0
This Article does not, however, aim to reject totally the concept
of role model. Indeed, it is the desire to salvage a defensible and
20 C. WRIGHT MILLS, On Knowledge and Power, in POWER, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE:
THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF C. WRIGHT MILLS 599,612 (Irving L. Horowitz ed., 1963).
Writing about intellectual work, Mills observes:
Intellectual work is related to power in numerous ways, among them these:
with ideas one can uphold orjustify power, attempting to transform it into
legitimate authority; with ideas one can also debunk authority, attempting
to reduce it to mere power, to discredit it as arbitrary or as unjust. With
ideas one can conceal or expose the holders of power. And with ideas of
more hypnotic though frivolous shape, one can divert attention from problems of
power and authority and social reality in general.
Id. (emphasis added).
Cornel West refers to the concept of role model as a "glib formulation[]."
CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 31 (1993). Discussing what he saw as the racial
reasoning of the black leadership that prevailed during the Clarence Thomas/Anita
Hill Senate hearing, he comments:
Unfortunately, most black leaders remained caught in a framework of racial
reasoning-even when they opposed Thomas and/or supported Hill. Rarely
did we have a black leader highlight the moral content of a mature black
identity, accent the crucial role of coalition strategy in the struggle for
justice, or promote the ideal of black cultural democracy. Instead, the debate
evolved around glib formulations of a black 'role model' based on mere pigmenta-
tion, an atavistic defense of blackness that mirrors the increasing xenophobia
in American life, and circled around a silence about the ugly authoritarian
practices in black America that range from sexual harassment to indescrib-
able violence against women.
Id. (emphasis added).
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coherent meaning for the term, in the face of the rhetorical threat
that attempts to endow it with everything and thus to rob it of any
meaning at all by trivializing it, that has led me to reflect on the
concept. In this regard, my concern about the manipulation of the
coricept of role model parallels the concern David Couzens Hoy
expresses in relation to the term "ideology": "it is used in so many
different senses that it has become meaningless."
21
I sympathize with the concern of some minority legal scholars
who argue that the use of the concept of role model has negative
consequences,22 such as turning the issue of material inequalities
21 David C. Hoy, Deconstructing "Ideology-, 18 PHIL. & LITERATURE 1, 4 (1994).
There are more parallels between Hoy's inquiry and mine. Just like the concept of
"real interests," to which the notion of ideology supposedly stands in opposition,
people sometimes use the concept of role model so abstractly that its explanatory
value with respect to specific cases and circumstances is very low. See e.g., infra notes
51, 154 & 191 (discussing Justice Scalia's use of the concept of role model in
Vernonia). And at other times, again like "real interests," of which ideology is
supposed to be a false imitation, some people invoke the concept of role model in
"common sense" ways, such that it has not been subjected to critical scrutiny to assess
whether those "common sense" views might be historically and culturally contingent,
rather than self-evident truths. See infra part III.A.3.c. Hoy's statement about what
he believes to be the poststructuralists' view of "real interest" can easily apply to the
notion of role model:
If I read poststructuralists like Foucault, Derrida, and Laclau and Mouffe
correctly, they are skeptical about the possibility of identifying these real
interests in a substantive way. That is, either the real interests will be so
universal and abstract as to be unexplanatory of concrete historical cases,
or they will be merely attributes of common sense, ones about which we
should be historically suspicious since the common sense of one age may
not be the same as that of another. The poststructuralists therefore have
little use for the concept of ideology, at least in the specific sense of
distorted group consciousness.
Hoy, supra, at 7.
Many scholars of color are at best ambivalent about using the concept as a
justification for affirmative action hiring programs. Anita Allen expressed it this way:
Role models can be extremely important, especially in the lives of young
adults. But ... the role model argument is deeply problematic. It mis-
characterizes black women's actual and potential contributions. The
argument encourages the inference that black women are inferior
intellectuals and that white teachers have no role to play in addressing the
special needs of black students.
Anita L. Allen, On Being a Role Model, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 22, 25 (1990-1991).
At another point Allen observes: "One problem with the role model argument is that
while it trumpets our necessity, it whispers our inferiority." Id. at 37.
Others, such as Richard Delgado, have specifically rejected the concept. After
giving a number of reasons why minority scholars ought to decline to be inscribed as
role models, Delgado concludes.
You can do other more honorable, authentic things. You can be a mentor.
You can be an "organic intellectual," offering analysis and action programs
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into a mere problem of psychology and perception, recharacterizing
institutional and structural constraints as individual failings on the
part of the supposed role model and lack of ambition on the part
of the supposed role model follower, and creating the possibility
that the concept will be invoked to affirm and sustain racial
tokenism.23 Despite these negative realities and possibilities,
however, we should not reject the concept of role model in its
entirety. Rather, we must investigate the "taken-for-granted"
meanings of the term, reveal how the ideology of disempowerment
characterizes those meanings, and rearticulate the concept as one
of resistance, empowerment, and transformation.
Part I explores the genealogy of the term "role model." It
examines the various ways and circumstances in which individuals
have understood and invoked the term over the last four decades.
As Part I illustrates, two distinct meanings emerged early on: the
"role imitation" view and the "comprehensive" view. Both of these
approaches enjoy logical and descriptive support. Part I also
identifies a recent shift in the use of the concept of role model away
for our people. You can be a matriarch, a patriarch, a legend, or a
provocateur. You can be a socially committed professional who marches to
your own drummer. You can even be yourself. But to the ad, ROLE
MODEL WANTED, the correct answer, in my view, is: NOT ME!
Delgado, supra note 15, at 1230-31 (citations omitted).
Interestingly, some minority scholars seem to be simultaneously attracted to and
suspicious of the concept of role model. For example, compare Derrick Bell's
observation that Justice Marshall "was disdainful of the value of 'role models' like
himself," Bell, supra note 12, at 213, with the following: "It is very sad but no less
clear that black women must assume much of the future leadership burden in the
racial struggle. It is thus imperative that we provide models and mentors." ELEANOR
KERLOW, POISONED IVY: How EGOS, IDEOLOGY, AND POWER POLITICS ALMOST
RUINED HARVARD LAW SCHOOL 94 (1994) (quoting Bell during his unsuccessful
attempt to persuade Harvard Law School to hire a minority woman professor).
2S Derrick Bell, in a memorial to Justice Marshall, writes, "[Marshall] was
disdainful of the value of 'role models' like himself in a society that deems
racial tokenism both progress and proof that personal failings, and not racism,
explain the meager achievements of so many blacks." Bell, supra note 12, at 213;
see also Linda S. Greene, Tokens, Role Models, and Pedagogical Politics: Lamentations
of an African American Female Law Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 87-89 (1990-
1991) (noting that "the symbolic aspects of our presence often dominate our
experiences" and describing role modeling as "a seductive and debilitating business");
Lani Guinier, Of Gentlemen and Role Models, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 93, 99 (1990-
1991) (preferring the term "mentor" to "role model" due to concerns about the way
the role model argument diminishes the contributions of role models); Angela Harris,
Women of Color in Legal Education: Representing La Mestiza, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.
107, 108-09 (1990-1991) (discussing the pressure on minority scholars "to prove [our]
specialness once and for all" and observing that "[t]he price of specialness is the
gilded cage of the token").
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from the role imitation and comprehensive views. More and more,
the concept refers to race and gender specific activities or interests.
I suggest reasons why that shift has occurred, why it might be
peculiarly American, and what purposes it might serve.
Part II engages in a critical evaluation of the two primary
historical conceptions of role model and argues that the recent
departure from them toward a usage of the concept of role model
that focuses on race and gender is sometimes logically unsound,
descriptively incoherent, and normatively suspect. I also argue,
however, that this new approach may sometimes be useful and make
sense in terms of what the noted political theorist, Charles Taylor,
has referred to as "the politics of recognition."24 Part II.C devel-
ops the notion of the politics of recognition, drawing from the
works of George Herbert Mead, Jfirgen Habermas, Charles Taylor,
and Axel Honneth and then explores the relationship between the
politics of recognition and the concept of role model.
Part III examines how each conception of role model-the role
imitation view, the comprehensive view, and the politics of recogni-
tion view-has fared in the jurisprudence of the courts. I conclude
that courts express inconsistent views regarding the usefulness of
the concept of role model in the context of adjudication. Likewise,
the courts that have accepted the term into their jurisprudence do
not agree on what meaning to attach to it. I also draw two general
conclusions from the jurisprudential "career" of the concept of role
model. First, courts invoke the rhetoric of role model to defend
normative positions without making extended arguments to justify
those positions. Second, the courts embrace the term as jurispru-
dentially meaningful and precise when the issue involves the
exclusion of marginal groups from political and social life. When
minority claimants invoke this rhetoric to support normative
positions that do not correspond with the horizons of significance
of members of the court,25 however, courts debunk the rhetoric as
amorphous and jurisprudentially suspect (in the same way that
general societal discrimination is said to be amorphous).2 6
Part IV deals with likely objections to including the concept of
role model within the politics of recognition. These objections are
24 Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND "THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" (Amy Gutmann ed. 1992).
2' For a description of the notion of"horizons of significance," see infra note 121
and accompanying text.
21 See infra note 166.
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premised on the fear that including the concept of role model as a
version of the politics of recognition devalues, or has the potential
of devaluing, two important precepts: individual agency and
cultural integrity. These objections, however, rest on erroneous
historical and empirical assumptions and are either unwarranted or
insincere.
I. ROLE MODELS: THE HISTORY OF A CONCEPT
The concept of role model is a rhetorical device. Like other
rhetorical devices, it emerged within a specific context and has a
certain history. A full understanding of the concept requires a
genealogical inquiry. This Part provides a brief account of the
various ways in which individuals have invoked the term over the
years.27 But before I begin this genealogical inquiry, let me
distinguish the term role model from two terms with which it has
often been confused: mentor2 8 and hero.29
27 For a comprehensive history of role theory, see BRUCEJ. BIDDLE, ROLE THEORY:
EXPECTATIONS, IDENTITIES, AND BEHAVIORS (1979) [hereinafter ROLE THEORY
EXPECTATIONS] and ROLE THEORY: CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH (Bruce J. Biddle &
EdwinJ. Thomas eds., 1979) [hereinafter ROLE THEORY CONCEPTS]. For an attempt
to reformulate role theory with a Nietzscheian insight, see Charles D. Kaplan & Karl
Weiglus, Beneath Role Theoy: Reformulating a Theoy with Nietzsche's Philosophy, 6 PHIL.
& SOC. CRrrICTiSM 289 (1979).
28 Paul Carrington, for example, has used the terms "role model" and "mentor"
interchangeably:
The idea that race or gender is important in mentoring relationships has the
unwelcome characteristic of being segregationist in effect. It suggests to
students and faculty that a Mexican-American student, for example, ought
to have a Mexican-American role model, not a black or a white role model. It
suggests that persons desiring career counseling should expect to receive it
from one of their own.
Paul D. Carrington, Diversity!, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1105, 1149 (emphasis added). For
an extended discussion of Carrington's substantive views on the question of race-
specific mentoring, see infra note 90.
" For example, when Winnie Mandela visited New York in 1990, the Washington
Post used the term "role model" in an heroic sense to describe her. "Leading crowds
in her 'Amandlal' (Power!) chant and hailed from midtown television studios to
Brooklyn street corners as an inspiration and a role model for African American
women, the anti-apartheid leader delivered potent messages with unflappable dignity."
Paula Span, The Rallying Cy of Winnie Mandela: In New York, the South African Forges
a Bond with Black Women, WASH. POST, June 23, 1990, at G1 (emphasis added).
Boston Globe columnist Ellen Goodman used similar language when she referred
to General Norman Schwarzkopf, the military leader of Operation Desert Storm, as
"the real thing" for those "search[ing] for a new model of male leadership." Ellen
Goodman, A Shining (Four) Star, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 1991, at 21.
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A. "Role Models," "Mentors," and "Heroes"
A mentor is an individual who takes an interest in a specific
person and supports that person in his or her professional life. The
mentor is usually older and certainly more professionally established
than his or her prot6g6. 3' The relationship between a mentor and
a prot6g6 is a reciprocal relationship. Both mentor and prot6g6
show active and personal interest in one another. One cannot be
a mentor to the world, nor can one be a prot~g6 of an individual
who shows no personal interest in oneself or in one's work. In
contrast, a role model relationship does not necessarily involve a
two-way relationship. While a supposed role model follower will
have an interest in the activities of his or her role model, the role
model does not need to have a specific interest in the role model
follower and often does not even know him or her personally.
Lawyers and law students can imitate a famous lawyer in spite of the
fact that the role model and the role model emulators have not met.
Unlike a mentor/prot6g6 relationship, a role model/role model
emulator relationship is not necessarily personal or reciprocal.31
The terms hero and role model have also been used inter-
changeably, 2 and I think the two are distinguishable as well. A
hero is not necessarily a role model. One of the distinguishing
features of a role model is that he or she inspires the possibility of
emulation. On the other hand, a hero instills admiration and
respect for the qualities he or she displays and the achievements he
or she has attained. Most people who consider someone a hero
" SeeJeanneJ. Speizer, Role Models, Mentors, and Sponsors: The Elusive Concepts,
6 SIGNs 692, 708 (1981) ("The term[] 'mentor' ... [is] often used ... to indicate
older people in an organization or profession who take younger colleagues under
their wings and encourage and support their career progress until they reach
midlife."); see also Taunya L. Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman
Law Professor, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46, 46 (1990-1991) (noting that the term
"mentor" has an intellectual connotation that the term "role model" generally lacks).
" For a further discussion of mentors and mentoring relationships, see infra notes
89-90 and accompanying text.
"2 In a letter to the widow ofJustice Thurgood Marshall,Judge Harry T. Edwards
of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit explicitly linked the term
hero to the concept of role model. "From afar, I watched and listened and learned,
and Thurgood Marshall became a true hero in my lfre. It would be presumptuous to say that
I aimed to emulate him, for what he did was beyond reach; but he was a role model for me."
Letter from Harry T. Edwards to Mrs. Marshall (Jan. 29, 1993), in In Memory of
Thurgood Marshall, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 205, 207 (1993) (emphasis added). Note how
Judge Edwards used the terms "role model" and "hero" interchangeably by explicitly
suggesting that emulation does not constitute a defining characteristic of the concept
of role model.
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might not have the capacity or the inclination to emulate the actions
and activities that made that person a hero. Judge Learned Hand
clearly understood this fine point. "One may admire and approve
the course of a hero without feeling any duty [one might say even
inclination] to follow him .... [T]here is surely an appreciable
distance between esteem and emulation."3 Of course, a hero can
act as a role model for certain individuals, but a hero is not
necessarily a role model for all individuals who consider him or her
a hero.
B. The Development of the Traditional Role Concept of Role Model
Given the distinctions among the concept of role model and the
terms mentor and hero, what does role model mean and how did it
achieve the prominence it currently enjoys?
Even though "[t]he term 'role models' first appeared as a
category in most fields in 1973," it emerged at least as early as
1957.s 4 In a book on the sociology of medical education, Wagner
Thielens, Jr. studied entrants to medical and law schools and
compared how the students of the two professions "begin to learn
and to practice the professional role."35 He found that students
"often choose a figure in the profession, a practitioner known
personally or one known only by repute, as a model to imitate and
an ideal with which to compare their own performance. In short,
they adopt a role model."36
As a rhetorical device, this concept of role model connotes
positive or desirable examples or commitments. It illuminates the
processes by which an aspiring role occupant learns the virtues and
commitments associated with that role from a role occupant. The
concept of role model in this sense has a restricted meaning; a role
s Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F.
24 (2d Cir. 1917). As Judge Hand explained, the fact that The Masses, a leftist
monthly magazine, praised conscientious objectors of WWI such as Emma Goldman
and Alexander Berkman should not, as most judges then thought, be taken as
encouragement to the magazine's readers to emulate those praised, and, thus, its
activities did not violate the Espionage Act of 1917. See id. at 541-42.
' Speizer, supra note 30, at 693. In a recent article about the wayjournalists used
the concept of role model in the O.J. Simpson case, Brent Staples claimed that "[tihe
term entered the language 30 years ago." Brent Staples, Role Models, Bogus and Real,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at A26.
" Wagner Thielens, Jr., Some Comparisons of Entrants to Medical and Law School, in
THE STUDENT-PHYSICIAN: INTRODUCTORY STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION 131, 137 (Robert K. Merton et al. eds., 1957).
" Id. (emphasis added).
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model can provide an example in a specific and narrow field. 7
For example, a professional acts as a role model to those entering
that profession, but only in relation to their professional lives.
Thus, a medical doctor serves as a role model for medical students,
and a lawyer serves as a role model for law students. There is
neither the demand nor the expectation that the professional will
serve as a role model in a comprehensive sense. This is how Robert
Merton understood the concept in 1956. Distinguishing between a
role model and what he termed a "reference individual," Merton
wrote:
Emulation [of individuals] ... may be restricted to limited
segments of their behavior and values and this can be usefully
described as adoption of a role model. Or, emulation may be
extended to a wider array of behaviors and values of these persons
who can then be described as reference individuals38
For the moment, our concern is not whether Merton's distinction
between role models and reference individuals is persuasive.3 9 Our
s' This meaning corresponds with the dictionary definition of the term. Webster's
defines a role model as 'a person whose behavior in a particular role is imitated by
others." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1021 (9th ed. 1988)
(emphasis added); see also RICHARD WEINER, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS 410 (1990) ("A role model is an individual who serves
as a prototype or model to be emulated."); Theodore D. Kemper, Reference Groups,
Socialization and Achievement, 33 AM. Soc. REV. 31, 33 (1968) ("[A role model]
possesses skills and displays techniques which the actor lacks (or thinks he lacks), and
from whom, by observation and comparison with his own performance, the actor can
learn.").
3 MERTON, supra note 13, at 357. Actually, the notion of a "reference individual"
or the related concept of "reference group" has prior origins. Herbert Hyman
supposedly coined the term "reference group." See id. at 329 (reporting that,
although others identified elements of the notion underlying the expression
"reference group," Hyman invented the actual term); see also Robert K. Merton &
Alice S. Kitt, Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior, in CONTINUITIES
IN SOCIAL RESEARCH: STUDIES IN THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF "THE AMERICAN
SOLDIER" 40, 69-70 n.25 (Robert K. Merton & Paul F. Lazarsfeld eds., 1950) (naming
Hyman as the pioneer of reference group research); Tamotsu Shibutani, Reference
Groups As Perspectives, 60 AM. J. Soc. 562, 562-63 (1955) (attributing the term
"reference group" to Hyman and redefining it based on stricter criteria). Theodore
Kemper later refined the definition of a "reference group" as "a group, collectivity,
or person which the actor takes into account in some manner in the course of
selecting a behavior from among a set of alternatives, or in making ajudgment about
a problematic issue." Kemper, supra note 37, at 32. See generally Herbert H. Hyman,
The Psychology of Status, 38 ARCHIVES PSYCHOL. 5 (No. 269) (R. S. Woodworth ed.,
1942).
" In fact, Merton himself understood that the distinction might not always hold.
"To be sure, a role model may become a reference individual as his multiple roles are
adopted for emulation rather than emulation remaining confined to the one role on
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concern involves Merton's conception of role models as role-
specific, rather than as role models in the comprehensive sense.
40
Merton argues that an individual provides an example only in
relation to a "limited segment of [his] behavior"-generally profes-
sional in nature.
41
1. The Role Imitation View
Merton's hypothesis presumes that role model followers can pick
and choose the characteristics they emulate, imitating the role
model only in relation to a particular role and not worrying about
other aspects of the role model's life. Indeed, this conception
explains why the concept of role model was originally understood
in positive terms only.42 By definition, a role model chosen
explicitly for his or her professional status cannot provide a negative
example. After all, a professional role model impliedly possesses a
certain positive professional status. So long as the role aspirant
disregards other negative aspects of the role model's life, imitation
will be limited to his or her positive traits.
In its earliest days, therefore, the concept of role model
conveyed a positive meaning tied to the notion of role playing.
43
Individuals occupy certain social positions and perform certain
social functions. By virtue of occupying those positions and playing
those roles, they will be looked up to and imitated by others who
aspire to those roles and positions. This conception assumes a
number of facts. First, there is differentiation of roles. 44 Second,
individuals appear to others primarily as role players. 4 Third,
the basis of which the initial psychological relationship was established." MERTON,
supra note 13, at 357.
40 1 argue that reference individuals are role models in the comprehensive sense.
See infra part I.B.2. For a general discussion of role models in the comprehensive
sense, see infra part II.B.
41 MERTON, supra note 13, at 357.
42 The currently prominent notion of negative role models was not considered a
constitutive part of the concept.
4' The development of this version of the concept of role model might not only
be a response to role differentiation, but also a response to the development of the
distinction between appearance and reality. What I have in mind here is the
emergence of movies where an individual plays a role in a performance that replicates
the action of another individual (real or imagined) at another time.
4' For an interesting discussion of how role identifications and role obligations
develop, see Michael 0. Hardimon, Role Obligations, 91 J. PHIL. 333, 333 (1994)
(defining "role obligations" as "the sort of obligations we have (or take ourselves to
have) as occupants of social roles: as citizens, family members, teachers, and so
forth").
45 But cf. id. at 359 ("[It is possible to identify with a role... without regarding
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individuals will have an impact on others only in relation to those
specific roles. I shall inquire whether these assumptions are
defensible at a later point in this Article.
46
For the moment, it is sufficient to conclude that the concept of
role model, in its simplest form, refers to a socializing process in a
social and political environment where a clear division of roles
exists and where people aspire to those roles by attempting to
imitate those whom they regard as performing admirably in those
roles. This conception assumes that individual role models embody
a collection of roles that role imitators can disaggregate in order to
service specific concerns.
47
2. The Comprehensive View
As I indicated earlier, however, Merton's conception of role
model also applies to an individual who provides a comprehensive
example in relation to "a wider array of behaviors and values,"
someone whom he refers to as a "reference individual." 48  An
individual may influence certain people through many aspects of
their lives-aspects which transcend a particular (professional) role.
Such an individual exerts a comprehensive influence. The most
obvious candidates for role models in this sense include parents for
children,4 9 teachers for students,5" and peers for teenagers.51
Two factors define those I have just listed as potential role
models in the comprehensive sense. First, comprehensive role
models are likely to spend a great deal of time with those role
model followers whom we believe will look up to them. As a result,
the role as essential to 'who one is' or taking the role to be an essential component
of one's 'true self.'").
" See infra part II.A.
47 See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
48 MERTON, supra note 13, at 356-58; see also supra notes 38-41 and accompanying
text.49 See Joan McCord & William McCord, The Effects of Parental Role Model on
Criminality, in ROLE THEORY CONCEPTS, supra note 27, at 370, 371-76 (discussing a
study that concludes that children whose parents served as poor role models have a
greater tendency to exhibit criminal behavior).
o See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
5' See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395-96 (1995) ("As to the
efficacy of [random drug testing of students who participated in the school's athletics
program] for addressing the problem [of teen drug abuse]: It seems to us self-evident
that a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role model' effect ofathletes' drug use, and
of a particular danger to athletes, is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes
do not use drugs.").
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the role model followers will have a chance to watch closely and
study the actions, habits, and commitments of their role models and
perhaps will imitate them someday. Given the fact that people in
their formative years learn about correct habits and virtuous
commitments by observing others, they will probably learn the most
from those with whom they spend a considerable amount of time,
that is, parents, teachers, and peers.
Second, comprehensive role models possess some kind of power
over those individuals for whom they may serve as role models.
This power is not always coercive-although coercion may play a
part-but there is a degree of vulnerability in the role model
follower vis-4-vis the role model. By vulnerability I mean two things.
First, the role model follower is subject to constant and imminent
sanction, moral or otherwise, from the role model whenever the
role model follower acts in ways inconsistent with the desires and
commitments of the role model. Parents, teachers, and even peers
have the power to sanction. This vulnerability might lead the role
model follower to develop a tendency to follow the role model even
in relation to activities and commitments that the role model would
have preferred that the role model follower disregard. Second,
given that individuals develop their identities largely through a
process of recognition and affirmation from others and that
recognition and affirmation will largely come from a "circle of
partners to communication" such as parents, teachers, and peers,
52
the role model follower will probably try to earn "invulnerability
and integrity"5 3 by purchasing recognition and approval through
a process of emulation. A vulnerable individual in this sense is
someone who fears a lack of recognition and affirmation, for
"invulnerability and integrity . . . depend on approval being
12 Axel Honneth, Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality Based
on the Theory of Recognition, 20 POL. THEORY 187, 189 (1992).
" Id. Honneth reads Hegel and, especially, G.H. Mead as holding the following
position:
[H]uman individuation is a process in which the individual can unfold a
practical identity to the extent that he is capable of reassuring himself of
recognition by a growing circle of partners to communication. Subjects
capable of language and action are constituted as individuals solely by
learning, from the perspective of others who offer approval, to relate to
themselves as beings who possess certain positive qualities and abilities.
Thus as their consciousness of their individuality grows, they come to
depend to an ever increasing extent on the conditions of recognition they
are afforded by the life-world of their social environment.
Id. (citations omitted).
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forthcoming from others."54 It makes sense, therefore, to say that
those who spend a great deal of time with people who have a certain
degree of power over them will probably emulate those people.
Time and power are therefore the social capital at the role model's
disposal. Indeed, the role model's influence inheres in his power
to structure the environment under which the role model follower
might imitate the role model's actions and commitments.
C. The Emergence of Race and Gender Specfic.Role Model Rhetoric
In recent years, at least in the United States, the concept of role
model has been extended to relationships beyond the two versions
I have outlined. Successful women are praised and held up as role
models to other women, even to those who might have different
ideological and political commitments. 5  Likewise, successful
minorities are held up as role models for members of their racial
and ethnic groups.5 Indeed, for a while the concept of role model
seemed to provide, for some, the most secure jurisprudential
justification for affirmative action both in the context of education
and employment.
57
Thus, a shift has occurred in American culture in the use of the
concept of role model to include gender and race specific emula-
tions. Indeed, in recent years role model rhetoric has been invoked
most prominently in relation to minorities, and sometimes in
relation to women. Generally, the concept of role model has
assumed prominence in both scholarly and popular discourse in
54 Id.; see also GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, & SOCIETY: FROM THE STANDPOINT
OF A SOCIAL BEHAVIORIST 175 (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934) ("The 'I' is the response
of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of
attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute
the organized 'me,' and then one reacts towards that as an 'I.'" (footnotes omitted)).
5 See Patricia Harrison, Successful Women: No 'One Size Fits All', USA TODAYJune
25, 1993, at 12A. Harrison, President of the National Women's Economic Alliance
Foundation, criticized Gloria Steinem for referring to the newly elected Republican
senator from Texas, Kay Bailey Hutchison, as a "female impersonator":
Whether we are talking about America's new women entrepreneurs or
women in the political arena, from Kay Bailey Hutchison to Dianne
Feinstein [a Democratic senator from California], they offer a powerful and
positive road of possibilities. These are not 'female impersonators.' They
are role models and contributors to community and country. Real women
doing real things.
Id.
6 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
5 See infra part III.A.1.
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relation to those who have been excluded from the centers of
political and social power. There has been a focus on the relation-
ship between the members of those minority or marginalized groups
who have supposedly succeeded and those members who supposedly
need some inspiration in order to succeed. Thus, the debate about
athletes as role models58 quite often involves a debate about
African Americans as role models for young African Americans:
people implicitly assume that the conversation is not about white
athletes being role models for either young blacks or young whites.
Likewise, in the debate about teachers as role models in the context
of higher education and employment, quite often African Americans
or Hispanic Americans are the subjects of discourse.
Before I suggest why recent discussions involving the concept of
role model have often focused on minorities, especially African
Americans,59 let me offer some speculation as to why attention has
shifted away from the traditional versions of the concept of role
model-the role imitation view and the comprehensive view-toward
a more race and gender specific conception. First, this-shift might
be tied to the fact that we live in a multiethnic, multicultural, and
multiracial society. The self-image of this country has generally
' See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. Sportsjournalists are aware of the
role they have played in creating the controversy:
[S]ome observers view the athlete-as-role-model very seriously indeed. For
example, the veteran New York sports columnist Dick Young has taken
Dwight Gooden, the Mets' 22-year-old pitching star, severely to task for
failing America's youth by testing positive for cocaine during spring training
in March. Young has railed that 'druggies' should be locked up in special
concentration camps.
John Papenek, Athletes or Role Models? Demanding Higher Standards from Players Is
Unrealistic, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 15, 1987, at 84, 84.
The episode involving OJ. Simpson, the former football player and television
sports analyst for NBC, has resurrected the issue of athletes as role models in the
media. For a sample of the commentary on the issue of the desirability of viewing
athletes as role models, see Carl Chancellor, A Black Role Model? Better Rethink That
Idea, Hous. CHRON., June 23, 1994, at A33 (arguing that OJ. Simpson, although a
star in many fields, is an inappropriate role model for the black community), available
in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File; Donald Kaul, Simpson Doesn't Deserve Hero's
Mantle, HOuS. CHRON., June 23, 1994, at A32 (noting that, although a football and
film star, O.J. Simpson was also a wife beater and adulterer and concluding that "if
any [athletes] are worth emulating, it is strictly by accident"), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Majpap File; David D. Porter, O. and Justice, Whatever Simpson Is, He Isn't a
Hero.. ., ORLANDO SENTINEL,June 21, 1994, at A9 (arguing that athletes in general
are only paid entertainers who do not deserve the status of role model or hero);
Staples, supra note 34, at A26 ("The only legitimate 'role model' [for children] is the
person whom children can see, feel, and interact with in their daily lives.").
" See infra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
ROLE MODELS
assumed that the "American Experience" brings together people
of different cultural backgrounds, racial origins, and ethnic
affiliations and, through a process of assimilation, produces
one People with certain distinct commitments, cultural sensi-
bilities, and civic virtues. Put simply, the dominant assumption
has been that institutional processes in this country trans-
form individuals of different cultural backgrounds and orientations
into individuals who are themselves "intrapsychically multi-
cultural."
61
That self-image, however, has never really reflected reality,
6 1
especially for African Americans. This country's institutions often
6 Amelie 0. Rorty, The Hidden Politics of Cultural Identification, 22 POL. THEORY
152, 155 (1994) ("[Ijndividuals of multicultural nations are in a sense themselves
intrapsychically multicultural. Typically, their shared identity-defining motives-and
the vast range of interpretive habits they carry with them-permeate and often
outweigh their cultural differences." (footnotes omitted)); see also Amy Gutmann, The
Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 171, 183 (1993)
("Not only societies, but people are multicultural."). Gutmann offers the Muslim,
Indian-born British writer, Salman Rushdie, as an example:
I was born an Indian, and not only an Indian, but a Bombayite.... My
writing and thought have.., been as deeply influenced by Hindu myths and
attitudes as Muslim ones .... Nor is the West absent from Bombay
.... The point is this: Muslim culture has been very important to me, but
it is not by any means the only shaping factor.
Id. (quoting Salman Rushdie, In Good Faith, in IMAGINARY HOMELANDS: ESSAYS AND
CRITIcISM 393, 404 (1991)).
61 In an op-ed piece for the New York Times, the distinguished scholar Richard
Sennett challenges the characterization ofmulticulturalism as a process of fragment-
ing and destroying America's "common civic culture." For Sennett, such an America
never existed:
From the beginning, American society has been fragmented by differences
of wealth, religion and language, as well as by the conflicts between slave
and nonslave states. The waves of immigration after the Civil War did not
break apart a unified nation; they added new diversities to old divisions.
... [Phrases such as] national identity or an American character...
disguise[] inequalities and legitimate[] attacks on people whose lives are
different .... [as not being] 'real Americans.'
Richard Sennett, The Identity Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1994, § 4, at 17; see also
Richard Sennett, The Rhetoric of Ethnic Identity, in THE ENDS OF RHETORIC, supra note
9, at 191, 206 ("Liberal piety hoped for [the word] 'we' to appear simply as an act of
goodwill. The piety is both naive and unworthy of the struggle involved in learning
to think fraternally about those one does not resemble.").
Interestingly, another distinguished scholar who sees himself as part of the
broader left wrote an op-ed reply to Sennett for the New York Times, calling people
like Sennett the "unpatriotic left," a phrase that has been used historically to silence
and victimize the left. See Richard Rorty, The Unpatriotic Academy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
13, 1994, § 4, at 15.
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treat African Americans as the negation of, or challenge to, the
"common civic culture," rather than as a constitutive part of it.62
Consequently, many African Americans, especially the young,
appear to be alienated from many of this nation's institutions,
including the two most important assimilative ones: the educational
system and the media. As a result, these institutions have not had
a substantial impact on the development of these "New World
sensibilities,"63 commitments, and outlooks among African Ameri-
cans.
64
In an environment where the major assimilative institutions do
not reach a certain segment of the population and in a context
where that marginalized group represents a challenge to the very
commitments and virtues that supposedly define the society's "New
World sensibilities," the only way to convince the marginalized
group to accept the virtues that the majority considers the defining
features of the society might be to offer up some individuals from
6 See generally Adeno Addis, "Hell Man, They Did Invent Us": The Mass Media, Law,
and African Americans, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 523 (1993) (discussing how the mainstream
media produces and reproduces a largely negative image of African Americans).
In his book, Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and Political Change, Harold Isaacs
best captured the ambiguous status that African Americans have occupied in this
society even after their basic humanity was formally, albeit reluctantly, recognized:
"Black Americans ... continued not to belong. They remained firmly placed but
always displaced, rooted yet held rootless, included yet relentlessly excluded: their
two-ness, American and Negro, made them national and alien at the same time."
HAROLD R. ISAACS, IDOLS OF THE TRIBE: GROUP IDENTITY AND POLITICAL CHANGE
199 (1975).
The paradox that Isaacs so lucidly describes is, of course, the process by which
blacks in this country have been constructed as the negation of this "common civic
culture." Blacks have been treated as the contrast to the virtues and sensibilities that
supposedly define this society. They are "firmly placed," "rooted," and "included,"
id.,. not only because they are physically here and have no where to go, but also
because their presence has profoundly affected and shaped the institutions and values
that define this society. Nevertheless, African Americans are "always displaced," "held
rootless," and "relentlessly excluded," id., because their presence is seen by the
majority as the background (the contrast Other) against which the virtues and
commitments of this polity are defined and developed, not as the co-developers of
these commitments and sensibilities.
Cornel West describes America as embodying a "radical cultural hybridity, an
improvisational New World sensibility." Jervis Anderson, Life and Letters: The Public
Intellectual, NEW YORKER, Jan. 17, 1994, at 39, 48 (quoting Cornell West discussing
the contributions made by both blacks, like Louis Armstrong and Sarah Vaughn, and
whites, like Ralph Waldo Emerson and Walt Whitman).
6 Indeed, for some African Americans the alienation is so profound that they do
not identify themselves as Americans. See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK
AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 34 (1992) (citing August Wilson and Toni
Morrison as prominent examples of African Americans who feel such alienation).
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within that group as role models. Thus, the concept of role model
can be seen as an attempt to develop unifying and assimilative
institutions in a divided society, where the example of members of
one community is, for various reasons, unavailable for emulation by
members of another. After all, Joe Montana, the white former
quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers and the Kansas City Chiefs,
is not generally regarded as a role model for inner-city black
children. Similarly, when commentators continually urge black
athletes to be positive role models (or more likely when they
castigate them for being negative role models), they implicitly
suggest that it is young blacks, not young whites, who will follow
their example. Seen this way, it does not seem accidental that this
new version of the concept of role model gets special emphasis in
this country in relation to African Americans.
There are two other reasons why commentators often apply this
concept of role model to African Americans. The first involves an
uncontroversial empirical claim: minorities, especially African
Americans, are seriously underrepresented in the political, social,
and economic life of this country. The Human Development Index,
which ranks the nations of the world according to longevity, educ-
ational achievement, and per capita income and is reported in the
United Nations' 1993 Human Development Report, tells the depressing
story. The United States ranked sixth based on its entire popula-
tion, first based on its white population, and thirty-first based on its
African American population.6 5 Statistical data collected by the
United States government tell a similar story: African Americans
have a relatively small stake in the nation's wealth6 6 and education-
al institutions," and they are relatively more likely to be affected
" See Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2430 (1994)
(citing the UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 1993 [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT]).
I See generally BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1994 (114th ed. 1994) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT]. While the median income of white households is $32,368, the median
income of black households is only $18,660. See id. at 466-67 (this. 710 & 712). One
third of African Americans live in poverty, as opposed to 11.6% of whites. See id. at
478 (tbl. 733). Almost 50% of black children live below the poverty line, compared
to 16% of white children. See id. at 475 (tbl. 728). The unemployment rate for
African Americans is almost twice that for white Americans. See id. at 418 (tbl. 651).
67 In 1992, African Americans accounted for only 2.4% of all doctoral degree
recipients. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Education, Arts and Humanities of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, May 17, 1994 (testimony of Arnold L.
Mitchem, Executive Director of the National Council on Educational Opportunity
Associations), available in Westlaw, Allnewsplus Database (Federal Document Clearing
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by crime, either as offenders8 or as victims.69 In addition, a
disproportionate number of African Americans are born to
unmarried women or otherwise become members of single-parent
families. 7' From these rather obvious and depressing empirical
facts, some observers draw a more contestable inference: one of the
reasons why minorities are underrepresented in the various aspects
of social and political life is that members of those groups do not
see any of their own in positions of significance. 7 1 This phenome-
non, some argue, might discourage many African Americans from
pursuing certain goals and from aspiring to certain positions of
power or influence in mainstream society. These observers
highlight the psychological and perceptual (as opposed to material
and structural) impediments to success.72  The assumption on
House, Inc. 1994). In fact, there was "a decline in African American doctoral
recipients from 1982 to 1992, from 3.4% to 2.4% of degrees overall." Id.
' Although African Americans represented only 12% of the population, they
made up 44% of the inmates in state and local jails in 1991. See Michele Ingrassia,
Endangered Family, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30, 1993, at 16, 25.
" "Almost 66 of every 100,000 black males age 14-17 are victims of major
violence," compared to only 8.5 for. whites of the same age group. W.John Moore,
Shooting in the Dark, 26 NAT'L L.J. 358, 359 (1994).
70 While the rate ofout-of-wedlock births has increased sharply over the last three
decades for all groups, it is significantly higher in the African American community
than in the white community: 68% percent of black children versus 22% of white
children are born out-of-wedlock. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 66, at 80
(tbl. 100).
71 Of course, some conservatives draw a different conclusion. They see the
underrepresentation as an indication of a lack of natural endowment and/or hard
work. Here I am thinking of Charles Murray and David Duke. See, e.g., RICHARDJ.
HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 276-80, 320-22 (1994) (arguing that the black
population in America has measurably lower cognitive skills than the white population
and that this difference accounts for the underrepresentation of blacks in high IQ
occupations); Lance Hill, Nazi Race Doctrine in the Political Thought of David Duke, in
THE EMERGENCE OF DAVID DUKE AND THE POLITICS OF RACE 94, 100-02 (Douglas D.
Rose ed., 1992) (explaining that David Duke, like Adolf Hitler, believes that "genetic
inferiority limits the ability of ethnic groups to absorb 'superior culture'").
' The lateJustice Thurgood Marshall was resisting this sort of claim when he told
Howard University students the following:
[People say,] "You ought to go around the country and show yourself to
Negroes; and give them inspiration." For what? Negro kids are not fools.
They know when you tell them there is a possibility that someday you'll have
a chance to be the o-n-l-y Negro on the Supreme Court, those odds aren't
too good.
Bell, supra note 12, at 213 (quotingJustice Thurgood Marshall, Speech at Howard
University (Nov. 18, 1978). Richard Delgado similarly observes that the most
important reason for rejecting the job of role model is that it
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which this argument is necessarily based is that a member of one
racial group cannot emulate members of another group. After all,
in the absence of such an assumption, it would make little sense to
talk about the need to see a member of one's own racial group in
a particular position as a figure of inspiration.
Second, quite often the discussion concerning African Ameri-
cans and their supposed failures as role models involves an implicit
assumption that African Americans act as a group and that they are
more likely than any other group to emulate their leaders and role
models. Elsewhere, I have characterized this phenomenon as the
majority's tendency to see African Americans as "types,"73 rather
than as individuals.
74
My emphasis in the preceding paragraphs on African Americans
should not suggest that the extension of the two traditional versions
of the concept of role model-the role imitation and comprehensive
views-to a race and gender specific version pertains exclusively to
African Americans. Quite the contrary, for instance, recall that, in
the 1992 presidential campaign, Vice President Dan Quayle publicly
criticized television's fictional character Murphy Brown for
providing a less than positive role model to young women.
75
Quayle assumed that viewers would likely imitate the attitudes and
lifestyles of the fictional characters they watch for entertainment.
This episode suggests not only that role model rhetoric is being
requires that you lie-that you tell not little, but big, whopping lies, and that
is bad for your soul. Suppose I am sent to an inner city school to talk to the
kids and serve as role model of the month. I am expected to tell the kids that
if they study hard and stay out of trouble, they can become a law professor
like me. That, however, is a very big lie: a whopper.... Fortunately, most
kids are smart enough to figure out that the system does not work this way.
Delgado, supra note 15, at 1228-29 (footnotes omitted).
7 See Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2253, 2262 (1993) (noting
that the media is especially guilty of viewing African Americans as "types").
7' This country's rhetorical commitment to taking individuals seriously has always
been in tension with the way it has treated African Americans. African Americans
have generally been treated as a group and, as such, have been summarily excluded
from various spheres of life. This exclusion was legal and public for a long time.
Now, it is more informal and private, but as effective.
It is also interesting to note that, when considering remedies for past exclusion
and discrimination that African Americans have suffered, institutions of power insist
that the individual, rather than the group, should be the point of departure. See infra
note 250 and accompanying text.
7' See supra note 7. Recently, Senator Robert Dole, the Republican majority leader
and presidential candidate, revived the debate about the role of the entertainment
industry in the moral decline of this country. See Michael Janofsky, Reviews By
Weekend Moviegoers Are In. Dole Gets a Thumbs Down, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1995, at 20.
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used outside the two traditional conceptions we explored earlier,
but also that a role model does not even have to be a real person.
76
Not too long ago, Charles Barkley, an NBA superstar Who plays
for the Phoenix Suns, rejected the notion that he or any other
celebrity has a duty to act as a role model for America's youth."
In an advertisement for Nike that ran during televised basketball
games, Barkley said, "I am not a role model. I am not paid to be a
role model. I am paid to wreak havoc on the basketball court.
Parents should be role models. Just because I dunk a basketball
doesn't mean I should raise your kids."7 8
76 See supra note 75 (discussing how even companies have been talked about as
role models).
7 See Sam Smith, Full Speed Ahead for Barkley: Sixers' Blunt Star Doesn't Woiry
About Bruising Egos, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1988, § 3, at 1, 12 (admitting that he has
occasionally let down his employer, which is "why athletes shouldn't be role models
for kids"). As Barkley observed:
I have a sneaker deal myself, but I don't understand why people would buy
one sneaker endorsed by one player over the other. Kids idolize profession-
al athletes, which is wrong in itself, and theyjust copy what they're wearing.
I think one of the problems we have in today's society is that it's the
parents'job to be the role models. To kids that idolize me, I tell them don't
do so just because I can dribble a basketball-that's really sick.
Leah Garchick, Personals, S.F. CHRON.,Jan. 31, 1990, at A8; see also Terry Blount, This
Stoiy Brought to You By the Chronicle, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 1, 1991, at 20 ("I don't
believe athletes should be viewed as role models .... just because you are able to
run and jump, that does not make you God.'" (quoting Charles Barkley)). Bo
Jackson, a member of the Chicago White Sox at the time, echoed the point: "my view
of role models is the same as Barkley's. Parents should be the ones children emulate,
not athletes." Bo Jackson, No: Parents Should Say Be Like Me, Not Like Bo, USA
TODAY, June 23, 1993, at 12C.
' E.J. Dionne Jr., The Role of Role Models: Values and Slam Dunks, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., June 24,1993, at 7 (quoting Barkley's advertisement). It is fair to point out
that Barkley had addressed the role model issue prior to the release of the ad and
that Nike, not Barkley, wanted to make use of the subsequent role model controversy.
Presumably, the selling capacity of the slogan, and not the merits of the debate,
inspired the advertisement.
Not all athletes agree with Barkley. Some think that there is something to the
notion of athletes as role models and that they have a special responsibility to provide
a good example for youngsters. In response to the Nike commercial, Karl Malone,
a forward for the UtahJazz, expressed his views: "Charles, you can deny being a role
model all you want, but I don't think it's your decision to make. We don't choose to
be role models, we are chosen. Our only choice is whether to be a good role model
or a bad one." Karl Malone, One Role Model to Another, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,June 14,
1993, at 84. For Malone, being a role model simply comes with the money and the
glory. See id. He also finds it paradoxical that professional athletes like Barkley
would resist the idea of being a role model while at the same time using their
prominence and visibility to earn money by endorsing products: "I mean, why do we
get endorsements in the first place? Because there are people who will follow our
lead and buy a certain sneaker or cereal because we use it." Id. Furthermore, Malone
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Note that Barkley does not suggest that he cannot be a
role model to children; he simply wants to restrict the concept
of role model to its traditional meaning: in the absence of
physical presence and the authority-vulnerability nexus,79 the role
model follower only emulates the role model in relation to the
specific role for which he or she is known."0 In Barkley's case that
means playing basketball. In other words, Barkley resists the notion
of comprehensiveness that commentators often invoke when they
apply the concept of role model to minority athletes:1 athletes
supposedly define for their potential emulators not only the
particular professional role for which they are primarily known, but
they are also expected to define the good and virtuous life for
admirers they do not know personally and with whom they have no
contact.
As Part I has demonstrated, the concept of role model has been
invoked as a rhetorical device in various ways and contexts. In its
early history, commentators used the rhetoric in the role imitation
sense to refer to the relationship between role-specific models and
role-specific aspirants. They also used the term in its comprehen-
sive sense to refer to the relationship between parents and children,
between teachers and students, and among peers. In the last few
years, however, commentators have invoked the concept of role
model in circumstances and contexts that go beyond the traditional
role imitation and the narrowly defined comprehensive views. The
notions of entertainers as role models and race and gender specific
role models now dominate the conversation about role models. Part
II will critically examine these various conceptions of role model to
adds, "I love being a role model, and I try to be a positive one." Id.
"' See supra part I.B.2 (discussing the comprehensive view).
8 See supra part I.B.1 (discussing the role imitation view).
8' For example, the public discussion about whether OJ. Simpson should be seen
as a role model is a discourse about role models in the comprehensive sense. It is the
demand for comprehensiveness, the expectation that athletes define the good and
virtuous life for young people, that makes the concept of role model controversial in
this particular sense. If the concept were restricted (as the role imitation view would
require) to the particular professional role for which OJ. Simpson was known (as a
great football player), there would not (and should not) be any controversy. Just as
a great lawyer or a great doctor could be viewed as a role model to aspiring lawyers
or aspiring doctors, so too could a great football player be properly viewed as a role
model for aspiring football players. The rhetoric of athletes as role models is
controversial and logically incoherent, however, when it is invoked in its comprehen-
sive sense, as is often the case.
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explore whether they are logically coherent and normatively
desirable.
II. THE CONCEPT OF ROLE MODEL: A CRITICAL EVALUATION
A. The Role Imitation View
That individuals who aspire to occupy certain socially defined
roles might imitate the actions and commitments of other individu-
als in order to perform successfully those roles themselves should
come as no surprise nor raise any controversy. Indeed, that is how
many of us learn about roles. We define roles not merely in terms
of the formal tasks and responsibilities involved, but also based on
how certain role occupants perform those tasks and responsibilities.
An aspiring lawyer gets an image of what it means to be a good
lawyer at least as much from seeing certain role occupants perform
that role as from mastering the formal descriptions of what
constitutes good lawyering. This holds true for any profession or
role, 2 especially when the task or role is complex.A3 Thus, it
makes sense to say that role occupants will have an influence on
those who aspire to those positions, for they provide aspiring role
occupants with a large part of the information that defines those
roles. Alfred North Whitehead got it right when he said, "We think
in generalities, but we live in detail." 4
82 I mentioned physicians and lawyers earlier, see supra notes 35-37 and
accompanying text, but learning by example also applies to teachers, artists, and
writers. For example, Alice Walker says that, in Zora Neale Hurston's work, she "had
discovered ... a model.... [who] had provided, as if she knew someday I would
come along wandering in the wilderness, a nearly complete record of her life." ALICE
WALKER, Saving the Life That Is Your Own: The Importance of Models in the Artist's Life,
in IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS 3, 12 (1983). Walker also quotes a letter
from Vincent Van Gogh to Emile Bernard, written in 1889 while Van Gogh was in a
mental hospital in the South of France: "Society makes our existence wretchedly
difficult at times, hence our impotence and the imperfection of our work.... I myself
am suffering under an absolute lack of models." Id. at 4. Commenting on Van
Gogh's observation, Walker notes that "[t]he absence of models, in literature as in
life, to say nothing of painting, is an occupational hazard for the artist." Id.
83 See Kemper, supra note 37, at 35 ("The more complex the task, the more
pressing the need for a concrete model. In many areas, it is virtually impossible to
try to teach a role without actual models.").
84 ROLE THEORY EXPECTATIONS, supra note 27, at 20. The great cultural critic and
critical theorist Walter Benjamin would have concurred. As he eloquently expressed,
the things that mattered to him he learned not from formal prescriptions, but from
people that played those roles. Thus, for example, in a letter he wrote on April 25,
1930 to his friend Gerhard Scholem, Benjamin declared: "I have come to know living
Judaism in absolutely no form other than you." WALTER BENJAMIN, THE CORRESPON-
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This narrow version of the concept of role model does not, of
course, claim that aspiring role occupants imitate the role occupant
outside his or her specific roles. It assumes that the lives of
individuals can be disaggregated into various roles (for example,
doctor, political activist, mother, etc.) and that aspiring role
occupants can selectively imitate these various roles. This assump-
tion seems defensible because individuals are constituted of
multiple and overlapping identities or roles. As George Herbert
Mead observed:
We carry on a whole series of different relationships to different
people. We are one thing to one man and another thing to
another.... We divide ourselves up in all sorts of different selves
.... We discuss politics with one and religion with another.
There are all sorts of different selves answering to all sorts of
different social reactions. It is the social process itself that is
responsible for the appearance of the self; it is not there as a self
apart from this type of experience. A multiple personality is in a
certain sense normal .... 85
The only way that we can simultaneously adhere to the notion
of distinct individual identity, on the one hand, and the social
nature of that identity, on the other, is to recognize that our distinct
individual identities result from imitated multiple identities
assembled in a distinct way or from overlapping multiple identities
imitated from different sources. If that is the case, the disaggrega-
tion of roles must play a part in the process of learning and
emulation.8 6 Assuming the disaggregation of roles and that role
model emulators imitate role occupants only in relation to their
specific roles, does it automatically follow that imitation would be
more pronounced and more likely if the role occupant and the role
aspirant are of the same race or gender? Many people who accept
DENCE OF WALTER BENJAMIN 1910-1940, at 364 (Gershom Scholem & Theodore W.
Adorno eds., Manfred R. Jacobson & Evelyn M. Jacobson trans., 1994). Benjamin
expressed the same view about two other areas that were central in his life: German
literature and Marxism. In each case Benjamin tied his understanding to a particular
person he knew or was close to, who performed well in those areas. In 1924, for
example, he acknowledged his indebtedness to a recently deceased friend, Florens
Christian Rang, "for whatever essential elements of German culture I have
internalized," for Benjamin had "seen the life that dwells in these great subjects
humanely manifested only in [Rang]." Id. at 252.
8 MEAD, supra note 54, at 142.
8 This is perhaps what Robert Merton meant when he observed: "Just as roles
can be segregated from one another in the course of social interaction, so they can
be in the form of reference orientations." MERTON, supra note 13, at 357.
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the role imitation view nevertheless argue that, either as a logical or
an empirical matter, people of the same race or gender as the
aspiring role occupant do not necessarily have qualitatively more
influence on that individual than role occupants of a different race
or gender. Their critique of race and gender specific theories of
role modeling takes two alternative forms: one responds to the role
imitation view of the concept of role model, while the other
responds to the notion of regarding the concept of role model as a
version of the politics of recognition.
The first version challenges, on empirical grounds, the notion
that a role model of the same race or gender as the role aspirant
will facilitate the learning of the specific role once the role aspirant
has chosen to pursue that particular role. The challenge here is to
the claim that black law students might learn better from black
lawyers, or that female law students learn better from female
lawyers. JudithJarvis Thomson, for example, argues that "speaking
personally" she does not find that this claim matches her own
experience:
I do not think that as a student I learned any better, or any more,
from the women who taught me than from the men, and I do not
think that my women students now learn any better or any more
from me than they do from my male colleagues.
87
Although Thomson makes clear that she is not speaking about the
experience of all women, much less about the experience of
minorities such as blacks, she argues that her experience and
observation must be taken as valid unless empirically shown to be
contrary to the evidence.
8 8
I tend to agree with Thomson on this count. There is no
evidence that aspiring role occupants master a specific role faster or
better when the role occupants are of the same gender or race. In
other words, race or gender specific theories of role modeling
cannot be understood in terms of the role imitation view. This
argument differs, however, from another point. Given the history
of gender and racial stratification in this country, it seems plausible
to assume that race and gender do play a role in mentoring
relationships.8 9 Take, for example, race and education. When all
S"Judith J. Thomson, Preferential Hiring, in EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT 19, 23 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1977).
88 See id.
" A recent study of the academic performance of male and female students at the
University of Pennsylvania Law School suggests that the difference in academic
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aspects of life outside an institution are segregated, from housing
to social life, such segregation must have an impact on how students
and teachers construct their relationships within the institution.
After all, mentor/prot6g6 relationships are basically relationships
based on the comfort level between teacher and student; thus, they
have a social dimension. The daily narratives and institutional
realities outside the academy define and reinforce the notion that
blacks and whites lead very separate lives and that their relation-
ships are characterized by mutual incomprehension. These
narratives and institutional realities must surely have relevance
inside the academy when teachers and students struggle to define
their relationships. The point here is not to blame white teachers
or black students for the state of affairs, but rather to emphasize
that the relationships we define and develop inside the academy
cannot escape the impact of the relationships and suspicions that
prevail in the larger society,90 and that this fact will likely curtail
performance between male and female students (with similar credentials entering law
school) might be due to the fact that women are excluded from informal learning
networks. See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy
League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 73 (1994) (observing that "relatively few
female students are apparently mentored by the [male dominated] faculty"). Based
on their findings and other data, the authors "hypothesize that women faculty are
more likely to mentor women students, that women students are more likely to
perceive women faculty as approachable, and that being able to approach faculty is
as critical to students' self-perception of their role in the institution as it is to the
substantive learning that takes place in these informal settings." Id. at 77-78.
o In an article advocating "resistance [against the diversity movement] among
those who care about the law and the institutions of law teaching" and "encourag[ing]
opposition by those who care about civil rights," Paul Carrington suggests that one
of the justifications for advancing diversity in the legal academy is the notion of
counseling. Carrington, supra note 28, at 1105, 1147-50. In addition to robust
intellectual exchange, compensation for past discrimination, and developing legal
institutions that can be inclusive and can be trusted by all segments of society,
Carrington argues:
The other tendered justification [for diversity] is that female law students
need to learn from female law teachers, black law students need to learn
from black law teachers, and so forth. This justification proceeds from the
premise that law teachers are professional counselors and role models for
students and that the common bond of race or gender is important to the
effective performance of those duties.
Id. at 1147-48. Furthermore, Carrington claims that both are marginal functions of
law teachers. See id.
Like most of the literature on role models, it is not clear what Carrington means
when he invokes the notion of role models. The use of the conjunctive "and"
between "counselors" and "role models" as well as his discussion in subsequent
paragraphs suggest that he sees a difference between counseling and role modeling.
Carrington seems to use the term "role model" in two different senses. First,
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he uses it to describe what I have referred to as the role imitation theory:
To the extent that role modeling is important for law teachers of any status,
the primary qualification would seem to be a demonstrated capacity to
adhere to high standards of professional ethics and public responsibility, not
race or gender. One should not fail when possible to replicate in a law
teacher the personal characteristics of George Wythe, a person of legendary
integrity, but there is little reason to suppose that the traits of public virtue
or good citizenship are linked to race or gender.
Id. at 1148. As I have argued, this is a legitimate use of the term, but Carrington also
seems to use the term as a synonym for mentoring and counseling:
The idea that race or gender is important in mentoring relationships has the
unwelcome characteristic of being segregationist in effect. It suggests to
students and faculty that a Mexican-American student, for example, ought to have
a Mexican-American role mode4 not a black or a white role model. It suggests that
persons desiring career counseling should expect to receive it from one of their own.
Id. at 1149 (emphasis added). As I argued earlier, mentoring and role modeling are
two separate processes. See supra part I.A. Apparently Carrington does not
appreciate this distinction. Nor does he see any place for race or gender specific
conceptions of the concept of role model under either the role imitation view or in
a mentoring relationship.
Carrington's suggestion that role modeling and counseling are similar appears
to be inconsistent with his earlier observation that role modeling and counseling are
two separate activities. Cf Carrington, supra note 28, at 1148 ("[R]ole modeling
should not be confused with counseling."). I agree with Carrington's earlier
observation that role modeling and counseling are two different activities. First,
unlike role modeling, counseling suggests that the relationship between the counselor
and the counseled is personal and reciprocal. One can be a role model to those one
does not even know, but one can only counsel specific people one knows. Second,
unlike a role model, a counselor is not held up as a candidate for emulation, but
simply as someone who imparts a certain body of information that the counselee may
or may not find useful. Also, although counseling, like mentoring, links two specific
individuals, the two are different in the following crucial sense: while a mentor
generally takes an interest in the professional life of the prot6g6, a counselor might
simply be interested in imparting a body of information about one narrow aspect of
the life of the counseled. Put simply, while mentoring often involves counseling,
counseling does not necessarily involve mentoring.
Carrington's belief that mentoring relationships should not be either race or
gender specific ignores the fact that, as I argued earlier, the racial divisions outside
the academy have an effect on how students and teachers structure relationships. I
think Carrington is right that some white teachers are wonderful mentors to minority
students and that some minority faculty are great mentors to nonminority students,
and, ideally, this would always be so; however, I think Carrington is mistaken in
taking isolated positive examples as proof that segregation outside the academy does
not have an impact on the process of teacher-student relationships. If the interaction
between white and black students in higher educational institutions, including law
schools, is any indication, one cannot escape the conclusion that the prevalence of
segregation in the larger society does indeed structure their relationships inside these
institutions. We should not mistake our aspiration for reality; ignoring reality only
impedes progress toward the ideal.
As to Carrington's contention that counseling is not part of what it means to be
an effective teacher and instructor, I think he is wrong as an empirical matter. Many
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the informal learning process for minority students. 91
The first version of the critique, in my view, misses the point.
When people refer to minorities and women as role models they
rarely claim that role aspirants master a particular role better or
faster if they learn it from a person of the same race or gender.
Rather, they often claim that, given the dearth of minorities and
women in certain professions, it might be necessary for aspiring
minority and female role occupants to see minorities and women in
faculty members whom I know set aside office hours during the week to make
themselves available to students who wish to come and talk to them. They
understand their jobs to include talking to their students outside the classroom
environment on a regular basis. My own experience tells me that students come to
see their teachers not only about specific topics covered in class, but also about legal
education and legal careers in general, for example, study strategies or course
choices, about career options, and certainly about providing letters of recommenda-
tion. Students' formal evaluations of a particular teacher might be influenced as
much by whether the teacher is sympathetic and helpful outside the classroom as by
how well he or she performs inside the classroom, and students' faculty and course
reviews do, in fact, play a considerable role in the promotion and tenure process.
Insofar as teachers and students both view counseling as part of the job description
and insofar as administrations and faculty weigh those activities in their formal and
informal evaluations of faculty members, the claim that counseling is "not central to
the teacher's task" seems wrong to me. Id.
Finally, Carrington observes that role modeling is only "a marginal function of
law teachers." Id. The reason he offers is that, "[g]iven the gulf between academic
law and law practice, it seems unlikely that many professional school students should
rely heavily upon teacher-scholars as role models." Id. I find this line of reasoning
extremely puzzling. Given the fact that the overwhelming majority of law students
first encounter the law and the notion of what constitutes good lawyering from us,
it is unclear to me why students should not or would not take their professors as their
role models. It also seems to be an astonishing surrender of professional responsibil-
ity for Carringtoin to assume that, in the contest between the academy and the
practicing bar over the notion of what constitutes good lawyering, students are likely
to believe that the bar offers the better vision; even more astonishing is tht he does
not seem to be disturbed by this assumption. Even if we were to accept that the bar
offers a better vision of the practice, is not the better approach to work within the
academy to reform the curriculum and the pedagogy to make legal education more
responsible and responsive, instead of simply wishing, and claiming, that students will
not take our colleagues as role models for a vision of the practice? Cf Harry T.
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REv. 34 (1992) (suggesting that the visions of lawyering held by both the
academy and the practicing bar are unattractive). In any case, legal practice is not the
only career that law school graduates enter. Some of our students, for example, go
into teaching. Why should we abdicate role modeling to the bar with respect to those
students who enter other fields of employment?
91 As I shall argue later, racial segregation in society at large also makes race
relevant to the process of role modeling within the academy. See infra part III.A. But
I also argue that race specific role modeling cannot be understood within the role
imitation view, but is rather best understood and described in terms of what I call the
politics of recognition. See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
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those roles to reassure themselves that they can indeed occupy those
roles and perform those functions and to show them how those who
share similar historical and institutional vulnerabilities can best
occupy, perform in, and redefine those roles. This process is what
Berenice Fisher might have had in mind when she observed that
"the meaning of being a role model [in relation to women] grows
out of discovering shared struggles and shared vulnerabilities in
relation to the world." 2 This second version of race and gender
specific role modeling seems more plausible than the role imitation
view.
93
Serving as a role model in the second sense is not about
mastering a specific body of knowledge-it is about the politics of
recognition. Under this conception, the role model provides
institutional affirmation for the aspiring role occupant. He or she
signals that the community does not continue to devalue the lives
of these groups.9 4 He or she provides a counternarrative intended
' Fisher, supra note 2, at 232. Fisher's general comment seems to be validated
by the experience of some female students as reported in a survey of medical
education. One first-year woman commented that she was
interested in learning how women physicians cope with the problem of
being physician, wife, and mother and a woman in a predominantly male
field.... I feel that I need more female physician role models. I find
myself referring to physicians as "he"-it is discouraging that all my
professors also use "he" when referring to physicians.
Roeske & Lake, supra note 2, at 462.
Harvard Law School students expressed similar sentiments in their suit against
the university for allegedly discriminatory practices committed by the Law School
against members of marginal groups, including women of color. Their complaint
maintained that the absence of women of color on the faculty injured them by
denying them "access to ... role models." Harvard Law Sch. Coalition for Civil
Rights v. President of Harvard College, 595 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Mass. 1992) (quoting
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint). Their claim seems to suggest that students who have
historically suffered similar vulnerabilities as their potential role models are denied
visible guidance as to how they can overcome these vulnerabilities and thus effectively
perform in their chosen role. For a further discussion of the controversy at Harvard
Law School, see supra note 5.
" See Thomson, supra note 87, at 23 ("[This] second claim, however, does seem
to me to be plainly true: black and women students do need role models, they do
need concrete evidence that those of their race or sex can become accepted,
successful, professionals-plainly, you won't try to become what you don't believe you
can become.").
' Thomson observes:
[Blacks and women] have not merely not been given that very equal chance
at the benefits generated by what the community owns which is so firmly
insisted on for white males, they have not until lately even been felt to have
a right to it. And even those [who] were not themselves down-graded for
being black or female have suffered the consequences of the down-grading
ROLE MODELS
to destabilize the narrative of exclusion that accompanied the
marginalization and devaluation of members of those groups. 95 As
I noted earlier, this version of the concept of race and gender
specific role modeling has also come under criticism. Critics
maintain that including the notion of role model as part of the
politics of recognition undermines a central moral and political
precept in this society-namely, individuality and individual agency-
by tying the notion of role model to group membership and
affiliation. I shall return to the politics of recognition in Part 1.C,
and I shall respond to this criticism in Part IV, but first I will
explore further the second traditional version of the concept of role
model: the comprehensive view.
B. The Comprehensive View
As I noted earlier, under some circumstances an individual
might serve as a role model in relation to a variety of roles as
opposed to one particular role,96 similar to Robert Merton's
"reference individual."97 For Merton, "[t]he person who identifies
himself with a reference individual will seek to approximate the
behavior and values of that individual in his several roles."9 8 But
as I argued earlier, the comprehensive view is only plausible when
two factors exist: when the role model and the role model follower
(or the supposed emulator) are tied by physical proximity and by an
authority-vulnerability social nexus.99 That being the case, the
of other blacks and women: lack of self-confidence, and lack of self-respect.
For where a community accepts that a person's being black, or being a
woman, are right and proper grounds for denying that person full
membership in the community, it can hardly be supposed that any but the
most extraordinarily independent black or woman will escape self-doubt.
All but the most extraordinarily independent of them have had to work
harder-if only against self-doubt-than all but the most deprived white
males, in the competition for a place amongst the best qualified.
Id. at 36.
" Thomas Nagel has referred to this narrative of exclusion as "an insult of the
most fundamental kind." Thomas Nagel, Introduction to EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT, supra note 87, at xii ("Blacks were excluded because they were thought
inferior and undesirable; they were really discriminated against, because they were
black, and it was an insult of the most fundamental kind.").
' See supra parts I.B.1-2 (describing role imitation and comprehensive versions of
the concept of role model).97 MERTON, supra note 13, at 356-58 (discussing the conceptual distinction between
"reference individuals" and the more restricted notion of "role models").
98 Id. at 3 56 .
11 See supra part I.B.2.
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concept of a comprehensive role model only applies in relation to
people such as parents, school teachers, and peers. Contrary to
current role model rhetoric, it would be logically erroneous to apply
this concept to people such as athletes.0 0 Athletes can only serve
as comprehensive role models for their children or for people to
whom they are in some way tied. They can serve as role models in
the role imitation sense for anyone who aspires to be an athlete,
but, despite the conventional wisdom and current popular usage,
the notion of the athlete as a role model in the comprehensive sense
seems logically unsound and normatively undesirable.
What is it that pushes people to assume that professional
athletes-who are generally young men in their twenties still
struggling to define themselves, 10 1 quite often without extensive
formal education, 10 2 while engaged in enterprises that glorify
Consider the debate surrounding O.J. Simpson. Whenjournalist Barry Cooper
writes that "[e]ven if [Simpson is] acquitted of murder charges, he's finished as a role
model," Barry Cooper, Simpson's Fall a LossforAfrican-Americans, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 19, 1994, at DI, available in LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File, he is clearly not
saying that aspiring football players will never model themselves after Simpson when
it comes to rushing a football. Rather, Cooper suggests that young people will not
want to model their general lives on a person like Simpson. As another journalist
observes:
There was, for example, the assertion that [the O.J. Simpson case] showed
conclusively how mistaken it was to view athletes as role models. Leave
aside that such a statement is premature in an unresolved case. It is entirely
true that athletic prowess does not automatically translate into good
character. It is also true that role models other than athletes deserve more
prominence. But even if Mr. Simpson were found guilty, how would it be
possible to go from there to sweeping conclusions about all athletes? How
many athletes are arrested for murder? How many more visit schools,
encourage kids to study, urge teenagers off drugs?
The O.J. Simpson Case, WASH. POST, June 22, 1994, at A20. My purpose here is not
to assess the validity of these writers' observations concerning what can or cannot be
inferred about the moral character of athletes in general from this particular case.
Rather, my point is simply that these writers invoke the notion of role model in the
comprehensive sense.
.01 See Taylor Buckley, Coleman a Victim of Unrealistic Public Expectations, USA
TODAY, Aug. 5, 1993, at 3C ("Why do we insist that these otherwise-immature and
very unworldly people, merely by virtue of their physical gifts and training, be social
role models? Do we train them for this?"); see also Frank Deford, Designated Heroes,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1994, at A19 ("[A]thletes are, for the most part, young men
footloose and fancy free, possessing great wealth and little responsibility, who have
been bootlicked and pushed ahead in line since they were children and are therefore
likely to Let Us Down.").
" The college graduation rate for student-athletes, especially black male student-
athletes, is very low. A recent report of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) compared a group of student-athletes who entered Division I colleges in
1984 and 1985, before the adoption of an NCAA bylaw that raised the 'eligibility
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violence ° 3 and combat° 4-should serve as comprehensive role
standards for student-athletes by requiring at least a "C" (2.0) grade point average in
college-preparatory courses and at least a score of 700 on the SAT or 15 on the ACT
admissions exams, with a group who entered in 1986, after the provision, commonly
know as Proposition 48, had come into effect. See NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASS'N, NCAA RESEARCH REPORT 92-01, at 3 (1993). The overall graduation rate for
the first group was 48.2% and the overall graduation rate for the second group was
56.5%; the rate for black male student-athletes increased as well, but from a very
dismal 29.5% in the first group to 39.5% in the second group; and the rate among
black male student-athletes in so-called "revenue sports" (football and basketball)
increased from only 28.5% in the first group to 33.4% in the second group. See id.;
see also Harold B. Hilborn, Student Athletes and Judicial Inconsistency: Establishing a
Duty to Educate As a Means of Fostering Meaningful Reform of Intercollegiate Athletics, 89
Nw. U. L. REV. 741, 745 (1995) ("These [graduation rate] statistics say nothing of the
quality of education, the student-athletes' fields of study, the means by which the few
passed their courses, or admission standards.").
Some estimate that "20% to 25% of the black athletes at four year colleges are
functionally illiterate." Derek Q.Johnson, Educating Misguided Student Athletes: An
Application of Contract Theory, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 96,97 (1985). At the extreme, some
student-athletes graduate from college without knowing how to read or write, like
former professional football player Dexter Manley, who confessed that he was
illiterate. See Tom Friend, Pro Football; For Manley, Without Football Lfe Is Impossible
to Tackle, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995, § 8, at 1 ("When he learned, at age 29, he said
he was preparing for life after football").
10 Many athletes who are supposed to be role models play in contact sports such
as football and basketball. In the National Football League (NFL), beating up on the
opposition is central to the enterprise, and violence is a virtue, not a vice. Timm
Rosenbach, a former quarterback for the Phoenix Cardinals, told a sports writer for
the New York Times that he thought he "was turning into some kind of animal."
Mariah B. Nelson, Bad Sports, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1994, at A21.
You go through a week getting yourself up for a game by hating the other
team, the other players. You're so mean and hateful, you want to kill
somebody. Football's so aggressive. Things get done by force. And then
you come home, you're supposed to turn it off? "Oh, here's your lovin'
daddy." It's not that easy. It was like I was an idiot. I felt programmed.
I had become a machine.
Id.
Some have argued that sports cultivate a culture of violence. Nelson argues that
the revelation that O.J. Simpson often abused his recently murdered wife, Nicole
Brown Simpson, should not surprise us. See id. Spousal abuse commonly occurs
among famous athletes. For example, baseball star Darryl Strawberry, "admitted
beating his wife and pointing a gun in her face." Id. Golf proJohn Daly was arrested
for "allegedly hurling his wife against a wall, pulling her hair and trashing the house"
and "pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor harassment charge." Id.
Nelson also points out that such abuse is not limited to the spouses and
girlfriends. For example, Wimp Sanderson had to resign from his position as the
men's basketball coach at the University of Alabama after his secretary won a large
settlement for allegations of physical abuse. See id. Sanderson explained that his
secretary received a black eye after "colliding with his outstretched hand." Id.
From these examples, Nelson concludes that through "hockey fights, football
tackles [and] baseball brawls, intentionally hurtful acts are portrayed as natural-for
men. Society's concept of violence is inextricably interwoven with its concept of
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models for emulation by young people (usually blacks)? And why
is it that prominent people in the public sphere insist that fictional
characters behave in a way that will set a positive example for
others? One reason might be that this role model rhetoric allows
those in positions of power to divert attention away from the real
question of power and distribution of resources in this society.
10 5
Thus, rather than engaging in a debate about the institutional
failures that led to the increase in single parenthood, policymakers
attack fictional television characters like Murphy Brown for setting
a bad example." 6 Rather than dealing with the shortcomings of
expected, condoned male behavior." Id. At a time when violence is destroying the
communities of the young people who supposedly view these athletes as role models,
do we really want to glorify activities that produce such violent confrontations?
"' I think Catharine MacKinnon had a point when she wrote:
[A]thletics to men is a form of combat. It is a sphere in which one asserts
oneself against an object, a person, or a standard. It is a form of coming
against and subduing someone who is on the other side, vanquishing ene-
mies.... Physicality for men has meant male dominance; it has meant
force, coercion, and the ability to subdue and subject the natural world, one
central part of which has been us.
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
121 (1987).
Although no one has conducted a systematic study of the rate of violence against
women by men who play contact sports, there is some (preliminary) indication that
on college campuses athletes "appear to be disproportionately involved in incidents
of sexual assault." Robert Lipsyte, Why Do Male Athletes Assault Women? Research
Begins, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at B14 (quoting TODD W. CROSSET ET AL., MALE
STUDENT-ATHLETES REPORTED FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT: A SURVEY OF CAMPUS POLICE
DEPARTMENTS ANDJUDICIAL AFFAIRS OFFICES (North Am. Soc'y for Sports Soc. 1994));
see also Mike Rubin, Illegal Procedures: Rap Sheets, Pay Offs, and Coaching Scams of
College Football's Real-Life Top 20, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 16, 1996, at 27, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
105 See MILLS, supra note 20, at 612 ("With ideas one can conceal or expose the
holders of power. And with ideas of more hypnotic though frivolous shape, one can divert
attention from problems of power and authority and social reality in general." (emphasis
added)).
106 During the 1992 presidential campaign, Vice President Quayle garnered an
enormous amount of public attention by condemning the fictional television character
Murphy Brown for conceiving a child out of wedlock. See supra note 7.
In Hollywood, a world away, people who are paid to create fantasy are
wondering aloud how the wheels of government became so consumed with
a situation comedy.
"I thought [William Bennett's comment that the cartoon character Bart
Simpson was 'a lousy role model'] was just another Dan Quaylejoke," Matt
Groening, creator of "The Simpsons," a favorite target of the Bush
administration, said in an interview.
"It turns out not to be a joke. It shows that the level of discourse in
this country has been reduced to the level of distracting entertainment."
Quayle Speaks, supra note 7, at 6; see also Janofsky, supra note 75, at 20 (noting that
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the educational system and the general neglect of urban America,
policymakers debate whether athletes are acting as positive role
models for inner-city youth.
Perhaps it is not surprising that entertainers, both real and
fictional, are now considered role models in the comprehensive
sense precisely at the moment when circumstances have seriously
undermined the influence of traditional comprehensive role models,
such as parents and teachers, for a large segment of the population.
As the economic capital of teachers has declined, that of entertain-
ers has grown astronomically. While a teacher often earns barely
enough to support a family, a successful entertainer (either an
athlete or a media star) usually commands a six- or seven-figure
salary. Quite often the decline of an institution's economic capital
also leads to the decline of its symbolic capital0 7 because, in this
or any other strongly market-oriented society, the prestige and
influence of an institution directly relates to the economic capital
invested in that institution.1
0 8
The rise of the rhetoric of entertainers as role models indi-
cates that the prestige and power of traditional figures of influ-
most moviegoers "disagreed with Senator Bob Dole's fingerpointing at Hollywood...
as the cause[] of a morality meltdown").
i7 The notion of capital figures prominently in the work of the French sociologist-
philosopher Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu argues that the logic of capital orders the
struggle among forces for legitimate authority and position. He defines capital in
an expansive way, including economic capital (the most obvious and well-understood
form of capital), cultural capital, and symbolic capital. As Bourdieu puts it, capital
refers to "all the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present
themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation."
PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 178 (Richard Nice trans.,
1977).
Cultural capital includes such things as culturally defined tastes, consumption
patterns, education, and art forms. Cultural capital also refers to things such as
prestige and status. Symbolic capital includes culturally significant attributes that one
can appropriate in the struggle for legitimate position and authority just as one can
appropriate economic capital in pursuit of the same end. For a thorough description
of Bourdieu's conception of capital, see Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in
HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241 (John
G. Richardson ed., 1986) and PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE
OF THEJUDGEMENT OF TASTE 13-16 (Richard Nice trans., 1984) (1979) [hereinafter
BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION] (presenting analyses that link cultural practices and tastes
to educational capital and social origin or to inherited capital).
" This phenomenon illustrates Bourdieu's observation that capital is convertible;
that is, one kind of capital can be exchanged for another. See BOURDIEU, DISTINC-
TION, supra note 107, at 114-68 (explaining that individuals and classes will shift their
capital allocations to permit social mobility toward areas that carry more prestige and
away from areas that carry less).
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ence, such as parents and teachers, has declined and is being
supplanted by figures from the entertainment industry. But it
seems erroneous to believe that they could perform the role model
functions traditionally performed by parents and teachers, not only
because the two characteristics that define comprehensive role
modeling-physical presence and an authority-vulnerability social
nexus-are not present, but also because there are few indications
that entertainers or athletes ought to serve as models for the good
and-virtuous life. Indeed, at least in relation to athletes, the reverse
appears to be the case. Just because an institution is well-endowed
with economic capital, and thus carries a great deal of symbolic
capital, it does not follow that it can, therefore, perform the
traditional role modeling functions of other institutions. Perhaps
the solution lies in strengthening the power and prestige of families
and the educational system by reversing the decline of their
economic and symbolic capital, which has been brought about by
governmental policies and the market, rather than blaming
entertainers for the disintegration of the good and moral life or
worse, hoping that the entertainment industry will perform the role
modeling functions that should be performed by parents and
teachers.
Indeed, given the lack of empirical data to support the
claim that people emulate the actions of athletes and television
characters in a comprehensive sense, combined with the fact
that many athletes are immature young people who are still
trying to discover themselves, why do people insist on regard-
ing these people as role models? As I mentioned earlier, focus-
ing on the behaviors and actions of certain individuals and
groups to explain social decay may allow those in positions of
power to avoid dealing with the institutional and structural
conditions that led to social decline. The pathologies of inner-
city crime, family breakdowns, drug dependency, and the prevalence
of hopelessness and defeatism are often caused by governmental
policies and market forces. It is easier for those in power to blame
black athletes or a television program than to take responsibility
for these structural and institutional problems which they have
helped create or sustain.
There might be another reason. Not only does this role model
rhetoric divert our attention away from the material basis of social
decay, thus making it more difficult to formulate a proper dialogue
about the actual causes of these problems, but it also sends a
message to those who are underrepresented in the social and
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political life of the community and overrepresented in its problem
areas that unfairness is only a perception or an attitude prob-
lem. 0 9 When members of the dominant group use the concept
of role model to condemn the conduct of supposed role models,
they send the message that, if the perception of role model
followers was not distorted by the misconduct of the supposed role
model, social conditions would improve. When, in rare circum-
stances, members of the dominant group invoke the concept of role
model to praise either the conduct or the position of the supposed
role model, they are also suggesting that the exclusion of role model
followers primarily results from their own erroneous perception of
structural and institutional exclusions. According to this rhetoric,
the role model has a responsibility to advertise these misperceptions
to the world. This rhetoric simultaneously allows members of the
dominant group to reassure themselves of their innocence and
generosity. By framing the problem as one of perception, members
of the dominant group can see themselves and their institutions as
innocent bystanders, free of blame for the unfavorable condition of
underrepresented groups. If members of the dominant group and
their institutions are not responsible for the underrepresentation of
those groups that supposedly need role models, whenever a member
of such a group is installed in a position of power, he or she
assumes that position through the grace, goodwill, and generosity
of the dominant group rather than through the requirements of
justice or the capacity and qualifications of the supposed role
model. This version of the concept of role model, therefore,
deemphasizes the structural and institutional aspects of exclusion as
well as the qualifications of the role model"0 while simultaneously
"0 Indeed, a statement issued by Stephen Higgins, Director of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, in response to allegations of widespread sexual
harassment and racial discrimination within the agency, illustrates how role model
rhetoric can be used to divert attention away from real institutional and structural
problems. "There are people working with us who perceive they are not being
treated fairly.... [W]e need to do more about it. People look for role models in the
higher ranks, and until we get more blacks and women in the executive ranks, you
will have a perception of unfairness." Stephen Labaton, Report to Fault Firearms Bureau
for Raid on Cult, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at Al, A15 (quoting Stephen H. Higgins
(emphasis added)). According to the Director, the purpose of a role model is to
reassure role model followers that structural or institutional problems do not exist
and to calm those who are "unduly" anxious about unfairness in the system. See id.
110 1 think Anita Allen is right when she observes that, in law schools or any other
area of employment, receiving a position based on one's potential as a role model for
future applicants "trumpets [one's] necessity," while simultaneously "whisper[ing
one's] inferiority." Allen, supra note 22, at 37; see also Guinier, supra note 15, at 1112-
14171996]
1418 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1377
highlighting the generosity and kindness of the dominant group that
selects that role model.
It is quite clear, therefore, that this version of the concept of
role model implicitly puts the blame for the underrepresentation of
excluded groups in particular enterprises either on a lack of natural
endowment among members of those groups or on cultural defects
(or perceptual problems) that impede group members from
succeeding. According to this argument, if some minorities can
make millions of dollars in sports, then the only reason that others
have not done as well in other areas of life is that they do not have
the desire or the traits necessary to succeed. Viewed this way, the
concept of role model diverts attention away from the problems of
power and social structure. Ironically, this diversion depends on
two contradictory messages. On the one hand, the message for the
intended emulator seems to be that, because there are no institu-
tional or structural impediments to success, if individuals adjust
their erroneous perceptions to the contrary, work hard, and possess
the necessary natural endowment, success will surely follow. On the
other hand, the message to the individual selected as a role model
is quite often that he or she achieved that position not because of
merit, but because of his or her representational and symbolic
value. Praising the supposed role model to his or her intended role
model followers as an example of success is, therefore, insincere.
The notion of comprehensive role modeling is implausible when
extended beyond an environment where the role model and the role
model emulator are tied by physical space and an authority-
vulnerability social nexus, for example, when the rhetoric of role
models is applied to professional athletes. The politics of recogni-
tion offers a possible ground for justifying the use of the concept of
role model in this extended, race-specific sense. But in some areas,
such as sports, the rhetoric of role models cannot possibly be
understood or defended in terms of the politics of recognition.
Given the fact that many minorities are well-represented in athletics,
the need for recognition in that area is simply not an issue;
therefore, when people insist that athletes serve as role models, they
cannot be talking about the need for affirmation. Indeed, the
problem is not the lack of affirmation of minorities in athletics, but
the tendency of the majority to see the achievements and aspirations
28 (arguing that affirmatively assisting minorities so that they may achieve prominent
positions makes them seem more like tokens than achievers).
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of minorities predominantly in terms of athletics and entertainment.
In many ways the rhetoric of athletes as role models simply
reaffirms the stereotype that African Americans as a group gravitate
towards certain roles,111 such as sports and entertainment, and
that role occupants in those fields define the good life for all
African Americans, even those who might have neither the capacity
. Indeed, it is this assumption that seems to have led the Supreme Court to
reject the dearth of minority contractors in Richmond, Virginia as a factual basis for
establishing racial discrimination in the construction industry and, hence, to reject a
set-aside program to aid minority contractors attempting to enter that industry. See
City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989). Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, observed: "It is sheer speculation how many minority firms
there would be in Richmond absent past societal discrimination," therefore the
extreme underrepresentation of minorities in the industry could not be "probative
of any discrimination in the local construction industry." Id. at 499, 503. Why not?
"There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation... [one
of which is] black and white career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be
disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction." Id. (emphasis
added). As I have argued elsewhereJustice O'Connor simply assumed that the high
proportion of African Americans in some fields (such as sports), and their extreme
underrepresentation in others (such as construction) accurately reflected the choices
and inclinations of members of this group. See Addis, supra note 62, at 545-49. A
substantial number of white Americans would probably agree withJustice O'Connor
on this point. Stereotypes about the career choices of African Americans are
common. Perhaps whatJustice O'Connor and those who share her view regard as
deliberate career choices are in large measure a result of social constraints that
prevent African Americans from entering certain fields and encourage them to
gravitate towards other fields from which they are not structurally excluded. By
characterizing this gravitation within the African American community as a matter of
attraction, Justice O'Connor finds unconstrained choice where it does not exist.
What is also strange about O'Connor's assumption (and the assumption of those
who share her views) regarding African Americans' gravitation towards certain fields
is that she never attempts to explain why this gravitation might logically occur. It is
especially troubling when one considers the fact that the notion of group-gravitation
is fundamentally inconsistent with the central ideology of this country that individuals
structure their lives as individuals rather than as members of a group. See id. at
547-50; see also infra note 250. Ironically, the supremacy of individual choice over
group-determination was the central theme ofJustice O'Connor's decision in Croson.
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; cf. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2827 (1993) ("A
reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same
race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of
their skin... reinforces the perception that members of the same racial group...
think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at
the polls."); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies
the simple command that the Government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not "as
simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class."'" (quoting Arizona
Governors Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983) (quoting City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 705 (1977)))).
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nor the desire to occupy those particular positions. In this respect,
the invocation of the concept of role model in athletics is in fact a
rhetorical continuation of the process of misrecognition. But, as I
shall argue in the rest of this Article, there are some circumstances
in which the notion of race (or gender) specific role model can best
be understood and defended in terms of the politics of recognition.
C. The Concept of Role Model and the Politics of Recognition
[M]oral progress is born of the struggle for recognition.
112
The dominant political fact of the late twentieth century has
been the politics of recognition. Many of the disputes in many
countries and regions of the world can be understood, to a large
extent, as skirmishes and struggles of groups and communities
animated by the desire for recognition. The form of recognition
desired and the manner in which it is pursued naturally differs from
one community to another. Thus, in Canada, 3 the former
Yugoslavia, 114 and some parts of the former Soviet Union," 5 the
112 Honneth, supra note 52, at 200.
.. The status of Quebec in the Canadian federation has been a point of discussion
and deliberation in Canada for a long time. Indeed, there is now a political party in
the Federal Parliament, Bloc Qu~bicois that advocates for the independence of
Quebec and, by virtue of the number of its members, has assumed the role of "Her
Majesty's Loyal Opposition, our government-in-waiting." Mordecai Richler, 0 Quebec,
NEW YORKER, May 30, 1994, at 50, 51. In October, 1995, the province held a
referendum on whether it should secede or remain part of Canada. Secession was
rejected by the narrowest of margins: 50.6% to 49.4%. See Clyde H. Farnsworth,
Quebec, By a Razor-Thin Margin, Votes 'No' on Leaving Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30,
1995, at Al. It does not seem likely that the issue of Quebec's independence will
dissipate any time soon. Lucien Bouchard, the most popular leader of the separatist
movement, has recently become the Premier of Quebec, and "most polls indicate that
support within Quebec for independence is even higher today than in October."
Clyde H. Farnsworth, Quebec Separatist Becomes Premier, PledgingEconomic Agenda, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1996, at A7.
14 See generally Hurst Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe:
Old Wine in New Bottles?, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1993) (providing
a brief assessment of the European approach to the conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia). For a longer and more extended treatment of the concept of self-
determination, see generally Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1993).
15 For example, the Economist called Crimea "[t]he most likely spark that could
make this Ukrainian tinder-box burst into flames." Looking into the Abyss, ECONOMIST,
May 28, 1994, at 45. In 1954, Nikita Khrushchev carved Crimea, whose population
is 70% Russian, out of the Russian Republic and handed it to Ukraine. Now, after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimea contemplates either independence or some form
of association with Russia. See Alessandra Stanley, Crimea Is Waging a War of Nerves
with Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1994, § 1, at 2.
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basic goal of various ethnic minorities has been to challenge the
very authority of the State by attempting to free themselves, as a
group, from its jurisdiction.1 16  Recognition here is manifest
through the ultimate form of self-determination: political divorce
from the currently constituted territorial unit.11 7  In an interna-
tional political arrangement that puts a premium on the state
system, communities with a distinct culture, tradition, and history
often seek to be recognized as independent states by other
sovereign states. Once a community receives such recognition, it
achieves formal equality on the international plane, which validates
its identity and signifies to the rest of the world that it has control
over its own affairs.
118
In other circumstances, such as in South Africa until recently
and in the United States in the not-too distant past, excluded
communities struggled for recognition by asserting their right to
participate in the (formal) political life of the community. Because
their exclusion was premised on the explicit assumption that
members of these groups did not possess the requisite qualities to
actively participate in the life of the community, the struggle for
For a discussion of other border disputes within the former Soviet Union, see
John Lloyd & Leyla Boulton, Myriad Territorial Disputes Set to Take Centre-Stage, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991, § 1, at 2 (noting 15 major border disputes); Serge Schmemann,
Ethnic Battles Flaring in Former Soviet Fringe, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1992, § 1, at 10
(noting the unresolved conflicts that have arisen in Moldova, Armenia-Azerbaijan, and
Georgia); Michael Specter, A 40-Mile Chain Against Russian Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 1994, at A18 (reporting that Abkhazia, an autonomous region in Georgia with a
Muslim minority, has been fighting the national government for independence and
discussing the secessionist war in the Russian Republic, where Chechnya has been
attempting to secede).
16 For a survey of current ethnic conflicts throughout the world and the challenge
they pose to the post-cold war international system, see David Binder & Barbara
Crossette, As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993,
§ 1, at 1.
117 See ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION: THE MORALITY OF POLITICAL DIVORCE FROM
FORT SUMTER TO LITHUANIA AND QUEBEC 27-149 (1991) (developing a moral theory
of secession while also examining its legality); Adeno Addis, Individualism, Commun-
itarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 623-28
(1992) (positing that normatively justifiable secession by ethnic minorities may in
certain circumstances fail to address the underlying conditions that gave rise to the
demand for secession).
138 What I mean by formal equality is that once a community constitutes itself as
a state that community benefits from the formal rules of current international law.
Its borders and internal affairs remain inviolate against other states, it has the right
to be admitted to the United Nations, its vote in the United Nations General
Assembly will be accorded the same weight as the vote of any other sovereign nation,
and it can exchange ambassadors with other nations.
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recognition by members of these excluded groups took the form of
asserting their rights to be recognized as "responsible moral agents"
by the formal political process and to have an equal opportunity to
participate in the shaping of the life of the community. 9
In the United States today and in other multi-ethnic coun-
tries, however, where excluded groups are formally recognized
as equal participants in the public life of the community, the
demand for recognition by members of minority communities is
premised on the claim that, although formally admitted to partici-
pate in the political process, their stories, histories, and cultures
are informally excluded from or downgraded by myth-constituting
institutions and processes such as the educational system and the
media. 120  The recent movements for diversity and multicultur-
alism in the United States are informed by this desire for and
necessity of recognition. To be validated means much more than to
be recognized as a formal participant in the political process. It
also means to see the processes, the "horizon[s] of significance," the
culture, tradition and history that go toward defining one's self
affirmed and validated.'
2 1
Thus, the centrality of the politics of recognition is tied to the
current understanding of how the identities of groups and individu-
als are constituted. As Charles Taylor put it: "Our identity is partly
shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of
others .... "122 The idea is that our identities are relationally
constituted, 23 and that "nonrecognition or misrecognition can
"' According to Ronald Dworkin, a feature of any just political society is that its
government treats "all its adult members, except those who are incompetent, as
responsible moral agents." Ronald Dworkin, The ComingBattles over Free Speech, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS, June 11, 1992, at 56; see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977).
120 For a discussion of how the media devalues the lives and histories of minorities,
especially those of African Americans, see Addis, supra note 73, at 2253-71 (arguing
that the devaluation of African Americans in the media is inextricably tied to the
devaluation of African Americans in the criminaljustice system); see also Addis, supra
note 62, at 527-28 ("The stereotypical pictures of African Americans painted daily in
the mass media are made possible because African Americans are seen and treated
as subjects of deliberation, rather than as deliberating subjects. Both as victims and
as resisters, stories about African Americans are largely told by others.").
121 CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 52 (1992) ("Recognizing
difference, like self-choosing, requires a horizon of significance.... ."). "Things take
on importance against a background of intelligibility. Let us call this a horizon. It
follows that one of the things we can't do, if we are to define ourselves significantly,
is suppress or deny the horizons against which things take on significance for us." Id.
at 37.
122 Taylor, supra note 24, at 25.
1'2 Taylor observes that "[tlhe crucial feature of human life is its fundamentally
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inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in
a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. " 124  Nonrecogni-
tion can take various forms. Sometimes it takes an almost literal
form, such as when an employee of a store ignores an African
American customer as if that person did not exist.125 In these
situations, nonrecognition is often the equivalent of a death ritual
performed to render the nonrecognized individual socially invisi-
ble. 126 At other times, nonrecognition takes a subtler and more
dialogical character.... We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes
in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us." Id. at 32-33;
see also WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC NEGOTIATIONS
OF POLITICAL PARADOX 64 (1991) ("My identity is what I am and how I am recognized
rather than what I choose, want or consent to. It is the dense self from which
choosing, wanting, and consenting proceed."); MERTON, supra note 13, at 292-93
('The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from
the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same group, or from
the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs."
(quoting MEAD, supra note 54, at 138)); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFER-
ENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990) (arguing that "many
categories used to describe people's differences are invented only at the moment
when summoned into the service of defining someone"); IRIS M. YOUNGJUSTICE AND
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 43 (1990) ("Group identification arises ... in the
encounter and interaction between social collectivities that experience some
differences in their way of life and forms of association, even if they also regard
themselves as belonging to the same society.").
124 Taylor, supra note 24, at 25. Referring to the damage that misrecognition can
do to groups or individuals, Taylor observes that a "person or group of people can
suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back
to them a contemptible picture of themselves." Id..
" Nonrecognition can manifest itself in all sorts of venues, including sidewalks.
Angela Harris writes:
I didn't really start to feel black until I went to Chicago, several years later.
I lived in Hyde Park and went to graduate school and was constantly run off
the sidewalk: by undergraduates in safety pins and neon hair, deep in angst-
ridden conversation; by hard-eyed business school women in pinstripe suits;
by blond young men in shorts going to or from sporting activities. Again
and again I would approach a group, expecting it to part as I walked into
it; again and again I would end up in the February mud or be jostled aside.
I was furious at my invisibility. Too lady-like to protest, I would direct
angry stares at their disappearing backs. But I envied them too.
Harris, supra note 23, at 109-10 (footnotes omitted).
126 By referring to this process of nonrecognition as a ritual I mean to suggest two
things. First, I want to highlight the fact that the process is routine, both in terms of
the fact that it is practiced by a large percentage of the majority race (hence giving
it a collective dimension) as well as the fact that individuals perform this act on a
regular basis (hence reproducing the act over a period of time). See ORLANDO
PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 37 (1982) ("The social aspect of symbolic
behavior refers to the ritual processes by. .. which symbolic ideas are acted out in
terms of real human interactions. Where the experience ... symbolized extends over
1996] 1423
1424 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1377
complicated form, when for example, a debate about social policy
within a certain segment of the population (say women) completely
ignores the concerns of a minority subgroup within that segment of
the population (say women of color). This form of nonrecognition
led Sojourner Truth to retort: "Ain't I a woman?"127  In many
ways the resistance of minority women scholars to what they
consider the essentializing scholarship of many white feminist
scholars echoes Truth's "Ain't I a woman?" retort.
121
a long period of time there is a tendency for a clearly defined symbolic pattern to
develop ... ."). Second, it is a ritual in the sense that for those who perform it,
"[nonrecognition] is a code for understanding their interpretation of life." TALAL
ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION 78 (1993) (citing G.S. WORGUL, FROM MAGIC TO
METAPHOR: A VALIDATION OF THE CHRISTIAN SACRAMENTS 224 (1980)). From the
ritual performer's point of view the nonrecognition ritual symbolically represents the
social death of the nonrecognized individual, thus resurrecting an earlier social
environment. As Patterson argues, slavery perhaps expresses the ultimate form of
social death. See 1 ORLANDO PATTERSON, FREEDOM: FREEDOM IN THE MAKING OF
WESTERN CULTURE 9-10 (1991) ("[T]he slave is always an excommunicated person.
He, more often she, does not belong to the legitimate social or moral community; he
has no independent social existence; he exists only through, and for, the master; he
is, in other words, natally alienated."); see also id. at 21 ("A slave is a dead man.").
For an interesting inquiry into the genealogy of rituals, see Chapter Two of
ASAD, supra.
127 In 1851, Sojourner Truth, an African American woman, asked this question in
a speech she gave to a women's rights convention which was almost exclusively white
and that almost exclusively addressed the rights and interests of white women. Truth
told her audience:
That man over there says women need to be helped into carriages, and
lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever
helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place!
And ain't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed, and
planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head me! And ain't I
a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man-when I could
get it-and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? I have borne thirteen
children, and seen them most all sold off to slavery, and when I cried out
with my mother's grief, none butJesus heard me! And ain't I a woman?
Susan Moller Okin, Gender Inequality and CulturalDfference, 22 POL. THEORY 5,21 n.3
(1994). For the text of Truth's slave narrative in its original form, see Reminiscences
By Frances D. Gage: Sojourner Truth, in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 115, 116
(Elizabeth C. Stanton et al. eds., 1969).
128 See, e.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 581,585 (1990) (arguing that, although feminist legal scholarship is "powerful
and brilliant in many ways," it presumes a unitary women's experience which silences
black women and other groups traditionally silenced by the mainstream); BELL HOOKS,
AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 1, 24 (1981) (claiming that, if
women are to be "committed to the feminist revolution," they must first "confront[J
the reality ofwhite female racism"). For one of the first sustained critiques of essen-
tialism in feminist scholarship, see ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN:
PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT at ix (1988) ("[T]he notion of a
generic 'woman' functions in feminist thought much the way the notion of generic
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Nonrecognition also occurs when dominant groups categorize
members of minority groups in certain roles. In this country, for
example, the dominant culture traditionally considers African
Americans physically capable but intellectually lacking. As a
consequence, certain roles remain out of reach for African Ameri-
cans, while other roles are considered a natural fit. Thus, while the
dominant group recognizes that African Americans can excel in
both athletic and artistic endeavors, the widespread view among
members of the majority race is that African Americans do not
possess the appropriate skills to fill leadership positions, even in
those areas where they excel, such as professional sports. Al
Campanis, while Vice President of the Los Angeles Dodgers,
expressed what I believe to be a widely held belief when he declared
that African Americans "may not have some of the necessities to be,
let's say, a field manager or perhaps a general manager [of a
baseball team]."
129
Before I explore the conceptual issue of misrecognition or
nonrecognition, let me just briefly mention the various ways in
which groups and individuals who have been targets of nonrecog-
nition have generally responded to the social threat of banishment.
Some have challenged the very institutions that cultivated the
culture of nonrecognition or misrecognition, such as the education-
al system and the media. 3 ' This challenge to nonrecognition
animates the multiculturalist movement. Here the struggle for
recognition is positive and political, and thus has a transformative
potential.
Other recipients, however, exhibit a dangerously pathological
response to the daily threat of social death and nonrecognition. A
good example is the experience of young African American males
who live in America's inner cities. This group frequently invokes
the term "dissing": to be "dissed" is to be disrespected, not
recognized, or misrecognized.' 3 ' When an inner-city youth is
'man' has functioned in Western philosophy: it obscures the heterogeneity of women
and cuts off examination of the significance ofsuch heterogeneity for feminist theory
and political activity.").
" Nightline (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 6, 1987). A 1990 survey conducted
by the National Opinion Research Center found that 62% of whites thought that
African Americans were less likely to be hardworking, and 53% believed that African
Americans were not as smart as whites. See Survey: White Racism Alive and Well, THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Jan. 9, 1991, at A4 (citing NATIONAL OPINION
RESEARCH CENTER, GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY (1990)). For the dearth of minority
administrators in sports, see Addis, supra note 62, at 558-59.0 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
" The Chambers Dictionary defines "diss" as "to reject or dismiss with contempt."
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"dissed" (or perceives himself to be "dissed"), he may feel compelled
to reassert himself and reaffirm his agency, quite often by taking
inordinately harsh measures against the perceived "disser,"
including even bodily harm or death. Ironically, the supposed
"disser" is usually another young African American male in more or
less the same social and economic condition as the "dissed." Often
it is very difficult for outside observers to comprehend why the
"dissed" felt so disrespected by the speaker, his victim, let alone why
this act of nonrecognition necessitated such a harsh retaliation.
One way to understand these murderous assertions of agency is
to realize that, for these young men, whose daily encounters with
the members and institutions of the majority are characterized by
disrespect and devaluation and who internalize that devaluation
over time, the only avenues left for them to pursue a semblance of
respect are the streets and their neighborhoods. What these young
men are robbed of in their daily lives-the recognition and respect
most fundamental to their identities-they attempt to regain on the
streets by engaging in disputes over the most trivial and mundane
aspects of existence, sometimes using exaggerated and even violent
means. I do not mean to suggest that every brutal act or inner-city
conflict among young African American males can be explained as
a response to disrespect and nonrecognition. There are numerous
reasons for the conflict and destruction among young African
American males, such as joblessness, drug dependency, and the
demise of the family unit. Many times, however, a young African
American male's exaggerated response can only be explained as a
reassertion of agency (the restoration of his "dissed manhood");" 2
THE CHAMBERS DICTIONARY 487 (1994). Apparently, Webster's New World Dictionaty
will also include the word in it next edition. See "Gustnado" Dissed By Dictionary
10-Yes, "Diss" Among Them-Official Addition to Lexicon, HERALD-SUN,July 30, 1995,
at G3.
132 Consider, for example, a recent story involving a 16-year-old who shot a 12-
year-old who comically nagged him "for a quarter outside a neighborhood grocery
store." A police officer observed: "He shot him over a quarter .... But it comes
to the bigger issue of disrespect between the younger boy and the older boy. He
came into a rage.... He was upset-about being dissed." Carey Goldberg, Boy, 12,
Dies in a Rage of Bullets, and a 16-Year-Old Is Held, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1995, at B1,
B3. The shooter told the police that "he felt justified because of the disrespect" the
deceased had shown him. Id.; see also Linda Fairstein, Family Violence in the United
States andAbroad, 15 N.Y.L. SCH.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 229,234 (1995) ("[In the Bronx
... a thirteen-year-old boy shot and killed the five-year-old girl who lived next door
to him because she had dissed him by stepping on his shadow."); Marc Fleisher, Down
the Passage Which We Should Not Take: The Folly of Hate Crime Legislation, 2J.L. & POL.
1, 41 n.119 (1994) ("A man was walking down the street and came upon a group of
black teenagers who passed him on both sides. He inadvertently brushed shoulders
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in these cases, the youth's need for reassertion seems to be in direct
proportion to the intensity and frequency of his devaluation in the
larger society.
Of course these two potential responses to disrespect and
nonrecognition do not exhaust the ways in which people can and do
cope with the daily threat of misrecognition and nonrecognition.
I mention them, however, to indicate how people, as individuals and
as groups, respond to the phenomenon. But what of the conceptual
question of respect and disrespect, recognition and misrecognition
(or nonrecognition)? In a very interesting article, Axel Honneth
explores the relationship between disrespect and integrity. Having
defined his project as one of clarifying the "interrelation between
disrespect and human integrity," 3' Honneth argues that, "we owe
our integrity, in a subliminal way, to the receipt of approval or
recognition from other persons.""3 4 Disrespect and the denial of
recognition is injurious because it impairs people "in their positive
understanding of self-an understanding acquired by intersubjective
means."135
with one of them who turned around and said: 'Hey man, you dissed me.' The
teenager then pummeled the man, knocking him to the ground, and shot him, leaving
him in the street where he was almost hit by oncoming traffic.").
Teenage pregnancy can also be understood as a partial attempt to reassert agency
obliterated in daily life. One author reports that unwed teenage mothers frequently
get pregnant in an effort to rebuild their self-worth in an environment that
continually tells them and their young male partners that they are not worth much:
Being pregnant means being the center of attention, wanting to keep a
boyfriend, or wanting to create something special. Getting a girl pregnant
is often an attempt to prove to peers and parents that one is now a man....
A teenager wants to have a baby in order to feel important and dignified,
to feel good about herself because she has not felt good enough before.
Becoming a parent is an attempt to secure intimacy, love, and safety, to
claim identity and a new status.
DANIEL B. FRANK, DEEP BLUE FUNK & OTHER STORIES: PORTRAITS OF TEENAGE
PARENTS 11 (1983).
133 Honneth, supra note 52, at 188. Ernst Bloch suggested a similar idea in his
famous work, Natural Law and Human Dignity (Dennis J. Schmidt trans., 1986).
'3' Honneth, supra note 52, at 189 ("[The] invulnerability and integrity of human
beings.., depend on approval being forthcoming from others.").
'5 Id. Honneth describes three forms of disrespect. The first and most obvious
is "disrespect that pertains to a person's physical integrity." Id. at 190. This form of
disrespect refers to interference with a person's control over his or her physical self.
The ultimate example of such disrespect is, of course, slavery. The slave did not own
his or her body; the master did. Torture and rape are current examples. "Through
the experience of this type of disrespect, therefore, the person is deprived of that
form of recognition that is expressed in unconditional respect for autonomous
control over his own body, a form of respect acquired just through experiencing
emotional attachment in the socialization process." Id.
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Implicit in the notion of misrecognition or disrespect is the
possibility of recognition. As Honneth put it, "[tlhere can be no
meaningful use whatsoever of the concepts of 'disrespect' or 'insult'
were it not for the implicit reference to a subject's claim to be
granted recognition by others."" 6 Thus, the demand for recogni-
tion is a demand to be treated as a responsible moral agent because
disrespect and nonrecognition are social rituals that destroy moral
agency.
Honneth and Taylor articulate what is an almost obvious and
intuitively correct observation: individual and group identities are
constituted through interactions with others. This view, which was
first systemically and coherently presented by George Herbert
Mead,137 and was recently reformulated by Jfirgen Habermas,
13 8
The second form of disrespect deals with a normative injury to the self, as
opposed to physical degradation. When an individual or group is structurally and
systematically excluded from enjoying certain rights afforded to others in society,
these exclusions are often accompanied by a background narrative that inflicts an
enormous insult on the members of the minority group.
The distinguishing feature of [this form] of disrespect ... thus lies not
solely in comparative restrictions on personal autonomy but in the
combination of these restrictions with the feeling that the subject lacks the
status of full-fledged partners to interaction who all possess the same moral
rights. For the individual, having socially valid legal rights withheld ...
signifies a violation of the person's ... expectation that he or she will be
recognized as a subject capable of reaching moraljudgments.... Through
the experience of this type of disrespect, therefore, the person is deprived
of that form of recognition that takes the shape of cognitive respect for
moral accountability.
Id. at 191.
The third form of disrespect is tied to the second. One way to discount a
person's status as a responsible moral agent is to downgrade his or her horizons of
significance, or "forms of living and convictions," through structural isolation. Id.
Multiculturalists complain that this form of disrespect defines the attitude of the
majority towards the culture and history of minorities.
These three forms of disrespect not only exclude and devalue minority groups,
but they also lead members of these groups to unconsciously embrace a devalued
form of their identity because "self-confidence and self-respect [are to some extent
learned] from the perspective of the approving reactions of partners to interaction."
Id. at 193. The district court in Oliverv. Kalamazoo Board of Education made a similar
observation: "the Kalamazoo Board of Education's ... failure to hire more Black
personnel compounded its acts of unconstitutional segregation because it intensified
the 'unrealistic self-images and detrimental attitudes' which the racial isolation had
inflicted on Black and White students." 498 F. Supp. 732, 744 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(quoting Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 180 (W.D. Mich. 1973)).
136 Honneth, supra note 52, at 189.
157 The relational construction of identity or self is the prime concern of George
Mead's work. See MEAD, supra note 54, at 135-226 (arguing that the self develops
through social interaction). He observes: "The 'I' is the response of the organism
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maintains that the self is essentially a process rather than a
substance. 3 ' As Mead put it:
The self is something which has a development; it is not initially
there, at birth, but arises in the process of social experience and
activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his
relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within
that process.
40
to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others
which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized 'me,'
and then one reacts toward that as an 'I.'" Id. at 175. WilliamJames suggested the
distinction between "I" and "me" as far back as 1890. See 1 WILLIAM JAMES, THE
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY 291, 371 (1890) (referring to the empirical person as
"me," and the source of subjective thought as "I"). ForJames, the "I" constituted the
self as a subject, while the "me" signaled the self as an object. See WILLIAM JAMES,
PSYCHOLOGY: BRIEFER COURSE 176 (1935).
At another point Mead says, "We cannot realize ourselves except in so far as we
can recognize the other in his relationship to us. It is as he takes the attitude of the
other that the individual is able to realize himself as a self." MEAD, supra note 54, at
194.
13 See 2 JORGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thom-
as McCarthy trans., 1987) (1981). In Chapter Five, The Paradigm Shift in Mead
and Durkheim: From Purposive Activity to Communicative Action, Habermas draws
heavily on Mead's work to develop what Habermas believes to be a more defensible
theory of the social "self." See id. at 1-111. He writes that "individuality too
is a socially produced phenomenon that is a result of the socialization process
itself and not an expression of residual, natural needs that escape that pro-
cess.... [T]he process of socialization is at the same time one of individuation." Id.
at 58.
9 See MEAD, supra note 54, at 178 ("The self is not so much a substance as a
process in which the conversation of gestures has been internalized within an organic
form."). Of course, by saying that the self is essentially a process, I do not deny that
the individual is also constituted by a physical body, an undeniable substance with
certain needs and desires. Rather, I mean to suggest the following points. First,
those desires assume an intentional dimension and find meaningful objects through
interaction with other needs and desires. As Habermas argues, a person can be aware
of himself as a desiring subject, as an "I," only through language and communication
with others. See HABERMAS, supra note 138, at 57-76. Second, most of the social roles
and responses that define the individual develop through a continuous process of
interaction with others.
140 MEAD, supra note 54, at 135. Actually, Mead sees two stages in the develop-
ment of the self:
At the first of these stages, the individual's self is constituted simply by an
organization of the particular attitudes of other individuals toward himself
and toward one another in the specific social acts in which he participates
with them. But at the second stage in the full development of the indiv-
idual's self that self is constituted not only by an organization of these
particular individual attitudes, but also by an organization of the social
attitudes of the generalized other or the social group as a whole to which
he belongs. These social or group attitudes are brought within the
individual's field of direct experience, and are included as elements in the
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These interactions sometimes involve a process where one individu-
al or group refuses to recognize the capacity of another individual
or group to act as equal moral agents. When accompanied by the
resources of power, this nonrecognition or misrecognition generates
a continual ritual of social death. As I noted earlier, this type of
ritual sometimes manifests itself when one group excludes another
group from certain roles, seeing the excluded Other as the negation
of the moral and normal order inhabited by the excluding
group. 141
Thus, when we talk about educational role models in a race and
gender specific sense, we do not mean that role aspirants will
master a particular body of knowledge faster and better when they
learn it from a supposed role model of the same race or gender.
Nor do we mean that the supposed role models will or should
define the good and virtuous life for emulation by the potential role
model follower by serving as comprehensive role models. Rather,
we mean that the presence of members of traditionally excluded
groups will provide visible reassurance to the aspiring role occu-
pants that the dominant group does not devalue them and their
horizons of significance and that they "share[] with all other
members of [their] community the qualities of ... morally account-
able subject[s]." 142 In other words, the presence of supposed role
models of the same race or gender provides a counternarrative to
the dominant narrative that has reinforced the exclusion of these
marginalized groups.
In the next Part, this Article explores how the concept of role
model has fared in the courts, that is, what versions of the concept
of role model the courts have embraced, if any, and whether they
are logically defensible and normatively sensible.
structure or constitution of his self, in the same way that the attitudes of
particular other individuals are; and the individual arrives at them, or
succeeds in taking them, by means of further organizing, and then
generalizing, the attitudes of particular other individuals in terms of their
organized social bearings and implications.
Id. at 158; see also ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZA-
TION OF EXPERIENCE 188 (1974) (arguing that the self is, at least partly, a function of
the social roles it enacts).
141 See CONNOLLY, supra note 123, at 64 ("Identity requires difference in order to
be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-
certainty."); see also supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the damage to
identity caused by the exclusion of an individual or group).
142 Honneth, supra note 52, at 194.
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III. ROLE MODELS, JURISPRUDENCE, AND
THE POLrIcs OF RECOGNITION
Quite often in this country, when a concept achieves some
prominence in the discursive landscape, it eventually finds its way
into the legal domain because legal institutions in this country play
a central role in the resolution of social and political disputes,
perhaps more so than in any other country or society. What may
have initially appeared to be a theoretical construct or a rhetorical
device to map and understand social arrangements is often tested
in court as a conceptual device to resolve disputes arising from
those arrangements. Of course, when the law embraces a particular
concept, that concept has an advantage over competing alternatives
because it is no longer solely the subject of philosophical musings
and political theory. It comes to determine the ways and means by
which our social and political life is ordered and regulated.
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
1. Endorsing the Comprehensive View
The concept of role rriodel got its sustained and perhaps well-
known judicial articulation in the early 1980s in a case involving the
retention of minority teachers at a time of retrenchment. In Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education,14' a collective bargaining agreement
between the Jackson, Michigan Board of Education and a teachers'
union was challenged by a group of white school teachers. The
agreement stated, among other things, that in the event layoffs
became necessary, those teachers with the most seniority would be
retained, provided that the percentage of minority personnel laid
off would not exceed the current percentage of minority personnel
employed.144  Under the terms of this agreement, the white
4 546 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1982), afJ'd, 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), and
rev'd, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
144 The agreement provided that:
In the event that it becomes necessary to reduce the number of teachers
through layoff from employment by the Board, teachers with the most
seniority in the district shall be retained, except that at no time will there
be a greater percentage of minority personnel laid off than the current
percentage of minority personnel employed at the time of the layoff. In no
event will the number given notice of possible layoff be greater than the
number of positions to be eliminated. Each teacher so affected will be
called back in reverse order for positions for which he is certificated
maintaining the above minority balance.
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teachers who were "at the bottom of the seniority scale among white
teachers" would bear "the white group's proportionate share of
layoffs that became necessary. "145 These white teachers argued
that the agreement, which made it possible for minority teachers
with less seniority to keep theirjobs while more senior nonminority
teachers were dismissed, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 46  Given the fact that before 1953 no
African American teachers worked in Jackson's public schools and
that there had been, until recently before the case, "'substantial' and
'chronic' underrepresentation of minority teachers on the Jackson
School District faculty," 147 the school board and the teachers'
association argued before the court that the agreement was
necessary to achieve the desirable goal of "multi-ethnic repre-
sentation of the teaching faculty. " 148 Otherwise, it was clear that
much of the recent gain in minority teacher employment would be
negated because, under the principle of "last hired, first fired," a
disproportionate number of minority teachers did not enjoy the
protection of seniority.
149
The district court upheld the constitutionality of the agreement
and, in the process, advanced a theory to justify such schemes.
50
Id. at 1198.
145 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 299 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146 See id. at 271-73.
147 Wygant, 546 F. Supp. at 1201. In its opinion, the district court briefly reviewed
the previous relationship between African American teachers and theJackson Public
School System. No black teacher was hired by the system until 1953, when one black
was hired among 61 hires; by 1961 there were only ten minority teachers among a
total of 515 teachers in the system; it was only in 1969 that the Jackson School
District started to think seriously about efforts to recruit minority teachers; and at the
time of the collective bargaining agreement, in 1971, "15.9 percent of the student
body was minority, while only 8.3-8.5 percent of the faculty was minority." Id. at
1197.
148 Id. at 1198 (quoting the agreement's self-declared purpose as "to have at least
the same percentage of minority racial representation on each individual staff as is
represented by the student population of the Jackson Public Schools").
4 See id. at 1197.
1 See id. at 1201. The court reasoned that the agreement was a proper remedy
aimed at the effects of prior discrimination:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment would permit theJackson School Board and
the Jackson Education Association to voluntarily adopt.., an affirmative
action plan to protect minority teachers from the effects of layoffs.
The objective of this affirmative action plan to remedy past "substan-
tial" and "chronic" underrepresentation of minority teachers on theJackson
School District faculty is plainly constitutional.
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The court argued:
[I]t is appropriate to compare the percentage of minority teachers
to the percentage of minority students in the student body, rather
than with the percentage of minorities in the relevant labor
market... because teaching is more than just ajob. Teachers are
role-models for their students. More specifically, minority teachers are
role-models for minority students. This is vitally important because
societal discrimination has often deprived minority children of
other role-models.
1 5 '
The district court apparently believed that teachers serve as role
models in the comprehensive sense. Students will emulate them not
only in relation to their professional roles ("teaching is more than
just a job"), but also in relation to their general commitment to
institutions and institutional life and their views about social life and
institutional arrangements. The fact that the district court viewed
teachers as role models in the comprehensive sense is neither
surprising nor wrong. As I argued earlier, teachers and parents can
legitimately be viewed as role models in the comprehensive sense,
because they satisfy the criteria of physical presence combined with
an authority-vulnerability social nexus.152 Children are more likely
to learn about correct commitments and virtuous ethical behavior
from their teachers because they spend a considerable amount of
time together and because teachers exercise a great deal of
sanctioning power over students.
The Supreme Court has also adopted the view of teachers as
role models in the comprehensive sense. In Ambach v. Norwich,"'5
the Court upheld a state law which specified that only United States
citizens or persons who indicated an intention to apply for citizen-
ship could receive a teaching certificate on the ground that "a
teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but
important influence over their perceptions and values."'5 4
' Id. (emphasis added).
M See supra part I.B.2 (discussing the comprehensive view).
1 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
" Id. at 78-79 (emphasis added). Other courts have also concluded that teachers
are role models in the comprehensive sense, for example:
The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not
confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach
by example the shared values of a civilized social order. Consciously or
otherwise, teachers-and indeed the older students-demonstrate the
appropriate form of ... conduct and deportment in and out of class.
Inescapably, like parents, they are role models.
Pfeiffer v. Marion Ctr. Area Sch. Dist., 917 F.2d 779, 785 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting
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Thus, the issue in Wygant was not whether black students would
learn a formal body of knowledge better and faster from black
teachers, although as I argued earlier, this might be the case in
mentoring relationships;15 5 the district court in Wygant did not find
that the minority teachers were race specific role models in the role
imitation sense. Likewise, the issue in Ambach was not whether
citizenship per se enables a teacher to teach a particular subject (for
example, science or even social science) better or improve the
students' ability to learn these subjects; 56 the majority in Ambach
clearly focused on the notion of teacher as role model in the
comprehensive sense, not on the possibility that a noncitizen would
be a less demanding or a less competent teacher. In Ambach and
Wygant, the Supreme Court and the district court, respectively,
viewed the teacher as a role model in the comprehensive sense and
were concerned about the possibility that either a nonminority or
a noncitizen might be a less effective teacher because of that
status.15 7 As the Supreme Court put it, through "the example he
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)); see also Dupree v.
School Comm., 446 N.E.2d 1099, 1101 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) ("Teachers, too, are in
a position of special public trust. As role models for our children, they have an
'extensive and peculiar opportunity to impress [their] attitudes and views upon their
pupils." (quoting Faxon v. School Comm., 120 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Mass. 1954))).
I argued earlier that peers can also serve as comprehensive role models for
children. Justice Scalia did not completely miss the mark when he invoked this
version of the concept of role model in Vernonia School District v. Acton as a
justification for a school policy that required random drug testing of students
participating in interscholastic athletics. "It seems to us self-evident," he observed,
"that a drug problem largely fueled by the 'role model' effect of athletes' drug use...
is effectively addressed by making sure that athletes do not use drugs." Vernonia Sch.
Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395-96 (1995).
Let me clarify the extent of my endorsement of Scalia's rhetorical move, lest
readers misunderstand me. By suggesting that Scalia properly views teenage peers
as comprehensive role models I do not necessarily endorse Scalia's conclusion that
schools can randomly drug test those designated as role models without violating
their Fourth Amendment rights. Whether student-athletes constitute role models for
other students is a separate question from whether school officials can constitutionally
compel those students to submit to random drug testing.
Second, my endorsement of Scalia's role model argument does not depend on
the students' status as athletes. Any students with access to any socially desirable
good can legitimately serve as potential role models.
155 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
"6 See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80 ("Certainly a State also may take account of a
teacher's function as an example for students, which exists independently of
particular classroom subjects.").
15 For other Supreme Court decisions that refer to teachers as role models, see
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,583-84 (1987) ("The Court has been particularly
vigilant in monitoring compliance with the Establishment Clause in elementary and
ROLE MODELS
sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes
of students toward government, the political process, and a
citizen's social responsibilities."15 Noncitizen teachers, the Court
assumed, might not provide the appropriate influence in the
development of these attitudes. 59
2. Confronting the Issue of Race Specific Role Modeling
Even if we view teachers as role models in the comprehensive
sense, however, we still need to ask why it would make sense to
argue, as the district court in Wygant did, that black students need
a black teacher on whom to model themselves. The district court
gave this answer: "This is vitally important because societal discrimina-
tion has often deprived minority children of other role-models." 160 This
observation lends itself to one of two interpretations. First, the
district court might have meant that discrimination against minori-
ties, especially African Americans, has deprived minority students
of successful minority role models-individuals whom young
minorities might emulate-in all contexts, educational and otherwise.
Alternatively, in using the term "other role-models," the district
court might have meant that, given the history of this country and
the narratives of difference that surround it, white teachers simply
cannot serve as role models to black students. How can an African
American student consider the Other as an example for emulation
secondary schools .... Students in such institutions are impressionable and their
attendance is involuntary.... The State exerts great authority and coercive power
through mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students' emulation
of teachers as role models and the children's susceptibility to peer pressure."
(citations omitted)).1'sAmbach, 441 U.S. at 79.
159 It is not quite clear, however, why we should think that a person who has lived
in this country for only ten years and has been a citizen for merely one year will be
a better role model than a person who has lived in this country for 30 years but has
yet to become a citizen. People choose to become citizens for various reasons, just
as they decline to take up citizenship for many reasons. Taking up citizenship does
not necessarily indicate that one has mastered the values of his or her new country
or has a total commitment to the institutions and values of the country in the same
way that the absence of citizenship does not automatically suggest a lack of knowledge
of and/or commitment to the values and institutions of this country.
"6 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 546 F. Supp. 1195, 1201 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(emphasis added), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), and rev'd, 476 U.S. 267 (1986);
see also Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 498 F. Supp. 732, 754 n.73 (W.D. Mich.
1980) ("In a school system ... which has a multi-cultural and multi-racial student
body, it is important that all students have a sufficient number of role models. This
is particularly true of races that have historically been discriminated against
throughout the country, such as Hispanics and Native Americans.").
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when many institutions routinely describe that student as radically
different from the Other in relevant aspects? In other words, the
district court's holding may rest on the following reasoning: given
the fact that discrimination against African Americans has histori-
cally rested on the proposition that African Americans lack the
intellectual capacities that white Americans possess, the notion of
a white teacher serving as an example of what a black child can
achieve intellectually might lack credibility to that child.
Either interpretation of the district court's rationale for
appropriating the concept of role model only makes sense in terms
of the politics of recognition. The district court does not mean that
black children will learn a particular subject better and faster from
black teachers (role model in the role imitation sense), nor does it
suggest that black teachers will provide better examples than white
teachers of the ideal and virtuous life (role model in the compre-
hensive sense). Rather, the district court argues that the presence
of minority teachers in the classroom constitutes a visible and
credible recognition and affirmation of those black students.
Historically, the dominant narrative in this country has asserted,
often implicitly, but at times explicitly, that minorities-especially
African Americans-are intellectually inadequate and thus different
from white Americans. It is therefore unlikely that a black child
would view a white teacher as a symbol or model of what that child
can accomplish. Thus, the presence of a minority teacher will
provide a more credible signal to the black child of that child's
intellectual potential. In addition, that presence will indicate that
social institutions no longer devalue members of the community to
which the black child belongs and the traditions and "horizons of
significance" that define the community.'61 This line of analysis
suggests that minority role aspirants need affirmation and recogni-
tion from minority role models.
162
161 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In the context of public
education, it is quite obvious that a school board may reasonably conclude that an
integrated faculty will be able to provide benefits to the student body that could not
be provided by an all-white, or nearly all-white, faculty.").
162 See Oliver, 498 F. Supp. at 748 ("[T]he need for the role models [at schools] is
important because they can encourage minority students to higher aspirations and at
the same time work to dispel myths and stereotypes about their race."); see also Latin
Am. Citizens Council v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 659 n.14 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Black and
Hispanicjudges serve as role models for other minority group members, who may not
have envisioned a legal or judicial career as a real possibility in the past."); Barhold
v. Rodriquez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988) ("'Role models,' in contrast, are
people whose very existence conveys a feeling of possibility to others; they give hope
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The Sixth Circuit upheld the district court's decision, 163 and
in the process endorsed the district court's theory of role
model."6 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with this analysis
and reversed the lower courts' decisions.1 65 Justice Powell, joined
by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor
explicitly rejected the role model theory as one with "no logical
stopping point," which would allow "the Board to engage in
discriminatory hiring and layoff practices long past the point
required by any legitimate remedial purpose." 166  Furthermore,
Justice Powell reasoned that
because the role model theory does not necessarily bear a
relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring
practices, it actually could be used to escape the obligation to
remedy such practices by justifying the small percentage of black
teachers by reference to the small percentage of black stu-
dents.
167
Indeed, Justice Powell found the race specific role model theory
uncomfortably similar to the separatist theory approved in Plessy v.
Ferguson.6 and rejected in Brown v. Board of Education.
169
that a previously restricted opportunity might now be available.").
'"See Wygant, 746 F.2d at 1157 ("We believe that it is within the power and
authority of the parties to this agreement [to adopt the protective affirmative action
policy], and that their action is in no respect in violation of the United States
Constitution or federal law.").
1 The court of appeals fully cited the district court's statement on role models
and endorsed it with the following remark: "We agree with and adopt [the district
court's] conclusions as stated above." Id.
165 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 278.
" Id. at 275. Justice Powell found the role model theory very similar to another
affirmative action theory the Court has also rejected: societal discrimination.
"Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for imposing a
racially classified remedy. The role model theory announced by the district court and
the resultant holding typify this indefiniteness." Id. at 276.
67 Id. In her concurring opinion,Justice O'Connor, while agreeing with Justice
Powell's decision to reject the role model theory, carefully distinguished it from
diversity-an independent rationale that was not an issue before the Court in Wygant.
See id. at 288 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The goal of providing 'role models'
discussed by the courts below should not be confused with the very different goal of
promoting racial diversity among the faculty.").
'- 163 U.S. 537, 540 (1896) (striking down a Louisiana statute that provided for
"equal but separate [train] accommodations for the white, and colored races").
169 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that "segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other
'tangible' factors maybe equal, deprive[s] the children of the minority group of equal
educational opportunities"). Justice Powell argued: "Carried to its logical extreme,
the idea that black students are better off with black teachers could lead to the very
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The fact that the Supreme Court finds no irony in comparing
the exclusionary theory approved in Plessy v. Ferguson and the
inclusive policy at issue in Wygant manifests a disturbing comfort
with a jurisprudence of false symmetry. To compare an inclusive
policy that attempts to incorporate minorities into the nation's
social and political life to a system designed to exclude minorities
from the life of the community on the explicit proposition that
those minorities are not equal moral agents strains any sense of
reality.170 The theory at issue in Wygant parallels the reasoning in
Brown, not Plessy, a fact that the Court has enigmatically overlooked. 171
system the Court rejected in Brown v. Board of Education." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
170 As Justice Stevens observed in his Wygant dissent:
There is... a critical difference between a decision to exclude a member of
a minority race because of his or her skin color and a decision to include
more members of the minority in a school faculty for that reason.
The exclusionary decision rests on the false premise that differences in
race.., reflect real differences that are relevant to a person's right to share
in the blessings of a free society .... [T]hat premise is 'utterly irrational,'
and repugnant to the principles of a free and democratic society .... The
inclusion of minority teachers in the educational process inevitably tends to
dispel that illusion ....
Id. at 316 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 452 (1985)).
171 Unlike the theory approved in Plessy, but like that approved in Brown, the
policy in Wygant sought to integrate rather than segregate. See id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("The inclusionary decision is consistent with the principle that all men
are created equal; the exclusionary decision is at war with that principle."). Unlike
the narrative of devaluation and misrecognition that accompanied the law in Plessy,
the narratives in Brown and Wygant emphasized the valuation and affirmation of the
moral agency of those traditionally deemed to lack moral responsibility. See id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The inclusion of minority teachers in the educational
process inevitably tends to dispel [the narrative of misrecognition] whereas their
exclusion could only tend to foster it."). And unlike Plessy, where the policy at issue
sought to keep the divisions of the community permanent on the proposition that the
two communities had different levels of moral and intellectual attainments, the
objectives at issue in Brown and Wygant sought to develop one community in the
context of a history of comprehensive exclusion of minorities.
I make these seemingly obvious observations because the Court has neglected
them by increasingly embracing false symmetries: the symmetries between
exclusionary policies, instituted for the specific purpose of denying minorities any
rights on the ground of their alleged moral and intellectual unfitness, and inclusive
policies, intended to admit historically excluded groups to the social and political life
of the community. See, e.g., Miller v.Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2492 (1995) (finding
that a Georgia proposal to restructure a congressional district to include a greater
portion of minorities offended the Equal Protection Clause for lack of a proper
"ameliorative purpose"); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2119 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (opposing the
position expressed by Justice Stevens that there is no "'moral [and] constitutional
equivalence'.. .between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute
ROLE MODELS
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its
position on the issue of whether the concept of role model should
serve as a justification for diversifying spheres of life. In City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,172 for example, the Court rejected
Richmond's set-aside program for minority building contractors by
benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality"
(quoting Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2120 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (first alteration in
original)); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,2827(1993) (stating that a reapportionment
plan that purposefully includes individuals of the same race in one district "bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid").
Justice Powell may have initially formulated thejurisprudence of false symmetry
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). In a rhetorical
move that has become famous, Powell struck down an affirmative action program
with the following language: "The guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one
thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person
of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."
Id. at 289-90. The observation seems eminently sensible. Who can disagree that
equal protection means equal protection to all. But, of course, the question is not
whether equal protection should vary depending on the race of the claimant, but
rather what constitutes equal protection in a social and political environment where
one social group has been systematically denied equal protection over an extended
period of time and where the effects of that exclusion implicitly and explicitly
structure the distribution of social goods and services in the present time. To
compare governmental actions that attempt to remedy this unequal distribution of
social goods and political power with the exclusionary and oppressive policies that
legitimated and cultivated the caste system manifests an amazing disregard for the
debilitating impact that this caste system has had and continues to have on American
society.
Affirmative steps to remedy this debilitating culture of exclusion do not threaten
to make equal protection mean one thing to one individual and something else to
another. Rather, the Court's treatment of the current caste system as neutral imperils
the equal application of equal protection. Case in point, the Supreme Court has,
until recently, traditionally refrained from striking down a state's drawing of voting
districts on equal protection grounds, even if those districts were drawn to advantage
a particular ethnic group or political party (as long as the districting was not designed
to disenfranchise an historically unpopular and disadvantaged group). In Miller and
Shaw the Supreme Court held that it would treat a district designed to give blacks a
majority, and hence an opportunity to elect their representatives, differently for equal
protection purposes. The Court held that such districts warranted strict scrutiny and
would likely fail as unconstitutional. AsJustice Ginsburg noted in herMiller dissent,
although ethnicity defines some of the current voting districts as a matter of political
reality, "[u]ntil now, no constitutional infirmity has been seen in districting Irish or
Italian voters together, for example, so long as the delineation does not abandon
familiar apportionment practices." Miller, 115 S. Ct. at 2506 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). She observes that, if other ethnic groups "may seek and secure group
recognition in the delineation of voting districts," it seems utterly incomprehensible
that African Americans, "'the very minority group whose history in the United States
gave birth to the Equal Protection Clause,'" should be treated differently. Id.
(quoting Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2845 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
'7 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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observing: "Like the 'role model' theory employed in Wygant, a
generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an
entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to
determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy. It 'has
no logical stopping point.'"173
3. Fundamental Flaws in the Supreme Court's
Role Model Jurisprudence
a. Overlooking the Politics of R~ecognition
In both Wygant and Croson, the Supreme Court simply misunder-
stood what injury this race specific concept of role model was meant
to address. The injury goes beyond the explicit exclusion of blacks
from particular fields. 74 It encompasses the concern- that a web
of narratives developed along with these specific exclusions,
narratives that attempted to legitimize those exclusions by construct-
ing an identity of the excluded group to explain why members of
that group could not enter those fields. 175 These narratives have
had double targets and double impacts: they attempt to reassure
the excluder of the moral and just nature of the exclusion and,
more importantly, to convince the victim that he or she was
responsible for his or her own marginalization. Their impact has
been to reassure the excluders of their innocence while simulta-
neously reinforcing the self-devaluation and self-doubt of the
excluded.
176
Given this history, society ought to focus its efforts to remedy
past discrimination, at least partly, on countering this web of
',Id. at 498 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275).
' See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 498 F. Supp. 732, 747 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
("[A] school district's unconstitutional hiring practices can have an impact which
affects not only those in the labor market who were excluded from work, but also
others, most notably students. In such a case, a court must use care in fashioning a
remedy because what might be sufficient to remedy one group's injuries may do
nothing towards making the other group whole. This is because both may have been
harmed in different ways by the district's failure to hire minorities.").
'75 See id. at 737 ("The adverse impact which racial isolation has upon Black...
children in terms of unrealistic self-images and detrimental attitudes is only
intensified by a conspicuous absence of Black adults in positions of leadership and
respect." (quoting Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 368 F. Supp. 143, 190 (W.D.
Mich. 1973))).
176 In this respect, these historical narratives closely parallel current role model
rhetoric, which simultaneously reinforces the dominant group's innocence and
generosity. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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narratives that has constructed the identity of marginalized groups,
an identity defined by devaluation and misrecognition and one that
has taken root both among members of the marginalized and among
those of the majority group.1" A race specific theory of role
modeling is, therefore, about the politics of recognition. It suggests
that the employment or inclusion of a minority under the rubric of
affirmative action can best be defended not on the notion that there
might or might not have been explicit past discrimination by a
particular institution, even though in most instances that will be the
case, but rather as a recognition of the fact that the organized
exclusion of minorities in this country has constructed an identity
of these excluded groups that simultaneously justified their
marginalization and exclusion to the majority group while inducing
the minority group to adopt, often unconsciously, a deprecatory
self-image.' An individual from the marginalized group who
occupies a prominent position in society can counter that imprison-
ing narrative and thus fuel a process of reassurance for members of
the out-group and a process of relearning for members of the in-
group.1
79
The reply to Justice Powell's concern in Wygant that the role
model theory "has no logical stopping point"' is, therefore, that
it does. That stopping point will occur at the social and political
moment when the politics of misrecognition and devaluation against
out-groups cease to define the political and social environment of
this country.' We have not reached this point yet. In fact, as
Cass Sunstein properly observes, a caste system continues to define
the existence of black citizens in this country.
8 2
1 "See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 313 (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("Rather than analyzing a
case of this kind by asking whether minority teachers have some sort of special
entitlement to jobs as a remedy for sins that were committed in the past .... we
should first ask whether the Board's action advances the public interest in educating
children for the future."); see also Oliver, 498 F. Supp. at 751 n.61 ("An employer's
actions can also discriminate against nonemployees (e.g., students), and they havejust
as much right to be made whole as do employees. To accomplish this, a court must
be able to strike at those things which, if left untouched, would perpetuate the
discrimination against these individuals ...
17 1 See Taylor, supra note 24, at 25-26.
17 9 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315 (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("It is one thing for a white
child to be taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only 'skin deep'; it is
far more convincing to experience that truth on a day-to-day basis during the routine,
ongoing learning process.").
180 Id. at 275.
m See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
's See Sunstein, supra note 65, at 2429. The comprehensive and systematic nature
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b. Ignoring Logical Inconsistencies
Ironically, while the Supreme Court rejected the role model
theory as an "amorphous" remedial measure in one context, 183 it
considered the notion sufficiently precise to justify exclusion and
discrimination in another context. Thus, in Ambach v. Nor~wick, 84
the Supreme Court upheld a New York statute that permitted only
United States citizens or persons who intended to apply for
citizenship to receive a public school teaching certificate1 8 5 on the
of the devaluation of the lives and social welfare of black citizens led Sunstein to
suggest that the treatment of blacks by the status quo might well be a caste system,
which he defines as a system in which "social and legal practices [translate] highly
visible and morally irrelevant differences into systemic social disadvantage ...
[without] a very good reason for society to do so." Id. at 2411. At another point
Sunstein observes: "In the area of race and gender, daily denials of basic respect,
usually based on prejudice of some sort, are a large part of what it means to have a
caste system." Id. at 2432.
Indeed, there are numerous storiesand studies that show that a great deal of the
devaluation of the social welfare of black citizens results from the racism that defines
daily life in America, for example:
In 1990, the Urban Institute sent out young blacks and young whites with
equivalent r6sum6s and references, and who had been trained to behave
identically, to apply for entry-leveljobs. The whites did substantially better
.... [A] black face is still a net minus in the climb up the American greasy
pole.
Michael Kinsley, The Spoils of Victimhood. The Case Against the Case Against Affirmative
Action, NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 1995, at 62-63. A few years ago the ABC news
program Prime Time Live virtually replicated the Urban Institute's conclusions using
hidden cameras. See Prime Time Live: True Colors (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 26,
1991).
For statistics demonstrating the systematic disparity between the lives and social
welfare of black and white citizens in this country and suggesting that the lives of
black citizens are consistently and institutionally devalued, see generally HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 65; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 66.
" See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 497-98 (1989)
(criticizing the concept of role model as having "no relation to some basis for
believing a constitutional or statutory violation had occurred [and claiming that] it
could be used to Justify' race-based decisionmaking essentially limitless in scope and
duration"); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (criticizing the concept of role model as "too
amorphous a basis for imposing a racially classified remedy").
18 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
"5 One of the plaintiffs who challenged the constitutionality of the law came to
this country from Scotland, was a permanent resident, had lived in the United States
for almost a decade and was married to a United States citizen when she applied for
certification to teach nursery school through sixth grade. See id. at 71. She was a
"summa cum laude graduate of a Massachusetts college and [had] received an A
average in full-time graduate work in the State University of New York at Albany. She
has taught both in this country and in Great Britain." Id. at 85 n.4 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
ROLE MODELS
ground that "a teacher serves as a role model for his students,
exerting a subtle but important influence over their perceptions and
values." 8 ' Justice Powell, the same Justice who, in Wygant,
deemed the role model theory too ambiguous to justify race-based
decisionmaking, 187 seemed quite confident that the notion was
precise enough to justify the state's exclusion of resident aliens from
the teaching profession and to prevent that exclusion from violating
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 '
In Ambach, the Court clearly considered teachers to be role
models in the comprehensive sense.189 According to the Court,
students will emulate their teachers, not only in how they view the
teaching profession, but also in how they think about the good and
virtuous civic life. As explained earlier, this is a defensible view of
the concept of role model. Teachers, parents, and sometimes peers
can act as role models in the comprehensive sense because the
relationship between the role model and the role aspirants is
characterized by physical presence and an authority-vulnerability
social nexus.19 ° Thus, my complaint is not that Justice Powell's
conclusion in Ambach is logically indefensible, because as a general
matter teachers indeed serve as role models in a comprehensive
sense,' but rather that it is difficult to reconcile his contrasting
" Id. at 69-70 & n.1. The statute at issue in the case, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3001
(McKinney 1970), provided that "No person shall be employed or authorized to teach
in the public schools of the state who is... [fMot a citizen." § 3001. This restriction,
however, did not apply to a noncitizen teacher who "shall make due application to
become a citizen and thereafter within the time prescribed by law shall become a
citizen." § 3001(3).
Justice Blackmun in his dissent pointed out, with some degree of amusement I
suppose, that the list of occupations restricted to citizens or to those who have
declared their intent to become citizens also included "shorthand reporter, funeral
director, masseur, physical therapist, and animal technician." Ambach, 441 U.S. at 82
n.1 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
'
57 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
" See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 73-74 (stating that "some State functions are so bound
up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity as to permit the exclusion
from those functions of all persons who have not become part of the process of self-
government").
's9 See id. at 79-80 ("[Ilt is clear that all public school teachers, and notjust those
responsible for teaching the courses most directly related to government, history, and
civic duties, should help fulfill the broader finction of the public school system ....
[A] State properly may regard all teachers as having an obligation to promote civic
virtues and understandingin their classes, regardless of the subject taught." (emphasis
added)); see also Lorain Journal Co. v. Milkovich, 474 U.S. 953, 958-59 (1985)
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (emphasizing the role of public schools in preparing students
for the duties of citizenship).
" See supra part I.B.2.
'9' One could properly fault Powell, however, for failing to support his rather
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views of the notion of role model in Wygant. If the concept of role
model was a determinate concept in Ambach, legitimately conferring
benefits on some while denying benefits to others, why was it such
an amorphous concept in Wygant, such that the Court rejected the
theory as incapable of justifying broad remedial measures?
It is true that there are a number of factual differences between
the two cases. In Wygant the teachers who challenged the
agreement were already employed within the system, while in Amb-
ach the teachers who challenged the state statute were applying
for the first time;192 in Wygant the case involved the history of
racial discrimination in the educational system and its remedy,
while in Ambach it involved alienage. In my view neither of these
differences logically suggests that the concept of role model
should apply in one context, but not in the other. With respect
to the first distinction made, one could argue, as the court implied
in Wygant, that discriminatory layoffs impose a more unacceptable
burden on innocent individuals than does discriminatory hiring.
According to this reasoning, the white teachers in Wygant had a
more legitimate expectation for equal treatment (no layoffs
without receiving an equal opportunity to compete with black
teachers) than the alien teachers in Ambach who sought an equal
opportunity to compete at the time of hiring. In my view, such a
position is not persuasive.19 Even if we assume that the white
cursory conclusion with a more extended argument as to why teachers should be
considered role models in the comprehensive sense. The same can be said about
Justice Scalia's invocation of the concept of role model with respect to student-
athletes in Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395-96 (1995). As a
general matter, student-athletes can logically serve as role models for their peers in
a comprehensive sense. Scalia, however, invoked the concept of role model in an
utterly conclusory manner. He made no attempt to explain why he invoked the term
or precisely how it should apply to the given situation. Apparently, the term carried
its own meaning. It was, as he saw it, "self-evident." Id.
" The Wygant Court relied on this distinction in making its decision:
In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne by innocent
individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among society generally.
Though hiring goals may burden some innocent individuals, they simply do
not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future
employment opportunity is not as intrusive as loss of an existing job.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-83 (1986).
19' Surely the unequal treatment would have a similar effect on both plaintiffs,
whether the alleged discrimination was meted out at the point of entry or exit. Those
who are already in the system and are treated unequally lose their jobs, and those
who are treated unequally when they apply for jobs do not get the jobs they might
otherwise receive.
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teachers in Wygant had a better claim to their positions (a more
legitimate expectation for equal treatment) than the alien teachers
in Ambach had in relation to the positions for which they applied, it
does not follow that the African American teachers in Wygant could
not properly serve as valid role models for their African American
students. Whether it is logically sound to claim that African
American teachers act as role models for African American students
We could argue that the white teachers in Wygant had a more legitimate
expectation than the alien teachers in Ambach because a teacher's seniority correlates
with the level of his or her commitment (financial as well as social) to the surrounding
community and the degree of stability in his or her family life. Therefore, people
who demand an equal opportunity to protect their seniority have a more legitimate
moral claim than those who demand equal opportunity at the point of entry.
Although this is a plausible conclusion, I think there are problems with this
argument. First, in Wygant seniority was not a primary moral value around which
other values were to be negotiated. Indeed, seniority derived its moral force from the
same agreement that recognized the retention of minority teachers as an important
value. The agreement could have easily provided that merit, rather than seniority,
would be the dispositive factor with regard to layoffs, without raising any constitu-
tional problems. See id. at 299 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The compromise was ...
presented to the teachers, who ratified it by majority vote. Each of the six times that
the contract has been renegotiated, [the provision regarding minority preferences
during layoffs] has been presented for reconsideration to the members of the Union,
at least 80% of whom are white, and each time it has been ratified."). Thus, the
notion of seniority discussed in Wygant deserved no greater constitutional protection
than did the retention of minority teachers or the claim for equal treatment in
Ambach.
Even if we assume that there is some moral force to the idea that those who have
invested their time, money, and emotional energy in a particular community can
bring better claims than those who have not yet made such investments, this is still
an arbitrary distinction to some degree. Under this assumption, a person who has
lived in a particular community for ten years will supposedly have made more
investments than an individual who has lived in that community for eight or nine
years, even though empirical evidence might contradict this assumption. In other
words, seniority might not be a good predictor of a person's commitment to and
investment in a particular community. My point here is not that a legislature or a
school board could not determine that seniority on the whole (pedagogically,
politically, or as a measure of human capital) is a good thing and therefore should be
protected, but that no one has persuasively shown that seniority should be protected
as a constitutional value, nor has anyone shown that this value is so important that
local authorities should not balance it against other important constitutional values
such as remedying past discrimination and encouraging diversity. See id. at 282 n.10
("The Constitution does not require layoffs to be based on strict seniority."); see also
id. at 296 (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("[L]ayoffs are unfair. But unfairness ought not
be confused with constitutional injury."); cf id. at 286 (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("[A]
remedial purpose... [can] be accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has
a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required. Additionally,... a state
interest in the promotion of racial diversity has been found sufficiently 'compelling,'
... to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that interest." (citations
omitted)).
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should not be contingent on the strength or weakness of white
teachers' claims to equal treatment.
19 4
" Perhaps what troubled the Court about applying role model rhetoric in
affirmative action cases such as Wygant and Croson is the concern that the concept of
role model has the potential to become a permanent feature of political life in this
society, and thus to exclude a certain segment of the population from social and
political life whenever race is at issue. See id. at 275 ("The role model theory
[endorsed by the district court] allows the Board to engage in discriminatory hiring
and layoff practices long past the point required by any legitimate remedial
purpose."). The Court might have thought that these concerns do not arise in cases
where race is not involved, for in those cases there will be a clear social moment when
the use of the concept of role model to exclude one group so as to include another
group will be unnecessary. In Ambach, for example,Justice Powell seemed to suggest
that the social moment occurred when the resident alien plaintiffs became U.S.
citizens. As members of an excluded group, each permanent resident alien had the
power within himself or herself to escape that condition of exclusion by simply taking
the oath of citizenship. See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80 ("Appellees, and aliens similarly
situated, in effect have chosen to classify themselves."). In the affirmative action
context, however, the Court clearly believed that there could be no such social
moment that could render the role model argument clearly unnecessary. See Wygant,
476 U.S. at 276 ("[Under this role model theory] a court could uphold remedies that
are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the
future.").
This argument has a number ofweaknesses. In Ambach, the resident aliens could
avoid being discriminated against by complying with the Court's role model rhetoric
and thus becoming American citizens. But it seems rather odd that the Court would
be willing to force a resident alien to relinquish his or her native citizenship (which
obviously conferred at least some benefits) in order to enter the teaching profession,
which he or she was otherwise qualified to join, while characterizing nonminority
teachers who were initially forced to relinquish their teaching positions under a role
model theory (which obviously constituted a significant loss to the plaintiffs) as
innocent victims. In what sense are the resident aliens any less innocent victims than
the nonminority teachers who almost lost their jobs to minority teachers?
More importantly, the Court's concern that the use of the concept of role model
in racial contexts will have "no logical stopping point" simply begs the issue. If the
Court is correct, it is only because either racism is so entrenched and persistent in
our society that the role model argument will remain continually relevant or,
alternatively, although racism has practically vanished from our society, the role
model argument will remain necessary to support African Americans who will always
lag behind because of their inability (lack of natural endowment) to compete with
white Americans.
If the former analysis is correct, then the "no end in sight" argument has
no force. There is, of course, an end. The elimination of racism would render
the rhetoric of role model unnecessary. In the meantime, however, the concept
of role model must remain relevant. To the extent that the Court sees no end
in sight, this conclusion must rest on its pessimism regarding the plight of racism.
On the other hand, if it is the latter assumption-namely, that African Americans
will always lag behind because of their natural inability to compete with
whites-that has informed the Court's reluctance to embrace the concept of role
model, as it might well be, then the Court owes us an explanation for the basis of
that assumption.
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c. Disregarding Empirical Evidence
The factual differences between Wygant and Ambach and
the empirical evidence do not logically suggest that the rhetoric
of role model is dangerously amorphous and jurisprudentially
unsuitable in one context while determinate and jurispruden-
tially useful in another context. In Ambach there was no conclu-
sive, empirical evidence to suggest that students are more likely
to learn correct attitudes and virtuous commitments from a United
States citizen than from a permanent resident alien who, for
example, has lived in this country for thirty years.9 5 Likewise
in Wygant, the Court had no real evidence to suggest that minor-
ity students are just as likely to be affirmed and inspired by a
white teacher as they are by a minority teacher who shares their
life experiences and their vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the
Court accepted the former proposition and discounted the latter,
apparently based on intuition. As Justice Powell explained in
Ambach:
Although the findings of scholars who have written on the
subject are not conclusive, they generally reinforce the common-
sense judgment, and the experience of most of us, that a teacher
exerts considerable influence over the development of funda-
mental social attitudes in students, including those attitudes
which in the broadest sense of the term may be viewed as
political.'9 6
Based on this "common-sense judgment" and the "experience of
most of us," Powell apparently concluded that citizen-teachers act
as better role models than noncitizen-teachers 197 but rejected the
possibility that African American teachers will act as better
"9 ' See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The appellees, to be
sure, are resident 'aliens' in the technical sense, but there is not a word in the
record that either appellee ... is unqualified in any way... to teach."). I agree
with T. Alexander Aleinikoff's observation that "[w]hat makes America attractive
to immigrants are precisely those values that Americans celebrate: liberty,
equality, opportunity, government under law. Indeed, those who have chosen to
join us-and to give up a less happy existence elsewhere-may well feel more
committed to these values than those of us who happen to have been born here." T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 9, 31 (1990); see also Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from
Discriminatory Treatment By the National Government, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 275, 315
(noting that "[a]s a test of affinity, an alienage classification is seriously over-
and underinclusive").
1 Ambach, 441 U.S. at 79 n.9 (emphasis added).
19' See id. at 79.
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role models for African American students than white teachers.
t98
And whose intuitions and experiences does the phrase "most of
us" include? Certainly not the African American children who
see the presence of African American teachers in their schools as
visible affirmation that the majority culture and its institutions
do not devalue their lives and their horizons of significance,
and who, through the politics of recognition, may realize that
they are capable of performing certain roles and occupying
certain positions that traditionally have remained beyond their
reach. Thus, it appears that, when Powell accepted the notion
of role model as a helpful concept and when he rejected it as
dangerously amorphous, his conclusions rested not on empirical
evidence but rather upon his notion of what "the experience of
most of us" suggests.
Several general conclusions emerge from the comparison of
the Supreme Court's decisions in Ambach and Wygant. First,
the Court invokes the concept of role model as a key rhetori-
cal device to defend a normative position without making an
extended argument to justify that position, as was the case in
Ambach. At the same time, it debunks the concept as amorphous
and frivolous when the normative position that the concept
is invoked to support appears not to correspond with the experienc-
es of members of the Court, as seems to have been the case in
Wygant. Second, the specific experiences of members of the Court
are invoked and described as the experience of "most of us." Once
an experience is denominated as the "experience of most of us,"
it can apparently compensate for a lack of empirical data or
logic to support a particular conclusion.'99 By relying on the
198 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
19 Relying on some version of community, or what is quite often referred to as
the interest or experience of the community, to legitimate a legal decision is not new
to either legal scholars or judges and quite often occurs in both private law and
public law.
For example, Melvin Eisenberg argues that, in private law adjudication
"propositions of morality, policy and experience" constitute doctrinal social
propositions if those social propositions are "rooted in aspirations for the community
as a whole and . . . have substantial support in the community." MELVIN A.
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 1, 2, 15 (1988).
Harry Wellington has argued for a similar process in the public law realm. See
Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 244 (1973) (arguing that requiring courts
to apply "our" moral point of view constrains judicial reasoning by forcing judges
to adhere to conventional morality, rather than their own); Harry H. Wellington,
Histoiy and Morals in Constitutional Adjudication, 97 HARv. L. REV. 326, 334
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notion of the "experience of most of us," the Court enshrines a
particular activity or social arrangement as authoritative based on
its supposed congruence with "our experience" and "to delegitimate
or obscure other[]" experiences, often to the disadvantage of
marginalized groups."'
Thus, the experience of marginalized groups, especially
African Americans, suggests that, in a racially divided society
that has largely constituted the identity of the majority group
by defining the minority as its negation-primarily as intellec-
tually inadequate-it is unlikely that members of the minority
will feel affirmed and recognized by seeing members of the
majority in positions of intellectual authority, but the Court's
view of experience apparently suggests the opposite result. For
the Court, this racial history does not have any significant bear-
ing on how people interact with one another and perform
their roles. The Court seems to be saying that we are simply
teachers and students, people who occupy certain positions and
play certain professional roles unmodified (or not over-
determined) by our racial affiliation.2"' On the other hand,
our status as American citizens becomes a very important factor
(1983) (book review) (arguing that the Supreme Court should look to the "moral
ideal of the community" as a legitimate "source of law").
Bruce Ackerman also incorporates notions of community into his work.
Ackerman argues that "the People... are the source of rights; the Constitution does
not spell out rights that the People must accept." BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 15 (1991). What "We the People" as a political community do at "our"
most enlightened and deliberative moments apparently creates a constitutional
transformation in our society, even though the Constitution provides a specific
procedure for constitutional amendment. But as Don Herzog observes in a review
of Ackerman's book, "the people aren't some harmonious unified community. They-
we-are profoundly divided: the currently fashionable troika is race, class, gender, but
of course there are many more cleavages." Don Herzog, Democratic Credentials, 104
ETHICS 467, 470 (1994) (book review). That being the case, Ackerman's "higher
lawmaking moments of dualist democracy" collapse into "crass majoritarianism,"
undermining the democratic credential of his claim. Id. at 472. As Herzog aptly
observes, "[c]asting democracy as a matter of counting heads or aggregating
preferences is an impoverished approach." Id. "[T]he history of social and political
theory is [partly] a series of debates over how to identify the people." Id. at 473.
Therefore, merely invoking the authority of"We the People," even with capital letters,
will not change the essentially contestable nature of "the people" and "the
community" as legitimizing concepts. Id.
::n See Fraser & Gordon, supra note 1, at 311 ("We contend that unreflective uses
of [a] keyword... enshrine certain interpretations of social life as authoritative and
... delegitimate or obscure others, generally to the advantage of dominant groups
in society and to the disadvantage of subordinate ones.").
"o See supra note 111.
1449
1450 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1377
in the Court's application of the concept of role model. 2 ' Appar-
ently, we are not simply teachers, we are American teachers or, non-
American teachers. Thus, although national origin affects the way
in which the Court defines a particular role, racial background
is apparently irrelevant in the transformation and performance of
a role. Evidently, it is a matter of public knowledge that teachers
influence the values and attitudes of their students, and that
alien teachers may exert an undesirable influence, but it is appar-
ently unclear that African American teachers will provide a
more credible narrative of recognition and affirmation for African
American students than white teachers. In reality, however,
this view of the world is utterly unreasonable. In this country
"race matters," both in terms of how roles are performed and
how relevant people view role performers in relation to their
lives.
20 3
B. The Concept of Role Model in the Lower Courts
The comparison of the two cases seems also to suggest that
the Court embraces the concept of role model as a precise and
meaningful jurisprudential device when it is invoked to exclude
marginal groups from political and social life but rejects it as
jurisprudentially suspect when the concept is relied upon by
a minority group that seeks admittance into the various spheres
of life. 2 4  Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc. 205 marks another
example of the federal courts' adopting the rhetoric of role model
as a sufficiently precise jurisprudential guide when dealing with
a legal issue that involves a member of a marginalized group
202 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979) ("[A]n oath of allegiance or
similar ceremony cannot substitute for the unequivocal legal bond citizenship repre-
sents.").
2 0 See WEST, supra note 21; see alsoJEFF SPINNER, THE BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP
30 (1994) ("The formation of identity in the United States has been overwhelmed by
the distinction between Blacks and whites.").
0 For example, in Ambach, the Supreme Court used role model rhetoric to affirm
the exclusion of noncitizen teachers from public schools on the ground that they
would act as negative role models for their young, impressionable students. See
Ambach, 441 U.S. at 79-81. By sanctioning the preference of citizens for the teaching
profession, the Court agreed with the State of New York that citizens, even those who
might have just taken up citizenship after having resided in the country only for the
minimum five-year period (the probationary period), are more likely than permanent
resident aliens, who might have lived in the country for 30 years or more, to serve as
the appropriate positive role models for students.
205 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).
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supposedly acting as a negative role model. In Chambers, the Eighth
Circuit adopted the concept of role model as a legitimate judicial
standard for determining whether an employee should be dis-
charged. The plaintiff, a young, single black female, was employed
as an arts and crafts instructor by the Omaha Girls Club, a private
social club that offered programs designed to help young girls
"maximize their life opportunities."" 6 The Club expected its
instructors "to act as role models for the girls, with the intent that
the girls will seek to emulate their behavior." 207  To implement
this "role model rule," the Club banned "single parent pregnancies"
among its staff.28 During the course of her employment, the
plaintiff became pregnant and was subsequently discharged for
violating Club policy.
20 9
The plaintiff argued that the role model policy and the Club's
decision to fire her under the terms of that policy violated Title
VII's prohibition against race and sex discrimination. 2'0 The Eighth
Circuit concluded, however, that "the Club's role model rule [was]
justified by business necessity" because "there [was] a manifest
relationship between the Club's fundamental purpose and the
rule."211 The court also found that "the rule qualifie[d] as a bona
fide occupational qualification," 212 despite the district court's
21 Id. at 698-99.
2 07 Id. at 699.
21 Id. at 699 n.2 ("The following are not permitted and such acts may result in
immediate discharge: ... Negative role modeling for Girls Club Members ...
includ[ing] such things as single parent pregnancies." (quoting the Club's personnel
policies)).
209 See id. at 699.
210 See id. at 700. Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer. .. to discharge. . . or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
.... "42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
21 Chambers, 834 F.2d at 701,705. The Club's fundamental purpose included the
following objectives:
Develop and implement programs to enable girls to build positive self
esteem through skill development and application.
... Provide opportunities for girls to explore the full range of their
personal options ... and career choices in order to take control of their
lives.
Promote a broad view of responsibility as a citizen of a larger
community through education and civic activity.
Id. at 698 n.1 (quoting the trial record).
212 Id. at 705. The bona fide occupational qualification defense provides
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finding that the policy "would impact black women more harshly"
due to the "significantly higher fertility rate among black
females."
213
Even though there was no evidence showing that teenage
African American females would emulate young, single African
American mothers and thus "provoke teenage pregnancies," 214 and
even though the court was "uncertain whether the role model rule
by its nature [wa]s suited to validation by an empirical study,"
215
and even though "[c]ourts have consistently rejected the argument
that stereotyped customer preferences justify discriminatory
practices,"216 the Eighth Circuit concluded that the concept of
negative role model was a meaningful jurisprudential construct
17
"an extremely narrow exception" to the general rule requiring equality of employ-
ment opportunity. Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 702 (E.D. Mich. 1982)
(citations omitted). As the Fifth Circuit observed, "discrimination based on sex
is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by
not hiring members of one sex exclusively." Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442
F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). To prevail on this claim, an employer must prove
"that there is a 'positive relationship' between the rule or policy and the employ-
er's programs." Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 629 F. Supp. 925, 950 (D. Neb.
1986) (citations omitted), aftd, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987). The district court
in Chambers found that the defendant established that "its only purpose" was to
provide young women "with exposure to the greatest number of positive options
in life," that "teenage pregnancy is contrary to this purpose and philosophy,"
and "that it honestly believed that to permit single pregnant staff members to
work with the girls would convey the impression that the Girls Club condoned
pregnancy for the girls in the age group it serves." Id. Therefore, the district
court concluded that "the defendants have met the burden of showing that a manifest
relationship exists between the Girls Club's fundamental purpose and its single
pregnancy policy." Id. Based on this finding the Eighth Circuit confirmed that "the
[role model] rule qualifie[d] as a bona fide occupational qualification." Chambers, 834
F.2d at 705.
213 Chambers, 834 F.2d at 701 (quoting Chambers, 629 F. Supp. at 949).
211 Id. at 707 (McMillan, J., dissenting) (citing Avery v. Homewood Bd. of Educ.,
674 F.2d 337, 339 (5th Cir. 1982)).
The district court, and now this court, accepts without any proof [Omaha
Girls Club's] assumption that the presence of an unwed pregnant instructor
is related to teenage pregnancies. [Omaha Girls Club] failed to present
surveys, school statistics or any other empirical data connecting the inci-
dence of teenage pregnancy with the pregnancy of an adult instructor....
[The Club] instead relied on two or three highly questionable anecdotal
incidents to support the rule.
Id. (McMillan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
215 Id. at 702.
216Jatczak, 540 F. Supp. at 703 (citing Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389).21' As the Eighth Circuit observed, the "role model rule has a manifest relationship
to the Club's fundamental purpose." Chambers, 834 F.2d at 704. In a similar case, the
same rationale prevailed:
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that could be used to exclude individuals from the labor mar-
ket. 218 Why was it so easy for the Eighth Circuit to find a "mani-
fest relationship" between the role model rule and the Club's
fundamental purpose in Chambers and for the Supreme Court to see
a relationship between positive role modeling and citizenship in
Ambach, on the one hand, but so difficult for the courts to find a
sufficiently close relationship between the history and structural
reality of racial discrimination and the politics of misrecognition on
the other? Put simply, why do courts fail to see a "manifest
relationship" between the purpose of remedying past discrimination
and role modeling?
What explains the fact that some cases, Chambers and Ambach for
example, sanction reliance on the concept of role model to pursue
certain goals, while cases like Wygant and Croson explicitly reject the
use of the concept of role model as a means of pursuing policy
goals? The fact that the latter group of cases involved the troubling
process of classification by race might account for the courts'
divergent approaches. This argument presents a number of
problems, however. To begin with, it may simply be inaccurate.
The role model rule in Chambers focused to a large extent on race.
Although the rule did not explicitly classify by race, the plaintiff
established a prima facie case of disparate impact by demonstrating
that the role model policy excluded young African American women
at a higher rate than young white women.219 Even assuming that
[T]he decision to dismiss plaintiff was premised upon plaintiff's stated intent
to offer herself, in her condition of unwed pregnancy, as an "alternative
lifestyle" role model to the young women.., in her community project....
[T]his course of conduct and philosophy is contrary to the Purpose and
philosophy of the YWCA and violated plaintiff's agreement to espouse these
principles in her employment.
Harvey v. YWCA, 533 F. Supp. 949, 954-55 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
218 Regina Austin notes the irony of the' Club's policy and the decision of the
court:
Firing a young unmarried, pregnant black worker in the name of protect-
ing other young black females from the limited options associated with
early and unwed motherhood is ironic, to say the least. The Club
managed to replicate the very economic hardships and social biases that,
'according to the district court, made the role model rule necessary in the
first place.
Austin, supra note 15, at 553.
"9 The district court addressed the issue of race discrimination "only insofar as
[the role model rule] may have an impact upon the class of black women." Chambers,
629 F. Supp. at 944. In ruling upon the plaintiff's disparate impact claim, the district
court "relied on statistics showing that black women generally ... are more likely to
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classification by race distinguished the two groups of cases and that
the courts simply intended to reject racial classifications as norma-
tively undesirable, it is not clear to me why it should logically follow
from that normative position that the concept of positive role model
is therefore amorphous and unsound in cases involving race.
Whether or not African Americans serve as role models for other
African Americans, as an empirical or logical matter, does not
depend on whether one believes that classification by race is
normatively undesirable. The fact that the Court thinks racial
classification is morally unsound does not transform the concept of
role model, which the Court has held to be precise and determinate
in the nonrace context, into an amorphous and frivolous concept.
One, of course, could argue that role modeling is not a necessary
means to achieve diversity or to remedy past discrimination,220 but
the Court did not engage in such analysis. It simply dismissed the
concept as amorphous.
221
become pregnant than white women." Chambers, 834 F.2d at 701 n.12.
20 When analyzing racial classifications, courts apply a strict scrutiny standard of
review. Courts will only uphold a racial classification as constitutional if it accommo-
dates a compelling government interest through the least restrictive means necessary.
See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2113 (1995).
Racial classifications rarely survive the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Although the application of strict scrutiny almost always leads to the invalidation
of the government policy in question, the doctrinal formulation holds up the
possibility that there may be times when such classifications could be upheld.
Indeed, Justice O'Connor, writing for the 5-4 majority in Adarand, went out of her
way to "dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'"
Id. at 2117 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall,
J., concurring)). "The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the linger-
ing effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to it."
Id.
2 In this society where the politics of misrecognition and nonrecognition
has been practiced against African Americans for a long time and has mani-
fested itself through a narrative of social and intellectual inadequacy, surely a
governmental policy that develops a strong counternarrative to challenge the threat
of institutional exclusion is a necessary response to the "lingering effects of
racial discrimination." Id. Indeed, in this racially divided society, the concept of
role model is necessary for any counternarrative to be credible both to the narrator
of nonrecognition and the target of that narrative. See Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of
Educ., 498 F. Supp. 732, 753 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (noting that laying off minority
teachers "would take away badly needed student role models" which "would have a
psychological impact on the students and the general community who could perceive




The concept of role model has had a strange career in the
courts. While courts consider it "amorphous" and jurisprudentially
suspect in certain circumstances, they embrace it as a useful
jurisprudential device in other situations.22 2 While some individu-
als are excluded from certain areas of life because they apparently
set negative examples, others are included as positive role mod-
els. 22 3 When the courts draw these distinctions, they rarely offer
justifications for their decisions, other than what Justice Powell
referred to as the "experience of most of us."224 But, of course,
when that experience is challenged, both in terms of its empirical
validity and its normative force, it will not be adequate merely to
invoke the experiences as the basis for the legitimacy of a decision.
The courts invoke role model rhetoric in inconsistent, even
paradoxical, ways. At times they adopt the concept to legitimate the
politics of difference (citizen teachers are different from noncitizen
teachers), while at other times they reject it on the basis of the
politics of identity (members of the majority and the minority do
not have different needs). This inconsistency might be a function
of a number of factors. First, in both legal literature and general
discourse the term role model is often invoked, but rarely analyzed.
When invoked, it is rarely used as a method of analysis, but simply
as a shorthand for making and contesting normative claims.
225
When a particular activity or commitment is seen to be desirable,
commentators use the concept of role model as a rhetoric of
approval. But when the desirability of such commitment or activity
is in doubt, the concept of role model is used as a rhetoric of
disapproval. In either case, those who invoke it offer neither
empirical data nor the force of logic to justify their use. To quote
Martha Nussbaum, writing in another context, these commentators
act "as if they were in the know about some new and decisive
discovery that removes the need for argument."2 6 Thus, part of
the inconsistency surrounding the concept of role model can be
attributed to the fact that people invoke the rhetoric in a conclusory
' Compare Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) with
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395-96 (1995).
22 Compare Chambers, 834 F.2d at 705 (8th Cir. 1987) with Ambach v. Norwick, 441
U.S. at 69-70 (1979).
2 4Ambach, 441 U.S. at 79 n.9.
See supra note 191.
226 Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 205.
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manner rather than as a method of analysis. Second, courts
consistently apply the term in an inconsistent manner. Apparently,
courts consider the term too ambiguous when it is used as a tool of
inclusion, but consider it jurisprudentially precise when it is used as
a tool of exclusion. 27 In this process, history, logic, and empirical
evidence are substituted with what is supposedly our ordinary and
general experience.
228
Unfortunately, it is this "general experience" that seems to have
led the current Supreme Court to a rather puzzling, and in my view
tragic, state of affairs, where, as a general matter, minorities who
bring claims of disadvantage are greeted with moral skepticism,
229
See supra note 222.
228 I should qualify my observations with regard to this last point. Some of the
lower courts have rejected the negative role model concept as a business necessity
defense in employment discrimination cases involving discrimination against women
because they were unwed mothers or single and pregnant or because they did not fit
customers' stereotyped preferences for male employees. See Andrews v. Drew Mun.
Separate Sch. Dist., 507 F.2d 611, 617 (5th Cir. 1975) ("The third rationale proffered
by the school district in hopes of salvaging the [role model] rule, that the presence
of unwed parents in a scholastic environment materially contributes to school-girl
pregnancies is without support, other than speculation and assertions of opinion
.... ");Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F. Supp. 698, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1982) ("The Court is
not convinced by the testimony in this case of the necessity of a male role model ....
[Glender plays no significant role in the ability of a person to properly supervise the
clientele of the Sheltered Workshop [a work training program for mentally ill young
adults].").
One possible explanation for the difference between these cases, which involved
women, and cases such as Ambach and Wygant, which involved aliens and African
Americans, may be that gender stereotypes have declined over the past decades;
therefore, courts might now believe that these stereotypes no longer reflect "the
experience of most of us." But stereotypes about aliens and African Americans are
still pervasive in our society. Those who are in positions of power often have very
little social and personal interaction with these two groups; therefore, they tend to
rely upon these myths and stories that the dominant narrative circulates. See Addis,
supra note 73, at 2262.
22' For example, in Croson, Justice O'Connor stated that the dearth of minority
contractors in Richmond, Virginia might be due to numerous factors that have little
to do with racial discrimination, one of which, she surmised, might be the different
career choices of whites and blacks. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 503 (1989) ("There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority
participation, including ... black and white career and entrepreneurial choices.
Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction....
The mere fact that black membership in th[is] trade ... is low, standing alone, cannot
establish a prima facie case of discrimination." (citation omitted)); see also Wygant v.
Jackson Bd- of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) ("There are numerous explanations
for a disparity between the percentage of minority students and the percentage of
minority faculty [in theJackson school district], many of them completely unrelated
to discrimination of any kind. In fact, there is no apparent connection between the
two groups.").
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while whites who bring claims of disadvantage to challenge any
affirmative steps taken by the government to remedy past and
current discrimination increasingly receive constitutional recogni-
tion and protection, even when the challengers cannot show that the
remedy causes them any cognizable injury."'0 Ironically, courts
create this distinction by invoking the same rhetorical devices-such
as "apartheid," "segregation," "racism"-that courts of an earlier era
used to undermine and dismantle the officially sanctioned subordi-
2" In Shaw v. Reno and Miller .Johnson, the Supreme Court held that individual
white voters could state a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause by
alleging that their congressional district was so "bizarre" or "extremely irregular on
its face," Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993), that it can only be understood
as an "effort to segregate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race
without sufficientjustification," id. at 2830, or by offering direct evidence "that race
was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's decision to place a significant
number of voters within or without a particular district." Miller v.Johnson, 115 S.
Ct. 2475, 2481 (1995). In Shaw, the white plaintiffs from North Carolina who
challenged the constitutionality of their district could not prove that the shape of the
district deprived them of their right to vote or diminished the political strength of
their racial group. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2822-23. Indeed, whites held a voting
majority in ten of the twelve congressional districts in North Carolina. See id. at 2838
(White, J., dissenting). Although African Americans constituted 20% of the voting
population, North Carolina had not sent an African American to Congress since
Reconstruction. See id. at 2943 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Given the clear history and current reality of racial bloc voting among whites, see
Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v.Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 23, 55-56, 69-71, it is "a fiction" to claim that North Carolina's districting plan,
which was drawn to give African Americans an opportunity to exercise their rights
under the Fifteenth Amendment, "might have violated [the white] appellants'
constitutional rights." Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White,J., dissenting). The very real
injury that African Americans have suffered and still suffer in white-majority districts
from the very real phenomenon of racial bloc voting among whites was apparently
insufficiently weighty to defcat the fictitious injury that appellants supposedly suffered
from the creation of minority districts.
It seems rather odd that people who live fairly comfortably in an intensely race-
conscious district and who would probably not vote for a black candidate would
suddenly demand a color-blind district when their newly drawn district acquires an
African American majority. In the current environment, the alternative to minority
districts amounts not to color-blindness, but rather to black-blindness. I also find it
somewhat puzzling that white plaintiffs, who probably live in all-white neighborhoods,
would consider an African American majority district segregated and, therefore, a
violation of their own constitutional rights. Furthermore, it is interesting to explore
the assumption behind the appellants' challenge, namely, that an African American
majority district will always elect an African American candidate. This may be a
plausible assumption, although the district did not remain in place long enough to
confirm that prediction. But apparently the white challengers did not worry about
the historical fact that majority white districts will almost always elect white
candidates. As one commentator put it: "A status quo that disenfranchises minorities
is now constitutionally preferable to race-conscious redistricting." David Kairys, Race
Trilo6g, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (1994).
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nation and devaluation of African Americans. Courts apparently see
a moral symmetry between exclusions informed by racism on the
one hand, and governmental actions designed to remedy the effects
of such exclusions on the other. When minorities challenge the
disadvantages caused by institutional racism, the current Supreme
Court preaches restraint and requires detailed empirical evi-
dence.2 3' But when members of the majority challenge the disad-
vantages allegedly caused by the remedial policies that favor
minorities, the Court engages in judicial activism and requires only
a small amount of empirical evidence, if any, apparently because
"our general experience" supplements the lack of empirical data.
Thus, the Court's role model jurisprudence is consistently inconsis-
tent and therefore, perfectly consistent with the Court's recent
jurisprudence in other areas, especially affirmative action.
One way to reduce this inconsistency in role model jurispru-
dence is to clearly define what we mean when we refer to the
concept of role model, so that it can be used as a method of analysis
rather than as a mere conclusory device. Therefore, I have argued
that the concept can only be used legitimately under three condi-
tions: in the context of role imitation, which is not controver-
sial;232 in a comprehensive sense in certain specific relationships,
such as the relationship between parents and children, school
teachers and their students, and among peers;233 and in aid of the
politics of recognition.
IV. ROLE MODELS AND THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION:
REPLIES TO OBJECTIONS IN THE GUISE OF CONCLUDING REMARKS
The rhetoric of "role model" has become a prominent part of
the discursive landscape in this country. From popular discourse to
academic musings to judicial decisions, we find the term quite
frequently. It has become a key term, functioning as a site on which
visions and experiences of social life are "negotiated and con-
tested."2 34 Commentators invoke the concept under various circum-
stances to challenge or defend various normative positions, quite
often without any attempt to explain how the concept relates to that
2 3 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277 ("Evidentiary support for the conclusion that
remedial action is warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is
challenged in court by nonminority employees." (emphasis added)).
232 See supra parts I.B.1 and II.A.
211 See supra parts I.B.2 and II.B.
21 Fraser & Gordon, supra note 1, at 310.
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particular normative proposition. Indeed, commentators often
invoke the term as if it carried an uncontested and clear meaning,
thereby dispensing with the need for an extended explanation. For
example, when Justice Scalia used the term in Vernonia to uphold
the constitutionality of a school's policy mandating random drug
testing for student-athletes, he thought it was "self-evident" that
athletes' drug use had a "'role model' effect." 23 5 He apparently
thought that the term carried its own meaning and, therefore, could
be used as a key jurisprudential device with no more than a few
words of explanation. To some extent, Scalia might be right. Like
any other key expression, such as "quota," "dependency," and
"welfare,"23 6 the term carries "unspoken assumptions and connota-
tions that can powerfully influence the discourse[] [it] permeate[s]-
in part by constituting a body of doxa, or taken-for-granted
commonsense belief that escapes critical scrutiny. "237
Throughout this Article, I have attempted to puzzle out, partly
through a genealogical inquiry, the various meanings that the
concept of role model carries in its taken-for-granted appearance
and to determine whether any of those meanings are empirically
informed, logically sound, or normatively defensible. I have argued
that, broadly speaking, commentators invoke the concept of role
model traditionally, and in my view legitimately, in two contexts:
specific role imitation and comprehensive role modeling. Outside
these two situations, however, the only legitimate and defensible
circumstance where the concept of role model can be used is in
relation to the politics of recognition. Nevertheless, commentators
regularly apply the concept to other circumstances where the use of
other concepts and images would be more appropriate. Indeed,
commentators often invoke the concept of role model not to shed
light upon "problems of power and authority and social reality in
general," 218 but to divert attention away from these real issues.
2 Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2395-96 (1995).
' Another popular term frequently invoked but rarely defined is "self-determina-
tion." When groups assert their right of self-determination, they announce an
irrefutable basic principle that needs no explanation and to which other principles
and interests must defer; however, this seemingly clear principle of governance is
rather opaque. When we ask ourselves what constitutes self-determination, who
decides which group can exercise its right to self-determination, and how small the
self-determining unit can be, we realize that the concept of self-determination does
not carry its own clear meaning after all.
2 Fraser & Gordon, supra note 1, at 310.
218 MILLS, supra note 20, at 612.
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In this Part, I will address some of the possible objections to the
concept of role model as a version of the politics of recognition.
These objections are likely to come both from those who generally
support diversity and those who oppose it, but I will primarily
address the objections from those who are generally sympathetic to
diversifying spheres of life but remain skeptical about using the
concept of role model in that struggle.
There are likely to be two main objections to my proposal. First,
some might argue that embracing the concept of role model as a
version of the politics of recognition will lead to the practice of
tokenism and the devaluation of the supposed role model's merit.
This is what I shall refer to as the "devaluation of the individual
agent" argument. Second, others might argue that adopting this
version of the concept of role model will lead to cultural assimila-
tion, transforming those who supposedly need role models into
some version of the majority. I shall refer to this as the "loss of
cultural integrity" argument.
2 3 9
As I argued earlier, the fear of tokenism is real. 40 If the value
of an employee or an educator is seen exclusively in terms of his or
her symbolic role, there is a distinct possibility that a desire for
"diversity" will lead to only token representation. After all, if
employers only hire a particular individual to symbolize the possi-
bilities of success for members of the group to which the supposed
role model is said to belong, then employers will consider one or
two such individuals sufficient to convey the possibility of success to
those who have eyes and the desire to see. For this reason, many
minority legal scholars are skeptical about using the concept of role
model as a justification for diversifying spheres of life.
241
Using the concept of role model in service to the politics of
recognition, however, need not lead to this result for two reasons.
First, if the concept of role model provides a counternarrative to the
historical and dominant narrative in this country, the narrative of
exclusion and devaluation, then the credibility of this counter-
narrative will be undermined to the extent that tokenism and the act
of limited inclusion define the process of diversity. Given the
history of exclusion in this country, inclusion through tokenism is
239 Delgado, supra note 15, at 1227 ("To be a good role model, you must be an
assimilationist, never a cultural or economic nationalist, separatist, radical reformer,
or anything remotely resembling any of these.").
240 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
241 See supra note 22.
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likely to convince neither the role model nor the members of the
group to which the role model belongs that the institutional practice
of devaluing their lives is now over. Indeed, tokenism might create
the perception that the concept of role model is simply part of the
same old story of exclusion. Such a perception would defeat the
whole purpose of role model rhetoric by impeding the purpose of
the politics of recognition instead of encouraging members of the
marginalized group to believe that they too can perform those roles
and fill those positions previously beyond their reach. The
credibility of the counternarrative, in the eyes of the intended role
model and the aspiring role occupants, will be enhanced once there
is a "critical mass" of members of the marginalized groups in any
particular enterprise."' The credibility of the counternarrative
will also depend on whether the story it tells appears to be normal
to members of the marginalized group, as well as to members of the
majority.24 As one report put it: "Until more children look into
the eyes of teachers and see themselves reflected-and until many
teachers look into the eyes of children and see themselves reflec-
ted-many of those children will feel excluded from the educational
enterprise." 244 A critical mass of minorities in any particular
enterprise will transform the exceptional into the normal.
2
12 See e.g., Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 498 F. Supp. 732, 747-48 (W.D.
Mich. 1980).
[A] well-respected authority on matters concerning school desegregation
and co-author of the court-ordered study of the Kalamazoo School District
... [gave] uncontradicted testimony.., that in a district like Kalamazoo...
unitary status cannot be achieved until a 'critical mass' of Black teachers and
administrators has been hired. In determining what number, or percentage,
of Black teachers will form a critical mass for Kalamazoo, [the expert sug-
gested that the] major consideration was to achieve a number which would
insure that Black students had enough role models.... [The expert stated
that in] a multi-racial student body, the need for role models is important
because they can encourage minority students to higher aspirations and at
the same time work to dispel myths and stereotypes about their race.
Id.
243 1 think Anita Allen was right when she observed that "[t]he concept of black
women teaching in white schools is suspect in part because the experience of having
black women as teachers is unfamiliar to many faculty and students." Allen, supra
note 22, at 26; see also Greene, supra note 23, at 83 ("After a few years of teaching
law, it occurred to me that the hostility and bitterness that I and other African-
American female law teachers experienced might be related to the scarcity of our
presence .... ").244 Weber, supra note 4, at 1111 n.76 (citing COMMITTEE ON POLICY FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE, VISIONS FOR A BETTER WAY: A BLACK APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLINC 34
(1989)).
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Sheldon Goldman, a political scientist and a student of judicial
appointments, made a similar point in a recent review of President
Clinton's appointments to the federal bench. After observing that
Clinton has changed the face of the federal judiciary by appointing
an unprecedented number of minorities and women,245 Goldman ex-
plains why increased diversity is important. "Women and racial
minorities (particularly African Americans) historically have faced
tremendous obstacles to becoming lawyers and federal judges ....
[Their appointment] in significant number suggests that the
selection process does not discriminate against these groups."246
The only credible way to reinforce the message of nonexclusion "is
to have a physical presence on the bench.... It's also important...
to have a bench . . . that looks more like America [because that
tends to] . . . destroy those very damaging stereotypes of women
and minorities." 247 Judge Johnson of the Fifth Circuit supports
Goldman's observation by explicitly invoking the notion of role
model: "Black and Hispanic judges serve as role models for other
minority group members, who may not have envisioned a legal or
judicial career as a real possibility in the past."
248
I think it is plausible to assume that the presence of a critical
mass of marginalized groups in a particular enterprise, say teaching,
would not only enhance the credibility of a counternarrative in the
eyes of aspiring role occupants, and thus enhance the possibility of
role emulation, but would also facilitate a substantive transforma-
tion of the enterprise. In the teaching field, for example, the
245 See Sheldon Goldman & Matthew D. Saronson, Clinton's NontraditionalJudges:
Creating a More Representative Bench, 78 JUDICATURE 68, 68 (1994) (noting that as of
July 1, 1994, "[m]ore than three-fifths of all appointees ... have been women and
minorities.".).
246 Id. In another article, Goldman shows that 2.1% of President Reagan's
appointments to the district court bench were African Americans, compared with
6.8% by President Bush and 13.9% by President Carter. See Sheldon Goldman, Bush's
Legacy: The Final Imprint, 76 JUDICATURE 282, 287 (1993). Indeed, of all the presi-
dents from Johnson to Bush, Reagan appointed the smallest percentage of African
Americans to the district court bench. See id. The percentage of African Americans
appointed to the circuit courts of appeals over the past few years is even lower: only
1.3% of Reagan's appeals court appointees were African Americans, compared to
5.4% by Bush and 16.1% by Carter. See id. at 293.
247 Marcia Coyle, Clinton'sJudicial Choices Change the Bench's Face, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
24, 1994, at A16 (quoting Sheldon Goldman (final alteration added)).
248 Latin Am. Citizens Council v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 659 n.14 (5th Cir. 1990);
see also Barhold v. Rodriguez, 863 F.2d 233, 238 (2d Cir. 1988) ("'Role models'...
are people whose very existence conveys a feeling of possibility to others; they give
hope that a previously restricted opportunity might now be available.").
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presence of a good number of minority teachers, rather than a few
tokens, will make those teachers feel more secure and thus more
likely to introduce a more inclusive pedagogy as well as a more
inclusive narrative. A credible narrative of recognition at the point
of entry (that is, hiring a critical mass) will likely enhance the
possibility of transforming the dominant narrative of misrecognition
(or nonrecognition) that currently defines the domain of the
enterprise. Put simply, addressing the issue of physical loneliness
will enable minorities and women to lessen and even remove the
issue of intellectual and historical loneliness.
249
Second, the concept of role model need not lead to tokenism
because it is not the only justification for increasing diversity.
People are selected to perform certain roles and occupy certain
positions for many reasons. The politics of recognition is only one
reason, albeit an important one. An individual's character,
"qualifications," and merit are also important factors. Using the
249 By historical and intellectual loneliness, I mean the loneliness one feels when
one sifts through an historical or intellectual description and does not see oneself-
one's history and one's concerns-reflected in the texts and narratives. Cf Fisher,
supra note 2. at 215 (discussing Alice Walker's thoughts on the subject). The
presence of a critical mass of formerly excluded groups will encourage members of
both the minority and the majority to reduce the social and intellectual loneliness that
members of the minority feel by broadening the intellectual and historical scope of
the dominant narrative. Alice Walker observes that engaging her ancestors and
embracing other African American writers like Zora Neale Hurston gives her the
feeling that she is "with a great many people.., all very happy to see me consulting
and acknowledging them, and eager to let me know, through the joy of their
presence, that, indeed, I am not alone." Id. (quoting WALKER, supra note 82, at 13).
But I must not be misunderstood. To apply the concept of role model to the
politics of recognition in a credible manner, there need not necessarily be any
similarity between the intellectual orientations and social commitments of the
supposed role model and the members of the marginal group who are supposed to
emulate that particular individual. Thus, a conservative African American law
professor who associates herself with law and economics jurisprudence can serve as
a role model for African American students who consider themselves socially
progressive and politically liberal. Why? Because the historical basis for the narrative
of devaluation, misrecognition, and exclusion in this country has been one's
membership in a particular racial group, not one's intellectual orientation or social
commitment. Thus, an African American law professor, regardless of her intellectual
orientation, can act as a role model for African American law students because she
represents a visible counter to the imprisoning narrative of devaluation and
misrecognition. What makes an African American professor a credible role model
for African American students is not her intellectual orientation, but rather the
common struggles and vulnerabilities that she and her students share as African
Americans living in the United States. More importantly, the professor might teach
her students how to cope with, and even overcome, the struggles and vulnerabilities
that she has encountered.
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concept of role model as a justification for diversity will only
increase the possibility of tokenism and the devaluation of the
"merits" of supposed role models if we assume that the concept of
role model is the only justification for inclusive policies. That is
surely not the case. Seen this way, the concept of role model as a
version of the politics of recognition does not undermine the
agency of the individual role model. It is simply one of the multiple
roles the individual agent plays and the multiple identities that
define him or her.
Those who oppose diversity also are likely to argue that the
concept of role model as a version of the politics of recognition
undermines individual agency. But the individual agency that these
critics want to protect is not the agency of the specific individual,
but. rather individual agency as an abstract principle. Their
argument goes something like this: by invoking the concept of role
model as a narrative of recognition and as a means of increasing
diversity, we must assume that people act as members of a group
rather than as individuals. Thus, the concept of role model
undermines one of the basic principles of American society, namely,
that when making choices individuals look for inspiration from
various sources unencumbered by the burdens of group member-
ship. The concept also threatens to institutionalize the very evil that
the politics of recognition is meant to overcome: group conscious-
ness based on race or gender.
This argument is the same general objection that opponents
raise against all inclusive (affirmative action) policies, 250 and it is
2" See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995) ("At the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens 'as individuals, not "as simply components of a racial,
religious, sexual or national class."'".(quoting Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona Governing Comm.
v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)))); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct.
2097, 2119 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("There can be no doubt that the
paternalism that appears to lie at the heart of this [affirmative action] program is at
war with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitu-
tion." (citing the Declaration of Independence)); Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816,2827
(1993) ("When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived
common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that
their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than
their constituency as a whole. This is altogether antithetical to our system of
representative democracy."); City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
'No State shall.., deny to any person... the equal protection of the laws.' As this
Court has noted in the past, the 'rights created by the first section of the Fourteenth
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as unconvincing as it is familiar. First, it is empirically suspect
because, in a country where the distribution of goods and services
is still strongly affected by race, where people's interactions are
conditioned by race more than any other characteristic, where the
minority has been defined as the social and intellectual negation of
the majority such that members of the majority are virtually
unavailable for emulation by members of the minority, and where
people's lives are devalued by virtue of their membership in a
particular group rather than on account of their individual failings
or misbehaviors, it seems implausible to me to argue that invoking
the concept of role model as a version of the politics of recognition
would be inconsistent with the supposedly basic governing principle
of free individual agency. It is an unfortunate fact of social and
political life in this country that the basic principle that currently
defines social relationships is not individual agency, but rather
group membership, at least with respect to African Americans. By
ignoring this fact, we continue to embrace a status quo that devalues
members of "minority" groups in the name of celebrating individual
agency. The politics of recognition is in fact about recovering
individual agency for members of subordinated and devalued
groups by recognizing the historical and current reality of race
relations in this country and acknowledging that the dominant
narrative is a narrative of devaluation and misrecognition and that
this narrative is group-oriented.
The argument that race-conscious inclusive policies violate an
important political principle of liberalism-the principle of individu-
al agency-exists in tension with the actual political practice and
political tradition in this country with respect to African Americans.
Members of the majority routinely invoke the principles of individu-
al agency and individual autonomy to resist affirmative steps to
include African Americans but consistently violate those very
principles in their daily encounters with and treatment of African
Americans. When an African American applies for a loan, applies
Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual... .'" (quoting Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948))); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281
n.8 (1986) ("The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distributed
like bloc grants within discrete racial groups .... ."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) ("If it is the individual who is entitled to judicial
protection against classifications based upon his racial or ethnic background because
such distinctions impinge upon personal rights, rather than the individual only
because of his membership in a particular group, then constitutional standards may
be applied consistently.").
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for a job, seeks to buy a house in a predominantly white neighbor-
hood, or encounters a law enforcement official, he or she is often
treated not as an individual citizen or as a consumer but as a "type"
or a signifier of a group.
As to the issue of assimilation and loss of cultural integrity," 1
those who are viewed as role models for purposes of the politics of
recognition supposedly perform well, or are capable of performing
well, in certain roles. It is also the case that most of these roles are
defined by the status quo, both in terms of their content and the
manner in which they are performed. So, when individuals from a
marginal group are held up as role models based on their perfor-
mance in certain roles conventionally defined by the status quo, role
modeling constitutes an assimilative process; however, it would be
a mistake to reject the concept on this ground. Despite this
supposedly assimilative dimension, it does not follow, as critics
allege, that the concept of role model necessarily undermines the
cultural integrity of the group to which the role model belongs.
Even though roles are generally initially defined by conventions,
quite often they are refined and redefined by those who occupy
them. The role model does not simply occupy a rigid and eternally
defined role; he or she develops that role and how it should be per-
formed. That being the case, role models from marginal groups
have the potential and the power to transform the roles they
occupy, including the very conception of those roles, especially if
the members of the group represent a critical mass in the particular
enterprise. They are not simply passive and mechanical role
occupants, but rather individuals who can actively redefine their
positions using the very cultural resources and horizons of signifi-
cance that have been excluded from the process of role-constitution.
251 Some might argue that the issue here is not assimilation, but rather the
limitation of possibilities. The argument might go this way: The concept of role
model is restrictive. It restricts people's creative and imaginative potential in so far
as it represents the exhaustion of the good and proper life as defined by the role
model's life. The idea that role models constrain the otherwise imaginative and
creative potential of individuals is, however, unconvincing. People do not simply
imagine and create out of the blue. Creativity and imagination arise partly out of
their experiences, out of their encounters with others, and the cultural landscape.
Sometimes they directly appropriate other people's experiences, which we might refer
to as direct modeling. Other times, they follow the experiences of others by analogy
or use them as stepping stones to define a seemingly new role or a new field. The
point is that people necessarily learn and draw from other people in their communi-
ties to gather creativity and imagination.
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In addition, the suspicion of destructive assimilation is, in my
view, premised on a false dichotomy between the principled resistor,
who puts himself or herself outside the conventional structure, and
the role model insider, whose very status as a role model supposedly
robs him or her of the capacity both to understand and represent
the cultural and social needs of his or her fellow social outsiders.
This distinction does not reflect reality. The role model insider
might, in fact, wage a transformative battle by reinscribing and
redefining the role that he or she supposedly occupies and
represents to others, while the principled outside resistor might
simply continue to wage a defensive battle of survival against the
narrative of nonrecognition, one that ironically transforms his or
her desire for recognition as an agent into the pathological behavior
of self-devaluation and self-destruction. Furthermore, the concept
of role model as a version of the politics of recognition is not about
assimilation in the sense of the group losing its agency, culturally or
otherwise, but rather it is about providing marginal groups with the
vocabulary, the voice, and the imagination to provide an effective
counternarrative to the dominant narrative of exclusion and
devaluation.
CONCLUSION
Two purposes have animated and organized this Article. First,
my aim was to develop and defend one version of the rhetoric of
role model-what I have referred to as role model as a version of the
politics of recognition-that I believe has not been systematically
developed and defended. But this is part of a larger, and second,
purpose, namely, to sort out the various meanings that the rhetoric
of role model has been required to carry in popular and academic
discourse as well as in judicial decisions and to suggest which
meanings are empirically informed, logically sound, and normatively
defensible. That the concept of role model is widely invoked in
various circumstances is not in dispute. Athletes are often desig-
nated by the media and the courts as role models, the under-
representation of some minority groups in positions of political and
social influence is at times explained in terms of the lack of role
models for members of those groups, teachers are regarded by the
courts as well as in popular discourse as role models for their
students, even companies are regarded as role models for other
companies, and television characters are viewed as role models for
their viewing audience. The popularity of the concept has been
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inversely related to its clarity. There has not been any systematic
and sustained inquiry into the concept of role model. Indeed, quite
often the rhetoric of role model is invoked, in both popular and
legal discourse, as if it carried its own meaning and needed no
explanation. This Article has attempted to start a dialogue to
correct this oversight. It concludes that there are three senses in
which the concept of role model could legitimately be invoked-what
I have referred to as the role imitation view, the comprehensive
view, and the role model as a version of the politics of recogni-
tion-and that invoking the term outside these specific circum-
stances is likely to be logically unsound and normatively suspect.
